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Abstract
The Effect of Financial and Social Incentives on Water Conservation
by
Corey J. Lott
Water utility managers employ a variety price and non-price policies to induce conser-
vation as a way to defer expensive capacity expansion and to overcome scarcity during
periods of drought. Economists tend to focus on financial motivations for consumers,
but there is a growing literature in economics and other related fields that explores the
potential for other sources of motivation to be harnessed to achieve policy outcomes.
Knowing the relative effectiveness and the trade-offs associated with such approaches
can help planners to make more efficient policy.
This dissertation investigates the effect of financial and social incentives on water
conservation by studying multiple policy approaches used by a water utility in the Reno
metropolitan area to promote conservation in the context of a historic drought in the
southwestern U.S. In the first chapter, I investigate how providing better price informa-
tion on monthly utility bills can promote consumer response to financial incentives for
water conservation. I provide empirical evidence of consumer inattentiveness to prices,
and discuss how this behavior can undermine price schedules that are designed in part
to promote conservation. In the second chapter, I focus once again on consumer inatten-
tiveness to prices and consumption behavior, but I analyze a treatment that lowers price
salience rather than increases it. I examine enrollment in automatic bill payment and
paperless billing programs, which can encourage consumers to become inattentive to re-
curring charges and thus less aware when changing consumption habits lead to increased
water bills. These programs have the unintended consequence of encouraging consumers
viii
to be less attentive to prices, which further undercuts the response to conservation incen-
tives built into price schedules. In the final chapter, I turn from financial incentives for
water conservation to how social incentives can be used to promote conservation using a
field experiment to test the impact of providing normative comparisons on conservation
during a drought.
Consumers often face complex pricing schemes when making purchasing decisions.
Inefficiencies arise when such schemes are not fully understood. Electric and water utili-
ties use increasing block tariffs (IBTs) to promote conservation. However, recent evidence
suggests that consumers may not respond to the marginal price under these price systems.
The first chapter of this dissertation investigates price salience as a possible mechanism
by leveraging quasi-exogenous variation in the level of price-related information provided
to households on their monthly water bills. I exploit a merger between the two water util-
ities in Reno that occurred in 2015. Before the merger, one group of households received
information on monthly bills about the IBT price schedule, while the other did not; af-
ter the merger, both groups received price information. Using a difference-in-differences
approach, I find that providing consumers with bills containing better price information
leads to a more than 3% decrease in average water consumption, suggesting that salience
is important. I develop a model of consumer decision-making under price uncertainty
that predicts consumers will have a differential response to information based on where
their consumption is relative to the block tariff threshold. When estimating the effect
of information by historical consumption level, I find empirical evidence consistent with
these predictions.
The second chapter investigates how automatic and paperless billing enrollment affect
residential water demand using a difference-in-differences approach. I find that enrolling
in automatic bill payment (ABP) leads to a 2-3% increase in average water consumption
while paperless (PL) enrollment leads to a 1% increase in water consumption. I also
ix
shed light on the relationship between income effects and changes in consumption after
enrollment by estimating heterogeneous treatment effects by quintiles of the distribution
of property values. I find that average treatment effects do not significantly vary across
the income distribution, which indicates that the increase in consumption from ABP
enrollment is due to consumer inattentiveness rather than changes in income. I also
consider how enrollment in ABP and PL can affect subsequent participation in voluntary
conservation programs. ABP customers consume an additional 6% more than non-ABP
customers during when voluntary drought restriction are implemented. Overall, there
is evidence that enrollment in these programs promotes consumer inattentiveness to
prices as well as utility communications, which undermines financial and social incentives
designed to promote conservation.
The final chapter investigates how normative appeals for water conservation drive
behavioral change using a large-scale, randomized field experiment. Using a new social
comparison that reduces the correlation between pre-treatment consumption and the dif-
ference from the peer group, we isolate the impact of the normative component of the
message. The strength of the message, defined as a household’s performance relative to
a peer group, is a primary driver of social comparisons’ efficacy, consistent with social
comparisons imposing a moral cost on excess consumption. Relative to a nudge that high-
lights financial savings, social comparisons generate less persistent water savings and are
more dependent on sending multiple mailers. While moral motivations are likely driving
behavioral change in response to normative appeals, there are opportunities to improve
welfare by designing messages that prompt consumers to address mis-optimization of
water consumption. This chapter is joint work with Daniel Brent, Joe Cook, Kimberly
Rollins, Shawn Stoddard, and Michael Taylor.
x
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Chapter 1
The Effect of Price Information on
Consumer Behavior Under
Nonlinear Tariffs: Evidence from a
Water Utility Merger
1.1 Introduction
Consumers often face complex pricing schemes when making purchasing decisions,
which can lead to inefficiencies if consumers mis-optimize when such schemes are not
fully understood. One reason why consumers might have difficulty optimizing in this
context is that prices are likely to be less salient under complex price structures, since
consumers must navigate an entire price structure, requiring them to be knowledgeable
about more than one marginal price. In addition, prices may not be transparent in many
settings, which can exacerbate this problem (DellaVigna, 2009; Finkelstein, 2009; Sexton,
2015). In settings where market failures are involved, consumer inattentiveness may have
social consequences.
Electric and water utilities throughout the United States and in many parts of the
world use increasing block tariffs (IBTs) in part to promote conservation. While economic
theory predicts that consumers should respond to marginal price under these price sys-
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tems, recent empirical evidence suggests that consumers do not respond to marginal price
when facing IBTs for electricity (Ito, 2014) or water consumption (Ito, 2013; Wichman,
2014). One implication of this behavior is that complex prices can be welfare reducing
(Ito, 2014). Moreover, there may be implications for climate change and management of
scarce water resources when policymakers have a limited ability to use price schedules to
induce conservation.1
This chapter explores whether better information on a complex price schedule can
induce residential water conservation. Using a combination of theory and empirics, I
demonstrate that the answer depends jointly on the shape of the price schedule and the
distribution of residential water consumption. Price information treatments that fail to
consider these aspects may actually lead to increased residential water use.
I develop a model of consumer decision in the presence of price uncertainty under
IBTs, which predicts that consumers will have a differential response to price informa-
tion based on the location of their pre-treatment consumption relative to the block tariff
thresholds. Providing price information on monthly bills decreases information costs and
lowers price uncertainty for consumers, who will re-optimize consumption. The direction
of the treatment effect depends on the interaction of the ex-ante distribution of consump-
tion and the price schedule. Price information leads to an overall reduction in water
consumption if there are more households above than below the thresholds. If not, price
information may actually lead to increased water consumption. This model contrasts
previous models of consumer inattentiveness, which assume consumers systematically
misperceive price signals (DellaVigna, 2009; Chetty, Loney and Kroft, 2009; Wichman,
2016). These models conclude that a reduction (increase) in consumption after a price
1Electric and water utilities in the U.S. are regulated natural monopolies, and as such are mandated
to set prices at cost recovery levels. Many utilities have turned to IBTs to meet simultaneous objectives
of cost recovery and setting prices that are equitable and which encourage conservation. However, it is
difficult to meet the cost recovery mandate while setting marginal prices at sufficiently high levels that
reflect social costs or scarcity values.
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information treatment indicates that consumers under-perceived (over-perceived) prices
before the treatment.
I empirically test this model by leveraging quasi-exogenous variation in the level of
price-related information provided to households on their monthly water bills. Specifi-
cally, I exploit a merger between two water utilities that use IBTs in the same metropoli-
tan area. Before the merger, one group of households received a complete breakdown of
how water use charges are determined from the price schedule, while the other did not
receive any price information on monthly bills. After the merger both groups receive the
same bills with better price information. The merger transitions one group of households
to price information on monthly bills while holding rates fixed at pre-merger levels for
both groups. Using a difference-in-differences approach, I find that providing consumers
with price information on monthly water bills leads to an overall 3% or greater decrease
in average water consumption, suggesting that price salience is important. Moreover,
I validate the theoretical predictions from this model by finding differential treatment
effects for consumers with historical water consumption levels below and above the price
thresholds. Households above the threshold decrease water use, while those below in-
crease water use. This suggests that while price information can be used to promote
conservation, policy design should be careful in considering how the price schedule inter-
acts with the ex-ante distribution of water consumption. To the best of my knowledge,
this is the first quasi-experimental evidence that providing consumers with simple price
information on monthly bills significantly impacts demand under IBTs.
In addition to price salience, there are other explanations for why consumers do not
respond to marginal price under IBTs (Borenstein, 2009). Quantity salience is arguably
a major impediment for consumers to make optimal decisions in this context, since con-
sumers must have perfect knowledge of consumption choices throughout the billing period
in order to successfully achieve consumption targets. Several studies find evidence that
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higher frequency feedback about consumption leads to decreases (Jessoe and Rapson,
2014; Strong and Goemans, 2014) or even increases in demand (Strong and Goemans,
2015; Wichman, 2016). Another issue concerns the cognitive burden that complicated
price structures place on consumers. I do not focus on these important issues, but in-
stead I provide evidence that price salience is also important in this context. Moreover
the natural experiment analyzed in this chapter provides variation over price information
but not quantity information, making it uniquely suited for analysis of the relationship
between consumer behavior under IBTs and price salience.2
There is less evidence that price information can significantly affect consumption
decisions under IBTs. Kahn and Wolak (2013) find evidence that educating electricity
consumers about IBTs leads to an overall reduction in electricity demand through a field
experiment with two California utilities, however the treatment effect confounds three
sources of information that could impact consumer behavior under IBTs: in addition
to providing price information, the treatment also lowers the cognitive burden for the
consumer and provides information about the cost of operating specific appliances in
the home.3 By contrast, the simple, low-cost intervention of providing price information
on monthly bills that I study, does not require voluntary participation in an education
program, or adoption of a costly in-home display as in the case of quantity salience-based
interventions.
Another related paper finds evidence that consumers increase water consumption in
response to more frequent billing (Wichman, 2016). The author argues that a change
from bimonthly to monthly billing provides information to households that allows them to
2It is unlikely that quantity salience and cognitive difficulties would differentially impact the house-
holds in this study area, since they receive similar consumption history information once per month and
there are no bill calculator tools available through either utility in the study area.
3The treatment group in this field experiment undergoes a 30 minute education program that provides
households with information about how their electricity bill is calculated, the marginal price paid based
on recent electricity consumption, and how this information can be combined to estimate the cost of
various end-uses of electricity in the home.
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update their perception of the IBT price schedule. My natural experiment, by contrast,
provides actual variation in price information provided on monthly bills, making it more
suited to provide evidence of how consumers respond to price information when facing
IBTs for water consumption.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. First, I develop a model of
consumer decision making under price uncertainty to motivate how we would expect
consumers to respond to price information under IBTs. Following that I provide back-
ground about the empirical setting. I then develop an empirical test based on these model
implications to investigate whether consumer response to price information is consistent
with predictions from the model developed in this chapter. I also investigate whether
consumer response is consistent with an alternative model of consumer behavior. After
that I outline the main empirical strategy, and discuss these results. Finally, I discuss
how the insights from the model developed in this chapter can be used to predict overall
consumer response to price information and provide concluding remarks.
1.2 Decision Making Under Price Uncertainty
In this section, I develop a model of consumer decision-making under price uncer-
tainty to model behavior in the case where consumers face IBTs but do receive price
information on monthly bills. DellaVigna (2009) and Chetty, Loney and Kroft (2009)
develop models in which consumers systematically misperceive prices in situations where
prices are simple but not transparent. However, in settings where prices are complex,
consumers may respond to expected marginal price if they do not have complete infor-
mation about the price schedule. This is not an information asymmetry problem in that
utilities intentionally keep price information private. When it comes to electricity and
water consumption, consumers have the ability to become fully informed about prices,
5
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because price information is publicly available but not necessarily easy to find. Therefore,
the time cost of acquiring price information will make it optimal for some consumers to
remain uninformed.
Utilities can lower information costs for consumers by providing easy to understand
information about the price structure on monthly bills. Doing so will cause some con-
sumers to re-optimize, making consumption choices that are more consistent with their
optimum under full information. I contrast how consumption choices compare under
full price information and price uncertainty to illustrate how price information impacts
consumption choices and how these impacts may vary with pre-treatment consumption
levels.
Assume that consumers have preferences for water consumption, q, and a numeraire
good, z. Consumers maximize utility subject to a budget constraint, which is a function
of water charges, B(q), and income, I. Assume consumers fully exhaust income, then
the budget constraint can be rewritten as z = I − B(q), where the price of numeraire
consumption is normalized to unity.
For simplicity, consider a two tier IBT, illustrated in Figure 1.1, with marginal prices
p1 and p2 and tier threshold k. Water charges are a piecewise function of quantity
consumed, which depends on all three of these features of the price schedule.
B(q; k, p1, p2) =
 p1 q, if q ≤ kp1 k + p2 (q − k), if q > k
6
The Effect of Price Information on Consumer Behavior Under Nonlinear Tariffs Chapter 1
Figure 1.1: Two tier increasing block tariff
1.2.1 Full Price Information
Under full information the consumer’s utility maximization problem is as follows:
max
q
U(q, I −B(q; k, p1, p2)) (1.1)
Assume that the solution occurs at an interior optimum. The piecewise water charges
introduce a kink into the budget constraint so that the optimum either occurs at a
tangency point along one of the segments of the piecewise budget constraint or at the
kink point. Denote the informed consumer’s optimal consumption choice by q∗I . The first
order conditions are as follows:
q∗I =

q∗(p1), if
U1(q∗, I−p1 q∗)
U2(q∗, I−p1 q∗) = p1
k, if U1(q
∗, I−p1 q∗)
U2(q∗, I−p1 q∗) < k <
U1(q∗, I−p1 k−p2 (q∗−k))
U2(q∗, I−p1 k−p2 (q∗−k))
q∗(p2), if
U1(q∗, I−p1 k−p2 (q∗−k))
U2(q∗, I−p1 k−p2 (q∗−k)) = p2
(1.2)
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1.2.2 Price Uncertainty around Tier Threshold
Consumers might face uncertainty about several aspects of the price schedule. For
simplicity, assume that uninformed consumers know the price levels, p1 and p2, but are
uncertain about k, the point at which water consumption becomes more costly.4 Con-
sumers likely have knowledge of the fact that they face an IBT rate schedule. Moreover,
consumers have a rough idea of the price level from the average price, which can be
obtained from the the total water use charges and the quantity consumed on the bill.
Therefore it is the tier thresholds, about which consumers have the least information.
Next, assume the consumer knows their current consumption throughout the billing cycle
so that the only source of uncertainty in the consumer’s decision problem is k.5
To model this decision, suppose that consumer i has beliefs about the location of
the tier threshold, where 0 < k˜i < ∞ is a random variable representing these beliefs.
Assume that E[k˜i] = k and V ar(k˜i) = σ2i , since some consumers may be more informed
about pricing than others and thus would have less uncertainty about the price schedule.
I assume that price information decreases uncertainty for consumers, however I focus
my analysis on the extreme case where price information on monthly bills resolves all
uncertainty (i.e. V ar(k˜i) = 0). Let k˜i have a distribution, F (k˜i), that is defined on
support (0,∞). The uninformed consumer maximizes expected utility, choosing optimal
consumption q∗U :
max
q
E[U(q, I −B(q; k˜, p1, p2))] = max
q
[∫ ∞
0
U(q, I −B(q; k˜, p1, p2))dF (k˜)
]
(1.3)
4Alternatively, we can model uncertainty over p1, p2, or p2 − p1. These models lead to different
predictions about consumer heterogeneity. To model uncertainty about p1, p2, and k requires a joint
distribution defined over the support 0 < p1 < p2 <∞, 0 < k.
5Strong and Goemans (2014) develop a model of consumer decision making under quantity uncertainty
and consider the implications of IBTs in this context. They find that consumers below the tier threshold
will under-consume relative to full information and consumers above the tier threshold will either over-
consume relative to full information or the effect will be ambiguous depending on risk preferences. These
results will only exacerbate my findings.
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where
B(q; k˜, p1, p2) =
 p1q, if q ≤ k˜p1k˜ + p2(q − k˜), if q > k˜
Explicitly incorporating the piecewise water charges leads to the following:
max
q
E[U(q, I −B(q; k˜, p1, p2))] = (1.4)
max
q
[
P (k˜ ≥ q)E[U(q, I − p1q)| k˜ ≥ q] + P (k˜ < q)E[U(q, I − p1k˜ − p2(q − k˜))| k˜ < q]
]
=
max
q
[
U(q, I − p1q) + F (q)
[∫ q
0
U(q, I − p1k˜ − p2(q − k˜))dF (k˜)− U(q, I − p1q)
]]
The optimum is no longer a piecewise function, since the budget constraint is now
a smooth and concave function.6 To gain intuition into why this is the case, Figure 1.2
presents results from simulations for a Quasilinear utility function. Figure 1.2 (a) shows
the actual piecewise budget constraint, B(q; k, p1, p2), and expected budget constraints,
E[B(q; k˜i, p1, p2)], for various levels of uncertainty. In the case of quasilinear preferences,
expected utility maximization is equivalent to utility maximization with respect to the
expected budget constraint.7 For higher levels of uncertainty, the budget constraint
becomes less curved and as a result there is a larger distortion between the expected
budget constraint and the kinked budget constraint near the tier threshold.
Figure 1.2 (b) compares consumption choices under price uncertainty to full informa-
tion consumption choices across the distribution of preferences. This figure illustrates
the three main takeaways from this model: 1) uninformed consumers under-consume
just below the tier threshold relative to fully informed consumers, 2) uninformed con-
sumers over-consume just above the tier threshold relative to fully informed consumers,
and 3) the distortion between informed and uninformed consumption choices dissipates
as distance from the tier threshold increases. Moreover, Figure 1.2 (b) shows that the
6See the Appendix A for First Order Conditions.
7Although I present results for quasilinear utility, these results generalize for additively separable
utility functions.
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Figure 1.2: Comparison of Expected Water Charges and Consumption Choices
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Note: These simulations assume k = 10, 000 gallons, p1 = $2/1, 000 gallons, p2 = $4/1, 000 gallons, quasi-linear
preferences: Ui(q, I − B(q; k˜i, p1, p2)) = αi log(q) + I − B(q; k˜i, p1, p2), and truncated Normal beliefs: F (k˜i) =
Φ
(
k˜−k
σi
)
−Φ
(−k
σi
)
1−Φ
(−k
σi
) . Figure 1.2 (a) simulates the actual budget constraint and expected budget constraints corresponding
to different levels of uncertainty. Figure 1.2 (b) simulates optimal choices for informed consumers and uninformed
consumers over a range of αi’s. The Appendix presents additional simulation results.
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difference between informed and uninformed consumption grows linearly as distance from
the tier threshold decreases.
Now consider the effect of price information on consumption, which would lead an
uninformed consumer to re-optimize consumption. This model suggests that consumers
who were consuming just below the tier threshold will increase consumption in response,
consumers who were consuming just above the tier threshold will decrease consumption,
and consumers far from the tier threshold will have little or no change in consumption.
Moreover, we might expect the effect of price information to increase linearly as distance
from the tier threshold decreases. I use these predictions to develop an empirical strategy
with testable hypotheses in section 1.4. I then develop a similar empirical strategy to
test whether consumer response is consistent with an alternative model of consumer
behavior, where consumers respond to average price rather than expected marginal price
in the absence of price information (Ito, 2014; Kahn and Wolak, 2013). Following that,
I consider how the direction of the overall treatment effect will depend on how the IBTs
interact with the ex-ante distribution of consumption.
1.3 Background
This research takes advantage of a merger between the two major water utilities in
the Reno metropolitan area in Northern Nevada. Prior to the merger these utilities pro-
vided different levels of price information to households on their monthly utility bills.
The merger incorporates households from the “low information” utility into the service
territory of the “high information” utility. As part of this process, low information house-
holds transitioned to the same monthly bills that high information households received
throughout the study period, which included a full breakdown of water use charges and
11
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associated components of the price structure.8 Importantly, the impetus for this merger
is unrelated to differences in households served by either utility.9 In 2014, the utilities
announced that they would consolidate in order to take advantage of “integration op-
portunities that enhance economies of scale and/or other efficiencies” (Staff, 2009). In
January 2015, the merger was completed and the high information utility began providing
water service to both groups of households.
There are several aspects of this natural experiment that make it ideal for analyzing
whether providing price information about IBTs affects consumer behavior. The utility
merger lends itself to a difference-in-differences approach, where the treatment group are
low information households that transition from not having the price schedule reported
on monthly utility bills before the merger to having their water use charges broken down
by tier consumption along with the associated marginal prices. The control group are
high information households who get the full breakdown of water use charges throughout
the study period. Moreover, as a stipulation of the merger, all rates are held fixed at pre-
merger levels for a period of at least two years after the consolidation. This allows for an
examination of whether low information households re-optimize water consumption with
respect to the same rate schedule after receiving a price information treatment, relative
to high information households, who experience no change in price information or rate
schedule.
8In January 2014, the merger was announced. In December 2014, all of the low information households
received a special mailer explaining the change in their service provider. Finally, in January 2015, low
information households started receiving the same water bills as the high information households.
9Before 2015, municipal water service in the Reno metropolitan area was provided by Truckee Mead-
ows Water Authority (TMWA), the high information utility, and Washoe County Department of Water
Resources (DWR), the low information utility. TMWA is a not-for-profit, community-owned water util-
ity that is overseen by elected officials and citizen appointees. DWR is a division of the Washoe County
local government. TMWA provided water service for the majority of residents in the metropolitan area
prior to 2015 while DWR was responsible for areas outside of TMWA’s service area, including several
outlying regions that experienced high levels of growth.
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1.3.1 Billing Information
The primary difference in monthly bills before the merger relates to how water use
charges are presented. Figures 1.3 and 1.4 show components of the water bills for the
low information and high information utilities. The low information utility provides total
water use and total water use charges to households without any mention of the IBTs used
to determine these charges. The high information utility provides a complete breakdown
of water use charges including water consumption, marginal prices, tier thresholds limits,
and total water use charges for each tier. Both utilities provide information about their
rates on the Internet, however this information is only provided on monthly bills for high
information households, substantially lowering the cost of acquiring this information.
There are other dimensions on which consumers can receive information that could
affect water use decisions. Empirical evidence finds that providing households with high
frequency feedback about consumption significantly impacts demand (Jessoe and Rapson,
2014; Wichman, 2016; Strong and Goemans, 2015). However, the treatment and con-
trol group in this study receive similar quality information along these other dimensions.
Both groups of households receive comparable information about their consumption his-
tory on monthly bills; other bill components such as total monthly charges, fixed fees,
and surcharges are summarized in a similar fashion. Moreover, meters are read and water
consumption is billed on a monthly basis for both utilities, who report total water con-
sumption at the monthly level, making household groups exposed to the same frequency
of consumption information. Finally, both utilities provide price schedule information
through a link from their websites.
13
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Figure 1.3: Low Information Utility Monthly Bill
Note: The low information utility provided customers with the total consumption over the course of
the month (usage), the total water charges (water service) which include the fixed monthly fee and
consumption charges, other fixed monthly charges, and a one year water use history graphic.
14
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Figure 1.4: High Information Utility Monthly Bill
Note: The high information utility provided customers with the total consumption over the course of
the month (billed usage), the total water charges (total current charges) broken down into the fixed
monthly fee (residential customer charge) and consumption charges broken down by tier including
tier consumption and the marginal price, other fixed monthly charges, and a one year water use
history graphic.
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Table 1.1: Property Characteristics and Demographics
Low Info High Info Difference
Consumption/Day (1,000 gallons) 0.50 0.40 0.11∗∗
Consumption/Day Summer (1,000 gallons) 0.79 0.60 0.19∗∗
Consumption/Day Winter (1,000 gallons) 0.28 0.24 0.04∗
Marginal Price ($/1,000 gallons) 2.87 2.35 0.52∗∗
Year Built 1997.2 1983.3 13.8∗∗∗
Appraised Value ($1,000) 296.54 270.12 26.43
Yard Size (acres) 0.46 0.57 -0.11
Bedrooms 3.38 3.32 0.06
% Male 49.91 49.82 0.09
Median Age 40.80 38.25 2.55
% White 86.04 78.71 7.33∗∗∗
% Black 1.28 2.23 -0.95∗∗∗
% Hispanic 10.64 19.35 -8.71∗∗∗
Avg. HH Size 2.68 2.61 0.07
% Owner Occupied 81.33 64.97 16.36∗∗∗
Income/Capita 40,400 32,698 7,702∗
Median Home Value 392,334 309,819 82,515∗
% College Degree 44.64 37.42 7.22
Note: The ACS data are taken from the 2006-2010 ACS 5 year estimates. ACS data has associated
sampling error (reported as margins of error), which has not been accounted for in these balance
tables. The reported significant differences therefore are likely overstated. Robust standard errors
are clustered at the meter reading route level for water use and property characteristics, and at the
census tract level for demographic information. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
1.3.2 Data
The primary data used for this analysis are single family residential billing records
from TMWA and DWR that span the period from January 2010 to August 2016, which
include monthly water consumption, the billing dates corresponding to each record, rate
information, meter reading routes, and the spatial location of each water service. The
unit of analysis is the household, which is defined to be an unique water service-customer
combination. Only customers that remained at the same water service from at least
two years before treatment until the end of the study period were included in the final
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dataset. These sample requirements help limit sorting between utilities and remove some
renters from the sample, who may not pay water bills directly and tend to move more
frequently. The data were spatially matched with geocoded data containing structural
characteristics for each home from the Washoe county assessor and demographic infor-
mation the American Community Survey (ACS) corresponding to 2010 Census tracts. I
used NOAA weather station daily data to create monthly weather averages of temper-
ature and precipitation that correspond to the billing dates for each water service-bill
combination.
The final sample consists of an unbalanced panel of 60,833 households, 46,472 from
the high information utility and 14,361 from the low information utility, for a total of
4,460,397 observations. Table 1.1 presents summary statistics for the final sample. Al-
though there are significant differences in demographics, property characteristics, and
water consumption between low information and high information households, my em-
pirical strategy does not rely on balance between these two groups.
1.4 Heterogeneous Response to Information
In this section, I build an empirical strategy that can be used to test whether con-
sumer response to price information on monthly utility bills is consistent with the three
main takeaways from the model. This approach relies on the assumption that household
preferences remain constant over the study period. Under this assumption, providing
consumers with price information can identify consumer re-optimization by comparing
household consumption before and after the price information treatment. My empirical
approach uses the location of pre-treatment consumption relative to the tier thresholds to
identify heterogeneity in consumption response. Since low and high information house-
holds face different IBT rate schedules (i.e. the tier thresholds are located at different
17
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Figure 1.5: Ex-ante distribution of consumption vs. IBT: Low Information
Utility
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Note: This figure compares the histogram of summer (May-September) 2014 consumption (the last
year before the merger) for the Low Information utility to the price schedule. This indicates the
relative number of households below the nearest tier to those above the nearest tier.
consumption levels and marginal prices are also different.), I focus this analysis on the
low information households only.10
The first step of this approach is to separate all pre-treatment observations based on
location with respect to the nearest tier threshold. Figure 1.5 shows the interaction of
summer 2014 water consumption and the IBT schedule for low information households.
The blue consumption levels are observations that are below the nearest tier threshold
in 2014, and the red consumption levels are observations that are above the nearest tier
threshold in 2014. Households below the nearest tier threshold will experience a differ-
10Low and high information households that make comparable pre-treatment consumption decisions
will be located on different segments of their respective rate schedules. It is unlikely that households
with similar consumption or similar bill amounts have the same preferences.
18
The Effect of Price Information on Consumer Behavior Under Nonlinear Tariffs Chapter 1
ential treatment effect compared to households above the nearest tier threshold. Next,
I explicitly control for distance from tier threshold, since households with consumption
that is far away from any tier threshold should have a smaller response than house-
holds with consumption that is near a tier threshold.11 This approach is similar to the
difference-in-discontinuities design developed by Grembi, Nannicini and Troiano (2012).12
Finally, for simplicity, I use a linear distance specification to match the function of re-
sponse decay portrayed in Figure 1.2 (b). The actual function of decay, however, may be
non-linear and the functional form could vary below and above the tier thresholds. The
difference-in-discontinuities model is as follows:
ln(Yit) = β1 bis 1Post+β2 ait1Post+β3 dis bis 1Post+β4 dis ais 1Post+αi+λt+Witγ+εit (1.5)
where Yit is monthly water consumption divided by the days on the water bill for house-
hold i in billing period t, bis is an indicator for household i equal to one if pre-treatment
consumption in month s is below the nearest tier threshold and zero otherwise, ais is
an indicator for household i equal to one if pre-treatment consumption in month s is
above the nearest tier threshold and zero otherwise, dis is distance from the nearest tier
threshold of pre-treatment consumption for household i, in month s, 1Post is an indicator
for billing periods after the merger, αi are household fixed effects, λt are a full set of
month-by-year fixed effects, and Wit are a vector of weather controls including average
temperature and precipitation in inches, and εit is the idiosyncratic error term. In or-
der to account for possible correlation in the errors within neighborhoods, I cluster the
11I also estimate a discrete analogue of this model that uses consumers with pre-treatment consumption
that is beyond some bandwidth distance from any tier threshold as a controls for consumers in one of
two treatment groups: 1) pre-treatment consumption is just below a tier threshold or 2) pre-treatment
consumption is just above a tier threshold. See Appendix A for these results and more details.
12The equivalent identification assumption to those described in Grembi, Nannicini and Troiano (2012)
is that household preferences are constant across the merger.
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standard errors at the meter reading route level.13
If information leads consumer just below the tier threshold to increase consump-
tion and households just above the tier threshold to decrease consumption, then β1 >
0 and β2 < 0. Secondary predictions from the model are that β3 < 0 and β4 > 0,
since the effect of information on consumption should decrease as distance from the tier
threshold increases.
1.4.1 Results
I use three different approaches to determine treatment status, which is based on
some measure of consumption before the merger. I allow treatment status to vary for
each household by calendar month, since consumption exhibits highly seasonal patterns.
This implies that the same household could be below the nearest tier threshold during a
given month, and above that tier threshold the next month. First I use mean consumption
within household-billing month across all pre-treatment years (2010-2014) where:
bis =
 1, if
1
5
∑2014
y=2010 Yisy < knearest
0, otherwise
ais =
 1, if
1
5
∑2014
y=2010 Yisy > knearest
0, otherwise
for knearest representing the location in thousands of gallons of the nearest tier threshold.
My second specification uses this approach, but limits the pre-merger period to 2013 and
2014 only. Finally, I use consumption in 2014, the year before the merger, to determine
treatment status. The advantage of using the year before treatment is that it more closely
represents household preferences for consumption at the time of the merger. However,
13See Section 1.5 for more details on this clustering approach.
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Table 1.2: Low Information Heterogeneous Response to Information Dif-
ference-in-differences Results
(1) (2) (3)
2010-2016 2013-2016 2014-2016
β1 -0.0143 0.0059 0.0133
∗∗∗
(0.0084) (0.0051) (0.0043)
β2 -0.0365
∗∗∗ -0.0188∗∗∗ -0.0088∗
(0.0082) (0.0051) (0.0044)
β3 -0.0001 -0.0011 -0.0016
∗∗∗
(0.0010) (0.0007) (0.0005)
β4 0.0021
∗∗∗ 0.0010∗∗∗ 0.0008∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Mean Use Below 20.88 20.85 20.25
Mean Use Above 28.62 29.50 29.17
Mean Dist Below 4.15 4.26 4.46
Mean Dist Above 7.19 7.54 7.67
Within R-squared 0.0048 0.0034 0.0035
Households 14,361 14,352 14,344
Observations 468,897 284,166 212,532
Note: The dependent variable is log of monthly water consumption divided by the number of days on
the bill. The coefficients can be interpreted as the percentage change in consumption. The sample is
limited to summer water use (May-September) for Low Information households only. Controls for all
regressions include household FEs, month-by-year FEs, Average Temperature, and Precipitation in
Inches. Robust standard errors clustered at the meter reading route level are reported in parenthesis.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
using only one year of pre-treatment data makes this approach more vulnerable to mean
reversion. Therefore I use three approaches for comparison. Moreover, I limit the study
period to summer months when the information effect is most dramatic and I limit the
study period to 2013-2016 for model 2 and 2014-2016 for model 3.
Table 1.2 presents results from equation 1.5. Models 2 and 3 have positive signs
for the below tier group and the coefficient is significant in model 3. All three models
yield negative and significant coefficients for the above tier group. These results indicate
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Figure 1.6: Predicted Response to Information by Distance from Tier Threshold
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Note: This figure plots the predicted response to price information for consumers below and above
the nearest tier threshold from Equation 1.5.
that after controlling differentially for distance from tier threshold, there is a significant
discontinuity in the consumption response to price information on monthly bills. More-
over, this discontinuity has the predicted directional effect of increasing consumption for
households just below the tier threshold and decreasing consumption for households just
above the tier threshold. Furthermore, the distance coefficients have the expected signs,
which indicate that the below tier treatment effect becomes less positive as distance be-
low the tier threshold increases and the above tier treatment effect becomes less negative
as distance above the tier threshold increases. My preferred specification in column 3 in-
dicates that being below a tier threshold in 2014 leads to a 1.3% increase in consumption
after the merger, and being above a tier threshold in 2014 leads to a 0.88% decrease in
consumption after the merger.
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Figure 1.6 shows the predicted coefficients from this model. They are consistent with
the predicted behavior in Figure 1.2 (b), where the positive difference in the case of below
tier consumers and the negative difference in the case of above tier consumers converge
toward the 45 degree line. These results provide evidence that consumer response to
price information on monthly bills is consistent with price uncertainty around the tier
thresholds.
1.4.2 Predicting the Direction of the Treatment Effect
The interaction between the ex-ante distribution of consumption and the rate schedule
can be used to provide insight into the direction of the overall treatment effect. There are
three factors that combine to determine whether price information is expected to lead to
an overall increase or decrease in consumption. First, the treatment effect will depend on
whether there are relatively more households below or above the tier thresholds. Second,
the relative proximity of households below versus above the tier thresholds will influence
the share of each group that is expected to respond strongly to information. Third, the
function of decay in the treatment effect might be different for households above the tier
threshold than households below the tier threshold as Figure 1.6 suggests.
Figure 1.5 shows the distribution of summer consumption in 2014 for the low infor-
mation households along with the IBT rate schedule. Due to the location of the tier
thresholds combined with the fact that water consumption generally has a right-tailed
distribution there are more observations above the nearest tier threshold than below the
nearest tier threshold. There are approximately 27,000 observations below the nearest
tier threshold and 33,000 observations above the nearest tier threshold. However, much
of the right tail is located at a farther distance from the tier threshold, which would lead
some of these observations to be less affected by price information. The average distance
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from the nearest tier threshold is four thousand gallons for the below group and seven
thousand gallons for the above group. Overall, examining the interaction between the
ex-ante distribution of consumption and the rate schedule is an important first step in
predicting how price information is likely to affect average consumption.
1.4.3 Alternative Model of Consumer Behavior
Figure 1.7: Low Information Utility Average Total Price and Marginal
Price Schedules
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As an additional robustness check to provide further support that consumer response
is consistent with the model of consumer behavior developed in this chapter, I show
that consumer response is not consistent with predictions from an alternative model of
consumer behavior under IBTs. Kahn and Wolak (2013) and Ito (2014) argue that con-
sumers respond to average price rather than marginal price in the absence of adequate
price information about IBTs. This model assumes that consumers have no awareness
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Table 1.3: Alternative Model of Low Information Heterogeneous Response
to Information Difference-in-differences Results
(1) (2) (3)
2010-2016 2013-2016 2014-2016
β1 -0.0002 0.0272
∗∗∗ 0.0233∗∗∗
(0.0068) (0.0059) (0.0062)
β2 0.0466
∗∗∗ 0.0315∗∗∗ 0.0214∗∗∗
(0.0062) (0.0047) (0.0051)
R-squared 0.8230 0.8564 0.8634
Households 14,361 14,361 14,361
Observations 468,944 284,427 213,340
Note: The dependent variable is log of monthly water consumption divided by the number of days on
the bill. The coefficients can be interpreted as the percentage change in consumption. The sample is
limited to summer water use (May-September) for Low Information households only. Controls for all
regressions include household FEs, month-by-year FEs, Average Temperature, and Precipitation in
Inches. Robust standard errors clustered at the meter reading route level are reported in parenthesis.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
of the fact that they face an IBT price schedule, but rather a continuously increasing
price of water consumption. To illustrate this issue, Figure 1.7 shows the IBTs for the
low information households and the average price schedule, which is the total of all water
charges (this was called “water service” on the low information utility bills) divided by
consumption.14 If consumers do indeed respond to average price rather than expected
marginal price before receiving price information on monthly bills, then providing con-
sumers with this information should lead to a re-optimization that is consistent with a
transition from average price response to marginal price response.
Figure 1.7 indicates that 1) for Y < 20, AP > MP , 2) for 20 ≤ Y < 40, AP = MP ,
and 3) for Y ≥ 40, AP < MP . This motivates a similar approach to the one used in
section 1.4. Consumers with AP = MP before the merger will serve as the control group,
14Total water charges include water consumption charges and a fixed monthly fee. I do not incorporate
other other surcharges from the bill, although doing so does affect the results. This definition of average
price is consistent with how Kahn and Wolak (2013) define average price. Ito (2014), however, does not
include fixed monthly fees in his concept of average price. I can also reject that consumer response is
consistent with re-optimization from this second definition of average price.
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because they should not change consumption in response to price information under this
model of consumer behavior. By contrast, the two treatment groups with AP > MP and
AP < MP before the merger should have a differential response to price information.
The model is as follows:
lnYit = β1 1AP>MP,s 1Post + β2 1AP<MP,s 1Post + αi + λt +Witγ + εit (1.6)
where 1AP>MP,s is an indicator for households with AP > MP in month s before the
merger, 1AP<MP,s is an indicator for households with AP < MP in month s before the
merger, and 1Post is an indicator for billing periods after the merger. If β1 > 0 and β2 < 0,
then consumer behavior is consistent with a transition from average price to marginal
price response.
For this test of alternative models of consumer behavior, I used the same three meth-
ods of defining pre-treatment consumption as with previous results. These results, shown
in Table 1.3, indicate that consumer response is not consistent with this alternative hy-
pothesis of consumer behavior under IBTs. Although the coefficients for the below treat-
ment group are positive and significant in two out of three specifications, the coefficients
for the above treatment group are consistently positive and significant across all three
specifications. These results provide further support for the model of consumer behavior
under IBTs described in this chapter.
1.5 Main Empirical Strategy
Next I estimate the overall average treatment effect (ATE) of providing price informa-
tion on monthly utility bills using a difference-in-differences strategy, where households
served by the low information utility before the merger are in the treatment group, house-
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holds served by the high information utility are in the control group, and treatment occurs
when the merger takes place. The standard difference-in-differences approach regresses
the log of average daily water consumption for household i in billing period t on a set of
household fixed effects, month-by-year fixed effects, and an indicator for low information
households after the merger as follows:
ln(Yit) = β 1Low Info, Post + αi + λt +Witγ + εit (1.7)
where Yit is monthly water consumption divided by the days on the water bill for house-
hold i in billing period t, 1Low Info, Post is an indicator variable equal to one for low informa-
tion households in billing periods after the merger and zero otherwise, αi are household
fixed effects, λt are a full set of month-by-year fixed effects, and Wit are a vector of
weather controls including average temperature and precipitation in inches, and εit is the
idiosyncratic error term. I allow for robust standard errors, which I cluster at the meter
reading route level.15
In addition to the standard exogeneity assumption, this approach assumes that low in-
formation and high information households have parallel trends in average consumption.
The merger causes a parallel shift in consumption trends, which allows for identification
of the ATE, β, as the difference between consumption trends after the merger relative
to the difference before the merger. There are several concerns for this identification
strategy, which include differential trends between low information and high information
households and other confounding policies. I discuss these issues in detail and enhance
my empirical strategy to address these concerns.
15Previous studies have used meter reading route fixed effects to control for unobserved neighborhood-
specific characteristics that may influence water consumption (Ferraro, Miranda and Price, 2011). Stan-
dard errors are also likely to be correlated within meter reading routes. Some possible sources of corre-
lation could include spatial variation in water use due to regional weather patterns as well as economic
shocks to consumers residing in the same housing developments. There are 95 meter reading routes,
which ensures that there are a sufficiently high number of clusters.
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Figure 1.8: Differences in Pretreatment Seasonality and Trends
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(a) Average Daily Water Use: Control vs. Treatment
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(b) Differences in Estimated Linear Trends: Control vs. Treatment
Note: These figures demonstrate differences in pre-treatment trend and seasonality between low and high information
households. Figure (a) plots average daily consumption (monthly consumption divided by the number of days on the
water bill) for both groups. Figure (b) plots estimated linear time trends for low and high information households
from a model that regresses the log of consumption divided by the number of days on the water bill on separate linear
time trends, separate month fixed effects, weather controls, and household fixed effects. The sample is limited to
pre-merger time periods. Robust standard errors are clustered at the meter reading route level.
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There are indeed differences in pre-treatment trends as well as seasonality between
the low information and high information households. Figure 1.8 (a) shows average
monthly consumption divided by the days on the water bill for low information and high
information households, grouped by billing months over the pre-merger period. Although
both utilities have highly seasonal water consumption patterns, there are differences in
seasonal water consumption between the two utilities. Average consumption is much
higher for low information households during the summer and exhibits more dramatic
peaks in the height of the irrigation season. This motivates the addition of separate month
fixed effects for the low information households. Next, I allow for linear differences in
trend between treatment and control. Figure A.2 in Appendix A estimates a more flexible
difference in trends over the pre-treatment period and indicates that a linear difference in
trends is probably appropriate. Figure 1.8 (b) shows the estimated linear trends for each
utility over the pre-merger periods. Consumption for the High Information group has a
small, but insignificant increasing trend over this period. By contrast, low information
consumption has a significant increasing linear trend. Given these significant differences,
a model that does not allow for separate linear trend and seasonality would understate
the impact of the merger on water consumption.
The identification assumption in a difference-in-differences model that allows for a
separate linear trend for the low information households is that low information and high
information households have parallel growth in average consumption rather than parallel
paths of average consumption. Furthermore, the identification assumptions could be
further relaxed to allow for differences in seasonality between low and high information
households that is fixed over time. The relaxed difference-in-differences model is as
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follows:
ln(Yit) = β 1Low Info, Post +αi+λt +µ1Low Info∗ t+
12∑
s=1
νs1Low Info,Month s+Witγ+εit (1.8)
where 1Low Info ∗ t is an indicator for low information households interacted with a
linear time trend and 1Low Info,Month s is an indicator equal to one for low information
households if their billing month occurs during the sth calendar month. Conditional on
these relaxed assumptions β is the causal effect of providing price information to low
information households on monthly utility bills.
1.6 Main Empirical Results
Column 1 of Table 1.4 presents results from the full study period from 2010-2016.
The overall treatment effect is negative and significant at the 1% level. These results
suggest that providing price information on monthly bills to low information households
leads to a 3.2% decrease in average consumption. This amounts to a 500 gallon per
household per month reduction on average. I also separately estimate the results using
only the summer months from May to September in Table 1.5, which suggests a larger
treatment effect of a 4% decrease in average consumption, amounting to more than 1,000
gallons per household per month. The fact that the treatment effect is larger during the
summer is not surprising, since consumers have a much stronger incentive to monitor
water consumption during periods where high levels of irrigation significantly drive up
the total cost of water consumption.
Another issue for identification pertains to drought restrictions that occurred dur-
ing the summer of 2014, before the merger, and during the summer of 2015, after the
merger.16 During this period there was an historic drought throughout the Southwestern
16Drought restrictions were implemented late July-September 2014 and April-September 2015.
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Table 1.4: Main Difference-in-differences Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All Periods No Drought Periods No 2014 No 2015 No 2014-2015
β (All Periods) -0.0319∗∗∗ -0.0409∗∗ -0.0250∗ -0.0531∗∗ -0.0521∗∗
(0.0121) (0.0162) (0.0130) (0.0223) (0.0257)
Low Info Trend 0.0009∗∗∗ 0.0010∗∗∗ 0.0007∗∗ 0.0010∗∗∗ 0.0009∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004)
Low Info Avg. Use 15.72 15.18 15.71 15.72 15.71
Within R2 0.0089 0.0090 0.0082 0.0089 0.0081
Households 60,833 60,833 60,833 60,833 60,833
Observations 4,460,397 3,897,390 3,742,734 3,743,096 3,025,433
Note: The dependent variable is log of monthly water consumption divided by the number of days
on the bill. The coefficients can be interpreted as the percentage change in consumption. Results
based on the full sample. Controls for all regressions include household FEs, month-by-year FEs,
Average Temperature, Precipitation in Inches, and a separate trend and month FEs for Low Infor-
mation households. Robust standard errors clustered at the meter reading route level are reported
in parenthesis. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
U.S., which prompted a drastic drought response throughout the region.17 In response to
the drought, the high information utility requested voluntary watering reductions from
all customers during the summer months amounting to a 10% reduction in a household’s
monthly water consumption compared to the same month in 2013.18 The voluntary
reductions were implemented midway through summer 2014, before the merger, and
throughout summer 2015, after the merger. The low information utility took no sig-
nificant drought action during 2014, however the drought was a widely discussed issue
on the local and national news media. It is reasonable to assume that most households
in the Reno metropolitan area were aware of the ongoing drought. The concern with
these voluntary watering reductions, henceforth “drought restrictions,” is that they may
disproportionately affect water consumption for high information households before the
merger. Moreover, the low information households may respond differently to drought
17For example, in neighboring California, urban utilities were required to reduce demands by 25%.
18The high information utility had regular drought information inserts included with the monthly
bills and a city-wide public relations campaign that used multiple media formats to reach residents
including news media, billboards, and social media. The low information utility, by contrast, had very
little outreach.
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Table 1.5: Main Difference-in-differences Results: Summer Months
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All Periods No Drought Periods No 2014 No 2015 No 2014-2015
β (Summer) -0.0400∗∗∗ -0.0644∗∗ -0.0400∗∗ -0.0570∗∗ -0.0627∗∗
(0.0140) (0.0274) (0.0176) (0.0221) (0.0284)
Low Info Trend 0.0025∗∗∗ 0.0030∗∗∗ 0.0025∗∗ 0.0011∗∗∗ 0.0030∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0004) (0.0011)
Low Info Avg. Use 25.27 25.18 25.36 25.27 25.36
Within R2 0.0074 0.0064 0.0069 0.0073 0.0068
Households 60,833 60,833 60,833 60,833 60,833
Observations 1,918,766 1,489,547 1,617,200 1,617,423 1,315,857
Note: The dependent variable is log of monthly water consumption divided by the number of days on
the bill. The coefficients can be interpreted as the percentage change in consumption. Results based
on a sample that is restricted to summer months (May-September). Controls for all regressions
include household FEs, month-by-year FEs, Average Temperature, Precipitation in Inches, and a
separate trend and month FEs for Low Information households. Robust standard errors clustered at
the meter reading route level are reported in parenthesis. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
restrictions as new customers of the high information utility in 2015, being unaccus-
tomed to those types of communications. The concern is that the drought restrictions
may confound the treatment effect in either direction, depending on the direction of any
differential response to this policy.
I investigate possible confounding due to the drought in several ways. First, I provide
results that do not include any drought restriction periods that occurred during 2014
and 2015. Next, I sequentially drop all periods in 2014, 2015, and both years. These
specifications allow for better balance in seasonality between pre-treatment and post-
treatment consumption, since the drought restrictions only take place during the summer
months and consumption is highly seasonal. Columns 2-5 of Tables 1.4 and 1.5 present
regression results that exclude drought restriction months in the summers of 2014 and
2015.
Column 2 excludes only the months in 2014 and 2015 during which drought restric-
tions were in effect. This leads to a comparable treatment effect of a 4.1% decrease in
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average consumption. The difference is even more striking during the summer, when the
treatment effect climbs to a reduction of 6.4%.
I also run three additional specifications in Columns 3-5 omitting all months in 2014,
all months in 2015, and both years altogether respectively. The specifications produce
significant results. Omitting 2014 attenuates the treatment effect, but it is still negative
and significant. This model suggests that information leads to a 2.5% reduction in
the difference in average consumption between low and high information households
after the merger. Omitting 2015 leads to a 5.3% reduction in the difference in average
consumption and omitting 2014 and 2015 leads to a 5.2% reduction in the difference in
average consumption. The important takeaway is that all of these specifications yield
a treatment effect that is statistically significant and similar in magnitude to the main
results, which suggests that the estimated treatment effect is not being driven by these
other policies. I also consider the robustness of the results to other conservation programs
offered by the high information in Appendix A.
1.6.1 Event Study
The main regression model estimated in the previous section assumes that low infor-
mation and high information households have parallel growth paths, or a linear difference
trends. In practice there could be non-linear differences in trends, which would invali-
date the identification assumptions. To rule out higher order differences in pre-treatment
trends, I perform the following event study analysis that accounts for a linear difference
in trends as well as separate seasonality between low information and high information
households:
ln(Yit) = αi+
2016∑
k=2010
βk1Low Info,Year k +λt+µ1Low Info ∗ t+
12∑
s=1
νs1Low Info,Month s+Witγ+εit
(1.9)
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Figure 1.9: Event Study Plot
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Note: This event study plot uses the last year before the merger (2014) as the reference year. It demonstrates that
model 1.8 adequately controls for differences in pre-treatment trends and seasonality between low information and
high information households and that there is a significant reduction in the difference in consumption after the merger.
Robust standard errors are clustered at the meter reading route level. Figure A.3 in Appendix A shows that without
a linear difference in trends, there are significant differences in pre-treatment trends relative to 2014.
where 1Low Info,Year k is a set of year fixed effects for the low information utility. I use 2014,
the year before the merger, as the reference period and plot the βk’s which represent the
difference between treatment and control relative to the reference period. A convinc-
ing event study would indicate that there is no difference between the pre-treatment
coefficients (2010-2014) and a significant difference in the post-treatment coefficients,
compared to the estimated difference in 2014.
Figure 1.9 estimates an event study that uses 2014 as the reference year.19 After
including a separate linear trend for the low information utility and separate month
fixed effects, there are no remaining differences in pre-treatment coefficients, relative to
2014. By contrast, there are significant negative differences in 2015 and 2016 relative to
19I also estimate placebo tests in Table A.2 in Appendix A
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2014.20 These results suggest that allowing for a separate linear trend and seasonality
adequately controls for differences in pre-treatment trends between low information and
high information households.
1.6.2 Treatment Effect Heterogeneity
Finally, to shed light on who responds to price information, I look at heterogeneity in
the estimated treatment effect. This analysis investigates whether certain subpopulations
respond differently to price information on monthly bills. I estimate a conditional average
treatment effect (CATE), which interacts the treatment indicator with an indicator for
a given subpopulation (Abrevaya, Hsu and Lieli, 2015). For pre-treatment variables
that are continuous, households are grouped into subpopulations using quintiles of the
distribution. The CATE model is as follows:
ln(Yit) =
5∑
q=1
[βq xiq1Low Info, Post + λqt]+αi+µ1Low Info∗t+
12∑
s=1
νs1Low Info,Month s+Witγ+εit
(1.10)
where xiq is an indicator equal to one if household i is in quintile q and zero otherwise,
1Low Info, Post is an indicator for low information households after the merger, and λqt are
a full set of quintile-by-month-by-year fixed effects. βq is then the effect of providing
price information on monthly utility bills to households in quintile q.
I focus on quintiles of pre-treatment summer water consumption, assessed property
value as a proxy for wealth (Ferraro and Miranda, 2013), and yard size as a proxy
for landscaped area (Renwick and Green, 2000). These variables are a way to look at
variation in response to information over variables that are proxies of preferences for
water consumption.
20The 2010 coefficient drops out of any specifications that include a linear trend and month fixed
effects.
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First, I use quintiles of average pre-treatment summer water consumption from 2010-
2014 to estimate how the treatment effect varies across the distribution of water users.
The results in Column 1 of Table 1.6 indicate that water users in the highest quintile of
summer water consumption are driving the treatment effect. For these households, the
treatment effect is a 1.7% decreases in consumption relative to households who used a
similar quantity of water before the merger. These results suggest that households with
more available margins on which to decrease consumption and who stand to gain the
most in terms of saving money from water consumption due to the high marginal price
they face have strongest response to price information on monthly bills, as we would
expect.
Next, I estimate CATEs using quintiles of yard size in Column 2 of Table 1.6. The
results are significant for only the lowest and highest quintiles of yard size. These results
indicate that low information households with the smallest and largest yards reduced
consumption by 3% relative to high information households with comparable sized yards.
In light of the fact that yard size and property value are positively correlated, these results
make some sense. Households with small yards tend to be associated with lower levels of
income. We would expect these households to respond more to price information than
high income households. By contrast, households with larger yards have more margins
available to cut back on consumption.21 Therefore, these results suggest that households
with more margins of adjustment in consumption respond to the signal that they can
save money on their bills by decreasing consumption.
Finally, the results for quintiles of appraised value in Column 3 of Table 1.6 are signif-
icant for the first, second, and fourth quintiles. Low information households in the lowest
quintile of property values decrease consumption by 7.5% after receiving price informa-
21Making small adjustments in irrigation watering, for example, can lead to substantial decreases in
consumption. This effect scales up with the size of the lawn.
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Table 1.6: CATE Difference-in-differences Results
(1) (2) (3)
Pre-treatment Use Yard Size Appraised Value
β1 -0.0160 -0.0280
∗ -0.0747∗∗∗
(0.0114) (0.0144) (0.0186)
β2 -0.0245 -0.0070 -0.0402
∗∗
(0.0181) (0.0103) (0.0192)
β3 -0.0034 -0.0104 -0.0219
(0.0143) (0.0130) (0.0169)
β4 -0.0106 -0.0077 -0.0407
∗∗
(0.0110) (0.0165) (0.0156)
β5 -0.0174
∗ -0.0312∗∗∗ -0.0201
(0.0101) (0.0105) (0.0138)
Mean Use Quintile 1 5.52 12.23 14.23
Mean Use Quintile 2 12.07 17.61 19.93
Mean Use Quintile 3 17.71 19.41 19.59
Mean Use Quintile 4 24.55 22.92 23.15
Mean Use Quintile 5 44.32 32.14 34.09
Within R-squared 0.0071 0.0070 0.0073
Households 60,806 60,771 60,771
Observations 1,918,412 1,917,341 1,917,341
All Nonzero: F 2.4075193 2.2160527 5.4343096
All Nonzero: p .04215667 .05892997 .00019313
All Equal: F 2.2269449 1.331074 5.3786146
All Equal: p .0718246 .26407663 .00060085
Note: The dependent variable is log of monthly water consumption divided by the number of days on
the bill. The coefficients can be interpreted as the percentage change in consumption. The sample is
limited to summer water use (May-September). Controls for all regressions include household FEs,
month-by-year FEs, Average Temperature, Precipitation in Inches, and a separate trend and month
FEs for Low Information households. Robust standard errors clustered at the meter reading route
level are reported in parenthesis. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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tion on monthly bills, relative to high information households with comparable property
values. By contrast, low information households in the second and fourth quintiles reduce
consumption by 4%. These results are reasonable, since we would expect lower income
levels to be more motivated to watch their spending on utility bills. Receiving better
price information helps cue these households to the fact that they can save money by
conserving water.
Overall, the CATE analysis indicates that the treatment effects are being driven by
high water users, households with large yards, and low income households. These results
suggest that price information leads to a decrease in consumption for households who
either have more margins of conservation available or low income households with a
stronger need to keep utility bills at a minimum.
1.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, I present quasi-experimental evidence that providing price information
on monthly bills for residential water consumers who face IBTs for water consumption
leads to a more than 3% decrease in average water consumption, amounting to 500 gallons
or more of water saved per household per month on average. These results aggregate to
roughly 86 million gallons of water saved over the course of a year for the low information
households. These results are robust to non-linear differences in pre-treatment trends
and other concurrent conservation policies. I also show that low income households and
households with more margins of adjustment in consumption are more likely to respond
to price information treatments.
This research demonstrates that price salience is a possible mechanism behind em-
pirical evidence showing that consumers do not respond to marginal price under IBTs. I
also argue that economic theory predicts consumers will have a heterogeneous response
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to price information depending on the location of their pre-treatment consumption rel-
ative to the tier thresholds. I provide empirical evidence that consumer response to
price information on monthly utility bills is consistent with these predictions. My model
results contrast previous theories of consumer inattentiveness, which predict consumers
systematically underestimate or overestimate price when prices are nontransparent.
This research dispenses cautionary advice for policymakers who want to use informa-
tion to improve conservation under IBTs. Although I find evidence that price information
can be used as a conservation instrument under IBTs, policymakers should be careful
to ensure that this will be the case. Depending on the interaction between the ex-ante
distribution of consumption and the rate schedule, price information could increase or
decrease average consumption or have no effect.
Price information is a low cost policy tool compared to many of the other programs
that have been pursued to promote energy and water conservation, such as high effi-
ciency appliance rebates, “cash for grass” programs, and in-home displays. Price infor-
mation treatments can be welfare-improving when the overall treatment effect leads to
conservation. This contrasts other approaches that employ social incentives to promote
conservation, which can impose moral costs on consumers (Allcott and Kessler, 2015). I
take up this issue in more detail in the third chapter of this dissertation. Finally, con-
sumers’ heterogeneous response to price information can be used to target households
who consume just above a tier threshold to achieve maximum effectiveness of prices as
a conservation instrument.22. This will help guarantee that price information has a net
effect of a decrease in consumption.
22This is similar to how targeting is done with social norms messages (Ferraro and Price, 2013)
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Chapter 2
Automatic Billing, Paperless Billing,
and Consumer Inattentiveness:
Evidence from Water Demand
2.1 Introduction
Consumer inattentiveness leads to mis-optimization in a variety of settings.1 In par-
ticular, consumers have a tendency to over-consume when facing prices and fees that are
well known but less salient such as sales taxes (Chetty, Loney and Kroft, 2009), ship-
ping and handling fees (Brown, Hossain and Morgan, 2010; Hossain and Morgan, 2006),
and road tolls (Finkelstein, 2009). Recent empirical evidence suggests that enrollment in
automatic billing services can lead to significant increases in consumption of toll roads
(Finkelstein, 2009) and electricity (Sexton, 2015). These authors argue that automatic
billing promotes consumer inattentiveness to prices. The rationale for these findings is
that when consumers enroll in automatic billing, they no longer need to read their bills in
1See DellaVigna (2009) for a survey of the literature on decision errors. There are several studies that
focus on consumer inattention to prices and fees. Brown, Hossain and Morgan (2010) and Hossain and
Morgan (2006) find that consumers are less responsive to changes in shipping and handling fees than to
changes in auction prices on eBay. Busse, Silva-Risso and Zettelmeyer (2006) find that consumers are
more responsive to rebates for car purchases than dealer discount promotions. Chetty, Loney and Kroft
(2009) find that displaying sales tax inclusive prices leads to significant reductions in demand. DellaVigna
and Pollet (2009) find that stock prices are less responsive to Friday earnings announcements relative to
other weekdays.
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order to pay them, which can make consumers unaware of increased spending associated
with increased consumption.
These results have wide-reaching implications as automatic bill payment (ABP) be-
comes more popular and widely used by consumers. As of 2010, it was estimated that
two-thirds of U.S. consumers had at least one recurring bill set-up to pay automati-
cally and amongst Internet-connected households 41% of all recurring bills were paid
automatically (Fiserv, 2010). Moreover, consumption behavioral will only become more
decoupled from spending as technology is developed that enable consumers to shop us-
ing mobile apps which allow purchases to be made with the push of a button, hiding
the payment transaction entirely. Another trend in billing, called paperless billing (PL),
requires that consumers forgo paper bills in favor of electronic bills that are emailed or
accessible through an on-line account. Currently, 54% of U.S. consumers are estimated
to receive at least one electronic bill, while 25% of U.S. consumers have gone completely
paperless with their billing (Fiserv, 2016). With PL billing, there is not a clear driver of
changes in consumption as there is with ABP, since consumers who use PL but not ABP
are still required to view their monthly bill in order to make a payment. However, it is
possible that PL promotes consumer inattentiveness as well. Perhaps consumers do not
take as much care to review their monthly charges when they are in an electronic format.
As such, there is no theoretical prediction for a consumption response to enrollment in
PL.
ABP and PL both have direct environmental benefits in the form of lower carbon
emissions and demand for lumber from decreased shipping of payments and bills as well
as decreased printing of bills. Moreover, ABP affords a variety of direct benefits to
consumers and retailers (Mastercard, 2006; Visa, 2006). Benefits to consumers include
convenience as well as savings on postage costs and and foregone late payment fees.
Automatic billing reduces costs for service providers due to increased certainty of on-
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time payments and lower transaction costs. Paperless billing affords some convenience to
consumers by allowing them to have an electronic record of their billing history, but the
major savings from paperless billing accrue to service providers in the form of reduced
printing costs and postage fees. It is for this reason that many service providers require
consumers to enroll in PL in order to enroll in ABP. Therefore previous research on ABP
effects estimates the combined effect of both programs (Sexton, 2015). Moreover, to get
an accurate estimate of the net environmental benefits of ABP and PL, consumer behavior
must be taken into account. If consumers increase electricity and water consumption after
enrolling in the programs, it undermines the environmental benefits of these policies.
This chapter investigates how automatic and paperless billing affect residential water
demand. Water consumption is another setting where automatic billing has the potential
to offset conservation efforts similar to electricity consumption. Using billing data from
a water utility in the Reno metropolitan area and a fixed-effects approach, I estimate the
effects of enrollment in automatic and paperless billing on water demand. This approach
takes advantage of a unique feature of the billing system that allows consumers to inde-
pendently enroll in PL and ABP to produce separate estimates of these two effects. I find
that ABP enrollment leads to a more than 2% increase in average water consumption
and PL enrollment leads to a more modest 1% increase in water consumption. Moreover,
both programs have effects that do not manifest until after three years of enrollment. I
also estimate the ABP and PL effect by quintiles of the distribution of property values
to shed light on the role that income plays in explaining the change in consumption after
enrollment. Sexton (2015) discusses concerns that the ABP effect might actually be an
income effect rather than a consumer inattentiveness effect, although the author does
not have access to detailed account records to further investigate this issue.
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study to estimate the impact of ABP
enrollment on water consumption. Moreover, this is the first study to investigate the rela-
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tionship between income, ABP enrollment, and the subsequent impacts on consumption
by estimating heterogeneous treatment effects by quantiles of appraised property values.
I find that the ABP effect is distributed across all quantiles of property value indicating
that the effect is not driven by consumers at higher income levels. By contrast, I find
that the lowest quintile of property values drives the PL effect, suggesting that paper
bills help low income families to keep better track of consumption.
I also consider how enrollment in ABP and PL can affect subsequent conservation
response to voluntary watering restrictions during a drought that took place from 2014-
2015. I find that ABP customers’ consumption is 6% higher on average than average
consumption for non-ABP accounts during the drought restriction periods. This sug-
gests that enrollment in these programs has an additional unintended consequence in
that consumers become inattentive to conservation appeals from the utility. A major im-
plication of this result is that ABP has the potential to undercut environmental policies
that use non-pecuniary incentives to promote conservation for both energy and water.
For example, the well-known Opower studies that use social comparisons to promote
conservation obtain a 2% decrease in electricity consumption (Allcott, 2011) and similar
effects have been found from social comparisons for water consumption (Brent et al.,
2016; Brent, Cook and Olsen, 2015; Ferraro, Miranda and Price, 2011). The ABP effect
would more than offset these conservation policies.
This research contributes to a literature focused on consumer inattentiveness to water
and energy costs. There is empirical evidence that consumers do not respond to marginal
prices for electricity (Ito, 2014) or water (Wichman, 2014) consumption when utilities use
complex nonlinear tariffs. Other research shows the importance of providing adequate
price information to improve salience in this context (Lott, 2017; Kahn and Wolak, 2013;
Gaudin, 2006; Pellerano et al., 2015; McRae and Meeks, 2016). Enrolling in ABP can
further exacerbate consumer mis-optimization in this context if prices become less salient
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as consumers view utility bills less frequently. Boampong (2016) looks at ABP enrollment
for electric utilities and finds that ABP customers have less elastic demands in response
to price changes. The evidence presented in this chapter, taken together with other
research in this area, suggests that ABP has the potential to undercut both pecuniary
and non-pecuniary conservation policies.
2.2 Background and Data
Truckee Meadows Water Authority (TMWA) is the primary water utility in the Reno
metropolitan area in Northern Nevada. TMWA has offered ABP since its inception
in 2003 and PL since the fall of 2009. Currently, 15% of TMWA’s residential single
family customers are enrolled only in ABP, 6% are enrolled only in PL, and 6% are
enrolled in both programs. ABP has gradually gained popularity over time; only 2% of
the customers in this study signed up during the first year that ABP was offered and
only 7% had signed up by 2010, when PL became available. Less than 2% of TMWA
residential customers signed up for PL by the end of 2010, and of these 34% were already
signed up for ABP. The unique feature of this billing system is that customers may enroll
in either program independently. There is no requirement for consumers to switch to PL
when initiating ABP. This requirement is put into place by many service providers to
decrease costs from both ABP and PL. However, these statistics demonstrate that, when
given the choice, many consumers prefer to continue receiving paper bills. This suggests
that many consumers still have a preference for non-electronic personal record-keeping.
To encourage customers to enroll in ABP, TMWA offers a 21 cent rebate per bill to “pass
savings onto (their) customers.”2 By contrast, there is no rebate for signing up for PL.
If self-selection into ABP is a concern for analysis, the enrollment incentive might help
2This rebate has been in place since the program began.
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mitigate this self-selection.
The primary data used for this analysis are TMWA’s single family residential billing
records from 2003 to 2017, which include monthly water consumption, the billing dates
corresponding to each record, rate information, meter reading routes, and the spatial
location of each water service. The unit of analysis is the customer account. Only
accounts that have at least one year of billing history are included in the final dataset,
which helps reduce the number of renters in the sample who tend to move more frequently
and may not pay water bills directly.3 This final sample, which I refer to as the “full
sample” throughout the remainder of this chapter, includes 149,513 accounts: 22,409
ABP only, 6,512 PL only, 7,491 ABP and PL, and 113,101 controls. Altogether, the
final sample is an unbalanced panel of account-by-month records for a total of 9,630,007
observations.
A major issue for analysis arises due to a large number of accounts that enroll in
automatic billing at approximately the same time as the customer account is initiated
with TMWA. For these nearly 60% of ABP and PL accounts there is not a sufficient
pre-treatment history, which is important for identification in a difference-in-differences
framework. To address this issue, I estimate specifications using both the full sample as
well as a more limited sample that excludes the accounts that have less than one year of
pre-treatment history. I refer to this sample as the “preferred sample” throughout the
remainder of this paper. This sample includes 8,576 ABP only accounts, 3,624 PL only
accounts, and 2,491 ABP and PL accounts.
The data are spatially matched with geocoded data containing structural character-
istics for each home from the Washoe county assessor and demographic information the
3In addition, accounts that have significant gaps in their billing history are excluded from the final
dataset. Also excluded are outlier observations and residential bills that have a multi-family designation
in the assessor records. Outlier observations are defined as having water consumption greater than 8
times the interquartile range of consumption for all single-family records within each billing month.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics
Control ABP Only PL Only Both N F p
Log(Consumption/Day) -1.3115 -1.3528 -1.3746 -1.3852 9,621,702 38.42 0.0000
Consumption/Day (1,000 gal) 0.4090 0.4133 0.3809 0.3930 9,621,702 20.73 0.0000
Water Charges 38.0862 38.6137 36.0148 37.0865 9,621,702 19.06 0.0000
Marginal Price 2.3135 2.3003 2.3117 2.3127 9,621,702 2.76 0.0463
Average Price 4.2803 4.5091 4.3604 4.5011 9,621,702 44.93 0.0000
(a) Billing Characteristics
Control ABP Only PL Only Both N F p
Account Duration 64.5968 73.5741 68.6062 67.8381 179,876 32.55 0.0000
Year Built 1984.3 1987.2 1987.3 1987.6 177,676 10.75 0.0000
Appraised Value ($1,000) 195.4463 226.5386 194.8001 218.9732 179,816 14.73 0.0000
Yard Size (Acres) 0.2223 0.2313 0.1888 0.2030 179,833 7.72 0.0001
Bedrooms 3.1936 3.2764 3.2059 3.2648 179,833 11.15 0.0000
(b) Property Characteristics
Control ABP Only PL Only Both N F p
Perc. Male 49.9225 49.7520 49.8850 49.7768 179,560 4.26 0.0072
Median Age 37.8656 39.0270 37.6293 38.7596 179,560 8.06 0.0001
Perc. White 79.0661 80.9839 79.8392 81.1794 179,560 13.49 0.0000
Perc.Black 2.1800 1.9296 2.1088 1.9131 179,560 12.00 0.0000
Perc. Hispanic 18.8066 15.8727 17.2630 15.2675 179,560 15.05 0.0000
Avg. HH Size 2.6241 2.5881 2.6254 2.5740 179,560 8.58 0.0000
Perc. Owner Occupied 65.7875 68.4060 66.9126 67.8492 179,560 6.44 0.0005
Income/Capita 32,286.24 35,554.76 32,633.74 35,327.61 179,560 13.14 0.0000
Median Home Value 310,196.4 339,404.4 315,186.9 338,216.3 179,560 14.33 0.0000
Perc. College Degree 37.2680 41.1809 38.7078 42.0268 179,560 20.74 0.0000
Male Employ. Rate 92.4341 93.2444 92.8033 93.4325 179,559 9.11 0.0000
(c) Census Demographics
Note: The ACS data are taken from the 2006-2010 ACS 5 year estimates. ACS data has associated
sampling error (reported as margins of error), which has not been accounted for in these balance
tables. The reported significant differences therefore are likely overstated. Robust standard errors
are clustered at the meter reading route level for billing and property characteristics, and at the
census tract level for demographic characteristics. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
American Community Survey (ACS) corresponding to 2010 Census tracts. I used NOAA
weather station daily data to create monthly weather averages of temperature and pre-
cipitation that correspond to the exact billing dates for each customer bill. Table 2.1
presents sample means for the full sample divided into the 1) control group, 2) ABP only
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accounts, 3) PL only accounts, and 4) accounts the enroll in both ABP and PL at some
point. In terms of water use, ABP accounts use more water and PL account use less
water than control accounts. ABP accounts are associated with higher property values
and newer, larger properties, while paperless accounts are associated with lower property
values and smaller properties—more in line with the control group. In terms of demo-
graphics, ABP accounts are associated with older, white, and more educated consumers,
with smaller household sizes, higher rates of employment, and higher per capita incomes
and median home values. PL accounts are similar to control accounts across these de-
mographics. These sample statistics suggest that there is selection into ABP based on
income and related characteristics, while there is less selection based on income for PL
accounts. Although there are significant differences in demographics, property charac-
teristics, and water consumption between these four groups based on an F-test, account
fixed effects will control for observable and unobservable differences in time-invariant
household characteristics.
2.3 Empirical Strategy
I identify the average effect of enrolling in ABP or PL programs on water consumption
using a fixed-effects approach, which controls for selection on time-invariant unobserv-
ables. I first perform an event study analysis to rule out concerns about differences in
pre-treatment trends between accounts who enroll in these programs and accounts who
never enroll in either program. I regress the log of average daily water consumption for
account i in billing period t on a set of account fixed effects, month-by-year fixed-effects,
and indicators for ABP and PL account before and after enrollment in these programs.
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The model is as follows:
ln(Yit) =
m∑
g=1
(
βAg x
A
itg + β
P
g x
P
itg
)
+
n∑
h=1
(
βAh x
A
ith + β
P
h x
P
ith
)
+
αi + λt +Witγ + f(Account Duration) + εit (2.1)
where Yit is monthly water consumption divided by the days on the water bill for account
i in billing period t, αi is an account-specific fixed effect which controls for observed and
unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity, λt is a full set of month-by-year fixed effects
which control for common shocks to consumption, Wit are weather controls that are
matched to the exact dates of each bill, f(Account Duration) is a cubic function of the
account duration at time t, and εit is an idiosyncratic error term.
4 I estimate clustered
standard errors by meter reading route to account for possible correlation in the errors
within neighborhoods.5
Interest centers on the βj’s for j = A,P , which estimate the average difference be-
tween ABP (PL) accounts and the control group before and after enrollment relative
to the difference during reference period, which is the first bill after enrollment. xAitg
and xPitg group ABP and PL observations into years before enrollment, and x
A
ith and x
P
ith
group ABP and PL observations into years after enrollment.6 I focus on a frame of five
4I include a cubic function of account duration to allow for consumption to vary non-linearly over the
life cycle of an account. We would expect consumption to increase quickly during the early period of a
new account, when for example landscape is being established. Consumption growth should eventually
taper off and even decrease over time as landscape becomes established and households invest in efficient
appliances.
5Previous studies have used meter reading route fixed effects to control for unobserved neighborhood-
specific characteristics that may influence water consumption (Ferraro, Miranda and Price, 2011). Stan-
dard errors are also likely to be correlated within meter reading routes. Some possible sources of corre-
lation could include spatial variation in water use due to regional weather patterns as well as economic
shocks to consumers residing in the same housing developments. There are 95 meter reading routes,
which ensures that there are a sufficiently high number of clusters.
6Let t0 be the date of ABP enrollment. Then x
A
itg is an indicator variable equal to one for ABP
account i if billing period t ∈ [t0− 12 ∗ g, t0− 12 ∗ (g− 1)) and zero otherwise. xAith an indicator variable
equal to one for ABP account i if billing period t ∈ [t0 + 12 ∗ g, t0 + 12 ∗ (g− 1)) and zero otherwise. xPitg
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years before and after enrollment to allow the effect of enrollment in these programs to
accumulate over a longer time horizon. A convincing event study would indicate that
there is no significant difference between the pre-treatment coefficients relative to the
reference period and a significant difference in the post-treatment coefficients. I plot the
βA’s and βP ’s from this single specification in separate event studies. For both of these
event studies, I use the preferred sample that requires treatment account have at least
one year of billing history prior to enrollment.
Next, I use the difference-in-differences analogue of the previous model to investigate
various issues that impact the estimated effect of enrollment in ABP and PL. The model
is as follows:
ln(Yit) = β
A
i x
A
it + β
P
i x
P
it + αi + λt +Witγ + f(Account Duration) + εit (2.2)
where βAi is the account-specific treatment effect for enrollment in ABP and β
P
i is
the effect for PL enrollment. This framework allows the behavioral response to ABP
and PL enrollment to vary by household, where some households may be more prone to
inattentiveness than others. This model allows for estimation of unique treatment effects
based on account characteristics, which is useful for utility managers who have access to
detailed information about their customers.
In order for E[βji ] to be a valid estimator of the average treatment effect, βj, we
need to make several assumptions. First, the account-specific treatment effect is uncor-
related with deviations from the average propensity to receive treatment, E[βji |wit − w¯i]
(Wooldridge, 2010). This requires that enrollment decisions are not systematically re-
lated to expected treatment effects, which is reasonable in this setting since consumers
do not enroll in ABP or PL with the intention of increasing consumption. It is more
likely that consumers enroll, because they have a preference for convenience. Moreover,
and xPith are similarly defined for PL enrollment.
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the 21 cent per month incentive should help mitigate any self-selection bias. Identifi-
cation of the average treatment effect also requires strict exogeneity of treatment and
an overlap assumption (Wooldridge, 2010; Rubin, 1990; Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983).
Strict exogeneity could be violated in this setting if there are correlations between treat-
ment status in any time period and deviations in unobservable time-varying household
characteristics. Sexton (2015) argues that strict exogeneity is likely satisfied due to the
low number of accounts that dis-enroll from ABP.7 To sum, since households enroll in
ABP and PL for reasons unrelated to treatment and since treatment status is persistent,
βj is the causal effect of enrollment in ABP or PL on water consumption.
Next, I estimate heterogeneous treatment effects to examine how the ABP and PL
effects vary by subgroups of interest. I estimate conditional average treatment effects
(CATE) following Abrevaya, Hsu and Lieli (2015) by interacting xAit and x
P
it with subgroup
indicators. The CATE model is as follows:
ln(Yit) =
Q∑
q=1
(
βAq x
A
itq + β
P
q x
P
itq + λtq
)
+ αi +Witγ + f(Account Duration) + εit (2.3)
where xAitq is an indicator for account i in quantile q enrolled in automatic billing during
billing period t, xPitq is an indicator for account i in quantile q enrolled in paperless billing
during billing period t, and λtq are a full set of month-by-year-by quantile fixed effects.
Therefore, βAq is the effect of being in quantile q and enrolling in ABP and β
P
q is the
effect of being in quantile q and enrolling in PL.
Of particular interest, is whether or not the ABP effect is being driven by income
rather than consumer inattentiveness. In other words, if enrollment coincides with
changes in income, and changes in income also lead to changes in preferences for wa-
ter consumption, then the observed effect will be due to changes in preferences rather
7In this setting, on 2% of accounts dis-enroll in ABP or PL.
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than inattention to monthly utility bills. Using property values as a proxy for wealth
(Ferraro and Miranda, 2013), I investigate how the effect of enrolling in ABP or PL on
water consumption varies by quantiles of appraised value. Test whether the estimated
coefficients are significantly different across quintiles of the property value distribution
(Crump et al., 2008). A failure to reject the null hypothesis will provide evidence against
income and in favor of consumer inattentiveness driving the treatment effects.
I also consider how these effects relate to indoor and outdoor water consumption to
shed light on the mechanisms of changes in consumption. I estimate CATE by quan-
tiles of yard size as a proxy for landscaped area (Renwick and Green, 2000), which will
indicate whether the overall effect is being driven by changes in outdoor irrigation. If
consumers are using more water to achieve a more attractive landscape, and do not react
to subsequent increases in their water bills, we would expect this effect to be magnified for
larger yards. In another approach, I look at how the baseline effects from model 2 vary
seasonally by restricting the data to the summer irrigation months (May-September).
This will further indicate whether the ABP and PL effects operate through changes in
outdoor consumption habits.
Lastly, I analyze how ABP and PL enrollment affect performance in a voluntary
utility-wide drought restriction program by including an indicator for time periods during
which this program was in effect as well as interaction terms with the ABP and PL
terms. This specification will provide evidence of whether enrollment in ABP and PL
leads to lower participation in community-wide conservation efforts. This is important
from a policy perspective, since it can potentially impact utility managers’ ability to
communicate with consumers and ultimately could diminish the effectiveness of non-
pecuniary conservation policies such as normative messaging campaigns (Allcott, 2011;
Ferraro, Miranda and Price, 2011).
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2.4 Results
Estimation results provide evidence that ABP and PL enrollment both lead to signif-
icant increases in water consumption, although the effects are more pronounced for ABP
as we might expect. Since the dependent variable is the log of consumption, we can in-
terpret the coefficients as the percentage change in consumption. Results from the event
study analysis are shown in Figure 2.1. For both ABP (Panel a) and PL (Panel b), the
event studies indicate that there are no significant differences in pre-treatment trends and
there are significant increases in consumption after enrollment in either program. Since
this analysis relies heavily on pre-treatment comparisons, I limit my sample to accounts
that have at least two years of pre-treatment history, although the results are similar for
one year of pre-treatment history (see Figure B.1 in Appendix B). Furthermore these
results suggest that significant increases in consumption do not occur until several years
after enrollment. ABP leads to a significant 2% increase in consumption after four years,
and PL leads to a significant 1% increase in consumption after two years which increases
to 2% after four years. These results are further corroborated by duration results pre-
sented in Appendix B. We would expect that if consumer inattentiveness is driving the
increase in consumption that it would take time for the change to develop. Therefore
these duration results are consistent with this mechanism of change as opposed to a
change in preferences for water consumption that coincides with the enrollment decision.
Next, I examine the interplay between ABP and PL enrollment to gain insight into
what is driving the increase in consumption. In Tables 2.2 and 2.3, I estimate a model
that only includes an ABP effect (Column 1), only a PL effect (Column 2), both effects
(Column 3), and an interaction term in addition to both effects (Column 4).8 The first
two models produce significant effects for ABP and PL respectively, however including
8See Appendix B for results using the full sample.
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Figure 2.1: Event Study
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(b) Event Study PL Enrollment
Note: This event study plot uses the year of enrollment as the reference year. It demonstrates that the approach used
in this chapter adequately controls for differences in pre-treatment trends and that there is a significant increase in
consumption after enrollment. The sample is limited to accounts with at least 2 years of pre-treatment data. Robust
standard errors are clustered at the meter reading route level.
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Table 2.2: Baseline Results: 2003-2017
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ABP 0.0238∗∗∗ 0.0232∗∗∗ 0.0228∗∗∗
(0.0035) (0.0036) (0.0036)
PL 0.0106∗∗ 0.0050 0.0039
(0.0040) (0.0044) (0.0045)
Enrolled ABP and PL 0.0033
(0.0083)
Weather Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
f(Act Duration) Yes Yes Yes Yes
HH FE’s Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period FE’s Yes Yes Yes Yes
Within R-squared 0.0112 0.0110 0.0112 0.0112
Households 158,168 171,282 154,328 154,328
Observations 8,628,508 9,396,989 8,513,972 8,513,972
Note: The dependent variable is log of monthly water consumption divided by the number of days
on the bill. The coefficients can be interpreted as the percentage change in consumption. The results
are based on the preferred sample, which requires at least 1 year of pre-treatment data. Controls
for all regressions include household FEs, month-by-year FEs, Average Temperature, Precipitation
in Inches, and a cubic function of account enrollment duration. Robust standard errors clustered at
the meter reading route level are reported in parenthesis. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
both terms in the same model leads the PL effect to become insignificant. Moreover, the
interaction term in the fourth model is not significant. These results suggest that ABP
leads to a 2% increase in consumption, while PL leads to a 1% increase in consumption,
which is smaller but comparable to the 4% increase in electricity consumption found
by Sexton (2015) for joint ABP and PL enrollment. Overall, these results suggest that
ABP drives the increase in consumption, since only the ABP effect is robust to all
specifications. Moreover, the slightly smaller ABP effects in Columns 3 and 4 with similar
magnitude standard errors suggest that a model that does not account for differences in
PL enrollment might overstate the effect of ABP enrollment when enrollment decisions
are independent.
Next, I examine some of the self-selection issues that are a concern for causal estimates
of the ABP and PL effects. I interact the ABP and PL effects with an indicator variable
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Table 2.3: Baseline Results: Summer Months 2003-2017
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ABP 0.0322∗∗∗ 0.0316∗∗∗ 0.0309∗∗∗
(0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0047)
PL 0.0132∗∗ 0.0032 0.0011
(0.0057) (0.0058) (0.0062)
Enrolled ABP and PL 0.0064
(0.0109)
Weather Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
f(Act Duration) Yes Yes Yes Yes
HH FE’s Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period FE’s Yes Yes Yes Yes
Within R-squared 0.0150 0.0147 0.0150 0.0150
Households 154,168 167,066 150,449 150,449
Observations 3,579,451 3,900,024 3,533,037 3,533,037
Note: The dependent variable is log of monthly water consumption divided by the number of days on
the bill. The coefficients can be interpreted as the percentage change in consumption. The results are
based on the preferred sample, which requires at least 1 year of pre-treatment data. The sample is
also limited to summer months (May-September). Controls for all regressions include household FEs,
month-by-year FEs, Average Temperature, Precipitation in Inches, and a cubic function of account
enrollment duration. Robust standard errors clustered at the meter reading route level are reported
in parenthesis. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
for accounts that only ever enroll in ABP, an indicator for accounts that only ever enroll
in PL, and an indicator for accounts that enroll in both programs at some point during
their history. Table 2.4 presents these results in Columns 1 and 2. Once we separate
the effects based on these subgroups, we can see that the ABP persists at 2-3% while
the PL effect becomes small and insignificant. In Columns 3 and 4, I examine the
effect of dis-enrollment in ABP and PL. These results suggest that dis-enrollment leads
households to cut consumption, although by a smaller amount than the increase during
enrollment. There are no significant effects for PL. Figure 2.2 estimates event studies
for dis-enrollment these programs. These figures indicate that household consumption
drops back down after dis-enrollment, which suggests that customers might realize that
they are paying higher bills than they thought when they resume manual payment.
However, these results are consistent with both the ABP effect operating through both
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Table 2.4: Expanded Results: 2003-2017
4 Groups Disenroll
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Preferred Sample Full Sample Preferred Sample Full Sample
ABP, no PL 0.0227∗∗∗ 0.0306∗∗∗
(0.0038) (0.0035)
PL, no ABP 0.0048 0.0051
(0.0052) (0.0049)
ABP, Enrolls Both 0.0256∗∗∗ 0.0280∗∗∗
(0.0074) (0.0049)
PL, Enrolls Both 0.0037 0.0093∗
(0.0071) (0.0053)
ABP 0.0221∗∗∗ 0.0282∗∗∗
(0.0036) (0.0030)
PL 0.0055 0.0075∗
(0.0044) (0.0038)
After ABP Dis-enrollment -0.0184∗ -0.0177∗∗
(0.0096) (0.0079)
After PL Dis-enrollment 0.0020 0.0041
(0.0176) (0.0130)
Weather Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
f(Act Duration) Yes Yes Yes Yes
HH FE’s Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period FE’s Yes Yes Yes Yes
Within R-squared 0.0112 0.0109 0.0112 0.0109
Households 154,328 178,886 154,328 178,886
Observations 8,513,972 9,620,712 8,513,972 9,620,712
Note: The dependent variable is log of monthly water consumption divided by the number of days on
the bill. The coefficients can be interpreted as the percentage change in consumption. The preferred
sample requires at least 1 year of pre-treatment data. Controls for all regressions include household
FEs, month-by-year FEs, Average Temperature, Precipitation in Inches, and a cubic function of
account enrollment duration. Robust standard errors clustered at the meter reading route level are
reported in parenthesis. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
consumer inattentiveness and self-selection based on changes in income households into
the program. This prompts a more in-depth examination of the interaction between
treatment and income.
Table 2.5 presents CATE estimates based on quintiles of appraised property value
and yard size. First, I examine the effect of ABP and PL enrollment on consumption by
quintiles of appraised property value. In terms of income driving any self-selection into
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Figure 2.2: Dis-enrollment Event Study
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(a) Event Study ABP Dis-enrollment
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(b) Event Study PL Dis-enrollment
Note: This event study plot uses the year of dis-enrollment as the reference year. It demonstrates that household
consumption decreases significantly after dis-enrollment. Estimates limited to three years post-dis-enrollment due to
lack of observations outside of this time window. Robust standard errors are clustered at the meter reading route
level.
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ABP or PL enrollment, the share of ABP accounts within each quintile is comparable
and ranges from 10% in the lowest quintile to 15% in the highest quintile.9 For PL,
enrollment ranges from 5% to 7%.10 The results for ABP enrollment, shown in the first
two columns of Table 2.5, suggest the effects are comparable across the distribution of
property values. All ABP coefficients except for the fourth quintile of appraised value are
statistically significant and all coefficients are positive. The effects by quintile range from
3% in the lowest quintile just over 1.5% in the highest quintile. Moreover, the estimated
effects are not significantly different between quintiles. The effects are mostly insignificant
for PL and often negative, except for the lowest quintile of property values. These results
suggest that inattention drives the ABP effect rather than changes in income—the ABP
effect is the largest for the lowest quintile of property values if anything. Moreover, the
PL effect is being driven by low income households, which suggests that low income
household might be particularly prone to inattention. Perhaps conventional paper bills
are a more important resource for low income households to keep track of consumption
and utility spending.
Next, I investigate how these effects very across quintiles of yard size in columns 3 and
4 of Table 2.5. There is a fairly even share of ABP and PL accounts within each quintile
of yard size.11 However, there are significant differences in the effect of ABP enrollment
on consumption by property value quintiles. The results indicate that accounts with
larger yards are driving the ABP effect. In fact the highest two quintiles are significantly
different from the lowest two quintiles based on the actual quantity increases in water
consumption (see Appendix B for results that use Consumption/Day as the dependent
variable). The effects are generally insignificant for PL, except for the top quintile of yard
9The exact proportion from lowest to highest quintiles are: 10%, 12%, 13%, 15%, 15%.
10The exact proportion from lowest to highest quintiles are: 5%, 6%, 7%, 7%, 6%.
11The exact proportion of ABP accounts from lowest to highest quintiles of yard size are: 13%, 13%,
13%, 14%, 13%, and the proportion of PL accounts is 7%, 7%, 6%, 7%, 6%.
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Table 2.5: Heterogeneity Results: 2003-2017
Appraised Value Yard Size
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Preferred Sample Full Sample Preferred Sample Full Sample
Quintile 1*ABP 0.0296∗∗∗ 0.0324∗∗∗ 0.0167∗∗ 0.0252∗∗∗
(0.0097) (0.0072) (0.0064) (0.0054)
Quintile 2*ABP 0.0215∗∗∗ 0.0283∗∗∗ 0.0123 0.0238∗∗∗
(0.0072) (0.0058) (0.0082) (0.0069)
Quintile 3*ABP 0.0175∗∗∗ 0.0201∗∗∗ 0.0251∗∗∗ 0.0289∗∗∗
(0.0056) (0.0052) (0.0071) (0.0060)
Quintile 4*ABP 0.0094 0.0184∗∗∗ 0.0220∗∗∗ 0.0223∗∗∗
(0.0059) (0.0052) (0.0068) (0.0058)
Quintile 5*ABP 0.0160∗∗∗ 0.0248∗∗∗ 0.0329∗∗∗ 0.0394∗∗∗
(0.0057) (0.0058) (0.0067) (0.0057)
Quintile 1*PL 0.0175 0.0198∗ 0.0097 0.0108
(0.0135) (0.0117) (0.0103) (0.0080)
Quintile 2*PL -0.0007 0.0020 0.0118 0.0133
(0.0118) (0.0093) (0.0103) (0.0089)
Quintile 3*PL -0.0045 -0.0011 0.0175 0.0146
(0.0062) (0.0078) (0.0117) (0.0095)
Quintile 4*PL -0.0006 0.0001 0.0050 0.0058
(0.0079) (0.0068) (0.0107) (0.0093)
Quintile 5*PL 0.0094 0.0037 -0.0190∗ -0.0125
(0.0075) (0.0068) (0.0103) (0.0079)
Weather Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
f(Act Duration) Yes Yes Yes Yes
HH FE’s Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period FE’s Yes Yes Yes Yes
Within R-squared 0.0114 0.0111 0.0115 0.0112
Households 154,287 178,832 154,295 178,848
Observations 8,512,734 9,619,047 8,513,104 9,619,776
Note: The dependent variable is log of monthly water consumption divided by the number of days on
the bill. The coefficients can be interpreted as the percentage change in consumption. The preferred
sample requires at least 1 year of pre-treatment data. Controls for all regressions include household
FEs, month-by-year FEs, Average Temperature, Precipitation in Inches, and a cubic function of
account enrollment duration. Robust standard errors clustered at the meter reading route level are
reported in parenthesis. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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size which has 2% decrease in consumption. Overall, these results suggest that changes
in water use behavior might be related to outdoor water consumption, since irrigation is
positively correlated with yard size. These results are corroborated by results shown in
panel (b) of Table 2.2 that restrict the data to summer irrigation months from May to
September. The pattern of results is similar to the overall results in panel (a), however
the magnitude of the coefficients appears to be larger, which provides further evidence of
the interplay between outdoor consumption habits and the increase in consumption for
ABP and PL accounts. The implication of these findings is that ABP enrollment is likely
to lead to more dramatic increases in consumption in areas where irrigation represents a
large share of total water consumption.
Finally, I examine how enrollment in ABP and PL affects subsequent response to
voluntary drought restrictions that were implemented by TMWA during the summers
of 2014 and 2015. From July-September 2014 and May-September 2015, TMWA asked
all customers to reduce consumption by 10% relative to their consumption in 2013 (the
last year before the drought). I include an indicator for these time periods to allow
consumption to vary during the conservation campaign. I then interact this indicator with
my ABP and PL terms to estimate the interaction effect. These results are shown in Table
2.6. Overall, there was dramatic response to the voluntary restrictions, with an estimated
3-4% reduction in average consumption.12 The ABP and PL effects are significant and
comparable to previous results. The main effects of interest are the interaction terms
between ABP and PL and the drought campaign. The ABP term implies that ABP
accounts consumed an additional 6% more water relative to control accounts during
the drought in addition to the more than 2% difference in consumption during non-
drought periods. The results are not significant for PL. Overall, these results suggest that
12Utility managers reported a more than a 15% reduction in system-wide water consumption during
2015. Some of this reduction is absorbed in the time fixed-effects in this model.
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Table 2.6: Drought Restriction Policy Results: 2003-2017
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Preferred Sample Full Sample Preferred Sample Full Sample
Drought Restrictions -0.0335 -0.0396∗ -0.0335 -0.0401∗
(0.0232) (0.0233) (0.0232) (0.0233)
ABP 0.0170∗∗∗ 0.0223∗∗∗
(0.0035) (0.0027)
PL 0.0053 0.0099∗∗∗
(0.0043) (0.0037)
ABP, Drought 0.0596∗∗∗ 0.0823∗∗∗
(0.0111) (0.0077)
PL, Drought -0.0089 -0.0338∗∗∗
(0.0106) (0.0077)
ABP only 0.0166∗∗∗ 0.0225∗∗∗
(0.0037) (0.0032)
PL only 0.0067 0.0097∗∗
(0.0051) (0.0047)
ABP, Both 0.0204∗∗∗ 0.0223∗∗∗
(0.0074) (0.0048)
PL, Both 0.0015 0.0095∗
(0.0074) (0.0054)
ABP only, Drought 0.0596∗∗∗ 0.0870∗∗∗
(0.0124) (0.0084)
PL only, Drought -0.0104 -0.0256∗∗∗
(0.0130) (0.0089)
ABP, Both, Drought 0.0559∗∗∗ 0.0601∗∗∗
(0.0211) (0.0121)
PL, Both, Drought -0.0041 -0.0203
(0.0229) (0.0131)
Weather Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
f(Act Duration) Yes Yes Yes Yes
HH FE’s Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period FE’s Yes Yes Yes Yes
Within R-squared 0.0113 0.0112 0.0113 0.0112
Households 154,328 178,886 154,328 178,886
Observations 8,513,972 9,620,712 8,513,972 9,620,712
Note: The dependent variable is log of monthly water consumption divided by the number of days on
the bill. The coefficients can be interpreted as the percentage change in consumption. The preferred
sample requires at least 1 year of pre-treatment data. Controls for all regressions include household
FEs, month-by-year FEs, Average Temperature, Precipitation in Inches, and a cubic function of
account enrollment duration. Robust standard errors clustered at the meter reading route level are
reported in parenthesis. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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inattentiveness translates into lower participation in utility-wide conservation campaigns
(or that households who enroll in ABP are less apt to respond to these programs). The
major implication of these results is that ABP enrollment may not only undermine utility
efforts to promote conservation in general, but it can seriously hamper utility measures
taken to cut demands when facing potential water shortages.
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter investigates the impact of ABP and PL enrollment on water consump-
tion, finding robust and significant results indicating that ABP enrollments leads to a
2-3% increase in average water consumption. There is also evidence that PL enrollment
can increase consumption by as much as 1%, but this result is less consistent across
different specifications. Furthermore, I demonstrate that this increase in consumption
after ABP enrollment is not being driven by an income effect by estimating heterogeneous
treatment effects by quintiles of appraised property value, finding that average treatment
effects are not different across quintiles. These results provide further evidence that ABP
enrollment contributes to consumer inattentiveness to utility costs. By contrast, my re-
sults indicate that that low income households drive the PL effect. Therefore maintaining
conventional paper bills might low income households keep track of consumption. The
implication of this finding is that utility policies that require customers to “go paperless”
in order to gain the benefits of enrolling in ABP might disproportionately negatively
impact low income households.
I also find that ABP and PL customers are less responsive to voluntary drought
restrictions. My results suggest that ABP accounts use an additional 6% more water
during drought restriction periods compared to non-ABP customers. Overall, my results
indicate that consumer inattentiveness that is promoted by ABP and PL enrollment has
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the potential to undermine both pecuniary and non-pecuniary conservation policies.
Despite the potential negative environmental impacts associated with ABP enroll-
ment, there ways in which utilities can mitigate these impacts. First, utilities could text
reminders each month to ABP customers with some basic information about their current
bill amount as compared to historical averages. This could help cue consumers to pay
attention to recent increases in their consumption. Another approach, could be to send
customers on ABP quarterly or biannual letters notifying them of changes in consump-
tion over that period. Utilities could also use alternative communication approaches to
ensure that ABP customers are aware of conservation programs and drought restrictions,
such as traditional mail communications.
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Chapter 3
Are Normative Appeals Moral
Taxes? Evidence from a Field
Experiment on Water Conservation
3.1 Introduction
A number of high-quality, randomized experiments have established that information
treatments that compare an individual household’s electricity or water consumption with
that of a peer group cause significant reductions in consumption.1 In general, most
of these social comparison studies have also found that the average treatment effects
are driven largely by effects among customers with higher pre-treatment consumption
(Allcott, 2011; Dolan and Metcalfe, 2015; Ito, Ida and Tanaka, 2015; Ferraro and Price,
2013; Ferraro and Miranda, 2013; Brent, Cook and Olsen, 2015). Why and how do these
comparisons work? One explanation is that these comparisons invoke social norms: a
consumer sees that his water consumption is higher than similar neighbors and feels guilty
about his “overconsumption.” In response to such a message, the consumer may impose
a “moral tax” on consumption. Conversely, consuming less than one’s peers can lead
1See among others Allcott (2011); Allcott and Rogers (2014); Ayres, Raseman and Shih (2013); Costa
and Kahn (2013) for energy and Ferraro, Miranda and Price (2011); Ferraro and Price (2013); Brent,
Cook and Olsen (2015) for water.
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consumers to impart a “moral subsidy” (Levitt and List, 2007; Ferraro and Price, 2013;
Allcott and Kessler, 2015). Framing the norm as a tax is appealing to economists, because
it can be incorporated into welfare analyses of various price and non-price approaches for
achieving conservation in the face of scarcity (as in the case we discuss) or reductions in
associated consumption externalities. It also has the logical extension that the behavioral
response should vary according to the level of such a moral tax, which we refer to as the
strength of the normative message. When the moral tax is higher (one is consuming
much more than one’s peers), the effect of receiving information highlighting this should
be larger than for those receiving a smaller, or negative, moral tax.
A second behavioral explanation draws from the more conventional household pro-
duction approach (Becker, 1965), and recognizes that social comparisons also provide
households with financially-useful information. Households informed that their water use
is 50% higher than similar neighbors might also receive a signal that they can achieve the
same utility from using water or electricity at lower costs by installing efficient appliances
or making behavioral changes (Ferraro and Price, 2013). This updating of beliefs and
re-optimization more generally fits the emerging rubric of correcting “internalities”, or
failures of consumers to internalize all of the private costs of their actions (Allcott, Mul-
lainathan and Taubinsky, 2014; Allcott and Sunstein, 2015; Allcott and Taubinsky, 2015).
Prominent examples of internalities in the water and energy sectors include: imperfect
information about the costs of water/energy consumption (Allcott and Taubinsky, 2015);
dynamic inconsistencies in decision-making (Allcott, Mullainathan and Taubinsky, 2014);
lack of salience of infrequent or automatic billing (Sexton, 2015; Wichman, 2016); and
confusion about nonlinear price structures (Ito, 2014; Wichman, 2014). Which of these
two behavioral explanations best fits the pattern of results found in social comparisons?
The answer to this question is important from a welfare perspective. Information
treatments to re-optimize and correct internalities are always Pareto-improving in mar-
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kets without externalities, since some households can achieve the same utility at lower
cost, and all other households are no worse off.2 In markets with negative externali-
ties, information treatments operating through re-optimization that cause an aggregate
decrease in consumption, such as most water and energy social comparisons, will have
even larger positive welfare gains due to reducing external costs. In contrast, if a social
comparison works purely by imposing a moral tax, there may be a significant fraction
of households for whom the level of their moral tax exceeds the correct Pigouvian tax.
Social comparisons might thus induce over-abatement and reduce welfare overall. Allcott
and Kessler (2015) demonstrate theoretically that the social welfare effects of a nudge
can vary substantially depending on the prevailing behavioral mechanism.
Testing these behavioral mechanisms has been empirically challenging because of a de-
sign feature of existing social comparisons: customers with above-average pre-treatment
consumption are much more likely to receive a message that they are consuming more
than their comparison group. In fact, water use and the type of message received are
perfectly correlated in studies where the comparison group is simply a utility-wide av-
erage consumption. These customers receive a higher moral tax, but they also receive a
stronger signal to re-optimize consumption (i.e. their water bill is much higher than their
neighbors’ bills). Why? In our setting in Reno, Nevada, as in many cities in arid cli-
mates, summer (May-October) household water use is driven predominantly by outdoor
water use on lawns and gardens. Consumption in the summer is generally four times
higher than in the winter. Thus, the most impactful water conservation decisions are
related to landscape changes (i.e. xeriscaping) and improvements in irrigation efficiency.
Optimizing the amount and timing of irrigation water can achieve the same green land-
scape with less water. If a financial “re-optimization” channel predominates, a signal
2This argument neglects the typically small cost of generating the information, which could in theory
be passed along in higher water or electricity rates.
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that household water use is higher than similar neighbors’ is likely a signal that outdoor
water use is driving this difference. A re-optimization of outdoor water use, for example
by installing an irrigation timer, may lower one’s bill substantially.3 In other words, with
a traditional social comparison, high water users are faced with a higher moral tax but
are also very likely the ones who might save the most money at the lowest utility-cost
when re-optimizing.
Our primary contribution is the introduction of a novel social comparison treat-
ment that allows us to better isolate a moral tax behavioral channel by decoupling pre-
treatment water usage from the type of message sent to households, and thus the level of
moral tax imposed. We do this by framing the comparison not in levels of consumption
(i.e. thousands of gallons of water used), as in traditional social comparisons, but in per-
centage reductions from a prior baseline compared to the percentage reduction of similar
neighbors. More concretely, the water utility in Reno (Truckee Meadows Water Author-
ity, or TMWA) asked all customers to reduce their water consumption in summer 2015
by 10% compared to summer 2013 in response to a drought (discussed more below). Our
novel information treatment informs customers by what percentage they have reduced
water consumption compared to 2013 as compared to the reduction achieved by similar
neighbors. We argue that this treatment still imposes a moral tax by signaling whether
one is “doing their part” to manage the drought, but provides much less financially-useful
information.4
3These are devices that, if used properly, can be set to apply the correct amount of water at the
correct time and thus keep a lawn healthy without over-watering and unnecessarily increasing one’s
water bill.
4To see this, imagine you are told that you are using 6,000 gallons per month and that your neighbors
with a similar lot size used 4,000 gallons. This might indicate that you could reduce water consumption
by 2,000 gallons, and thus your bill, while being able to maintain a yard that looks similar to your
neighbors. If, on the other hand, you are told that similar neighbors reduced their consumption by 8%
compared to 2013, while you reduced by only 4%, you would not learn much to update your beliefs
about whether you are optimizing how you use water: you don’t know the baseline consumption level of
the comparison household.
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We analyze this new social comparison in a utility-scale field experiment among
TMWA customers that sent one of five different mailers to single-family customers in
TWMA’s service area. Approximately 4,300 households were included in each of the
five treatment groups, with 21,552 in the control group. Two of these include norma-
tive appeals: one is a traditional social comparison in terms of total gallons used by the
household relative to a peer group, while the other uses the social comparison in percent-
age terms as described above. The third treatment provides rate information and frames
conservation in terms of households’ expected monetary savings. All of the mailers in the
study describe TMWA’s goal for each household to use 10% less water for each month of
the summer of 2015 relative to the summer of 2013 to cope with a temporary drought.
In this chapter, we focus on three of the five mailers.
Each of the three treatments generate statistically significant average treatment ef-
fects (ATEs) of roughly 1.5%. Although the individual ATEs are not statistically different
from each other, we find several patterns in our results which are consistent with social
comparisons operating at least partly by raising the moral cost of consumption. First,
we find that the strength of the normative appeal, defined as the difference between a
customer’s consumption (or percentage reduction) and that of similar neighbors, is a
strong driver of differences in responses to social comparisons. Importantly, this result
holds when the strength of the normative appeal is decoupled from pre-treatment con-
sumption. The conservation rate social comparison shows the same pattern of response
for low and high water users based on pre-treatment consumption, although the effect
is magnified for high users.5 Second, linking our experimental results with survey data
5Randomization was balanced by design on pre-treatment water consumption, but we could not
know a household’s conservation rate in advance. The conservation rate comparison treatment was not
therefore guaranteed to be balanced on percentage reduction and conditional average treatment effects
should be interpreted cautiously. As we demonstrate below, however, the treatment achieved remarkable
balance in conservation rates among baseline water use. In other words, some low baseline water users
reduced their consumption by a higher amount than their peers, and some high water users reduced by
a smaller fraction than their peers.
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collected after the conclusion of the field experiment, we find that pro-social households
were more responsive to the social comparison treatments, similar to Costa and Kahn
(2013) and Bolsen, Ferraro and Miranda (2014).
Third, by randomizing whether households received one or two treatment letters and
examining treatment effects after mailers stop arriving, we find that framing conservation
in terms of monetary savings leads to more persistent treatment effects than our nor-
mative social comparisons. The two normative treatments largely replicate the “action
and backsliding” pattern found by Allcott and Rogers (2014) (though in less temporal
granularity), where the initial effect of a mailer wanes over time before increasing upon
the receipt of a new mailer. The financially-oriented treatment causes a persistent effect
and a second mailer has no additional effect. This is consistent with the findings by Ito,
Ida and Tanaka (Forthcoming) that pecuniary incentives lead to more persistent effects
than moral suasion. It is also consistent with consumers being more likely to re-optimize
to address internalities when cued with monetary savings information, especially if this
re-optimization involves capital investments (e.g. low-flow toilets or xeriscaping) or more
permanent behavioral changes (e.g. irrigation timers). Consumers cued with norma-
tive appeals may draw on actions that are intent-oriented (Attari, 2014), but which
are more likely to be transient (e.g. shorter showers). Our survey results also support
this: consumers who reported previous conservation actions are less responsiveness to
the monetary treatment, suggesting that those households had already re-optimized and
exhausted any low-cost conservation opportunities.
Previous studies have attempted to investigate whether different types of nudges
trigger different mechanisms, but none has conclusively distinguished between moral and
financial motivations to normative appeals. Ferraro and Price (2013) compare social com-
parisons and generic pro-social appeals, both based on a moral motivation, to show that
social comparisons generate greater conservation responses; however, they do not con-
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sider non-moral based mechanisms, such as addressing consumption internalities. Ferraro
and Miranda (2013) use the traditional quantity-based social comparison and attempt
to distinguish between financial versus moral motivations by comparing treatments re-
sponses by households just above and below thresholds in increasing block rate pricing
structures, but fail to find that financial gain influences conservation response.6 Pellerano
et al. (2015) find weak evidence that adding information about financial savings to social
comparisons crowds out moral motivations, as postulated by Gneezy, Meier and Rey-Biel
(2011). Allcott and Kessler (2015) find that 35% actually have negative willingness to
pay for continuing to receive social comparison, indicating that moral costs are a likely
mechanism. However, their study takes place after the households had already received
one year’s worth of social comparisons, so the novel information component that helps
correct internalities may have already been exhausted.
3.2 Background & Experimental Design
In 2015, in response to low snowpack and expected drought conditions during the
summer irrigation season, TMWA launched a major media campaign through print,
radio, TV, social media, and billboard messages requesting each TMWA customer to use
10% less water from May through September 2015, relative to their water use during the
same months in 2013. The comparison year was 2013 because TMWA had asked for a
10% reduction during the latter part of the prior summer (July through September of
2014). Such a conservation request was uncommon in the region prior to 2014, however;
the last time TMWA had requested customers to reduce water consumption to address
drought was in 1992. To complement the media campaign, we worked with TMWA to
design a randomized control trial to test the effectiveness of five different personalized
6Differences in savings between tiers tend to be small and not all consumers are aware of marginal
changes in the price (Ito, 2014; Wichman, 2014).
70
Are Normative Appeals Moral Taxes? Chapter 3
letters mailed to residential single family households.
The TMWA request for a 10% system-wide reduction was met and surpassed. The
conservation request ended officially at the end of September. In November-December
the utility surveyed a sample of its customers (with email addresses) with the primary
goal of assessing the effectiveness of their media campaign. The survey included ques-
tions about what customers did to conserve water, whether their actions were considered
to be impositions, what prevented them from doing more to conserve water, and what
more they would have been willing to do if called upon to do so. The survey responses
included 2,544 households that were in our experimental groups, approximately 10% of
the sample size in our experiment. In their survey sample, TMWA included all house-
holds from our experimental sample that had provided TMWA with an e-mail address.
We were able to use these data to provide corroborating evidence regarding customers’
motivations and mechanisms of response to the treatment letters they received. We dis-
cuss relevant TMWA survey outcomes in this chapter in the context of interpreting our
main experimental results.7
3.2.1 Description of Treatments
This article focuses primarily on three of the five treatments (denoted T1 through T5):
a rate information treatment focused on financial savings (T3) and two social comparison
treatments (T4 and T5). However, since the treatments of interest contain components
of the first two treatments we present a brief description of all five treatments (Table 3.1;
Appendix C C includes example components of the five mailers). Every letter began:
“Because of the extended drought in Northern Nevada, we are asking all of our customers
to reduce water use by at least 10% this summer compared to summer 2013 - the last
summer before TMWA started asking for summer water use reductions.” All letters also
7A summary of selected survey results is available through the TMWA staff report (Christman, 2016).
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included the statement: “Since TMWA customers use on average about four times more
water in summer than in the winter, we expect that for most customers the easiest way
to achieve this reduction is to adjust outdoor watering.”
Treatment 1 provided households with six tips that the TMWA media campaign
publicized for how to reduce outdoor water consumption, similar to Ferraro, Miranda
and Price (2011). This letter was not customized to report on individual household
water use. The six tips were also printed on the reverse side of the other four mailers
(T2-T5).
Treatment 2 augmented the generic tips with personalized information about the
customer’s water use, with a title introducing the letters that read: “Below is your cus-
tomized water use report.” The T2 letter included a figure that displayed the customer’s
water use in thousands of gallons (kgal) for May through September of 2013 and also
their water use in 2015 for each month from May up to the last month billed before the
letter was sent out (Figure C.1 in Appendix C C shows the mailer). This figure and
accompanying descriptive text was included with Treatments 2 through 5. Therefore
all our treatments of interest include water conservation tips and personalized historical
water use information.
Treatment 3 (T3) contained the same components as T2, with the additional message
“Saving water saves you money”, a figure displaying (a) the rate structure with tiers and
price for each tier, (b) the customer’s water use in kgal within TMWA’s increasing-block
rate structure for the last month billed in 2015, and (c) the upcoming month’s target of
10% less water than the same month in 2013 within the rate structure. The letter also
provided the monetary savings that the customer could expect from meeting this goal
(see Figure C.2 in Appendix C C). We refer to this treatment as the rate treatment and
financial treatment throughout the remainder of this chapter.
Treatment 4 (T4) provided the same information as T2 with the additional message
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Table 3.1: Information Included in the Five Treatments
Information Components Included in Mailers* Treatment (Mailer) T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 
The message “Helping our region deal with drought: What you can 
do” with a sheet showing 6 low cost tips to reduce outdoor water use 
X X X X X 
The message “What is your 10% Goal?” with a water use bar graph 
showing in 1000’s of gallons the home’s:              
• 2013 water use for May through September,  
• Target water use for each month in 2015 as 10% less,                  
• 2015 actual monthly water use, up to last month billed.  
 X X X X 
The message “Saving water saves you money” with rate structure ** 
graphic showing home’s water use in 1000’s of gallons by tier/price: 
• for last month billed in 2015,   
• for same month in 2013,  
• for target goal of 10% less water used relative to 2013  
  X   
The message “How does your water use compare?” with a comparison 
of customer’s 2015 last month billed water use in 1000’s of gallons 
with similar neighborhood homes. 
   X  
The message “Are you doing your part?” with a comparison of 
customer’s 2015 last month billed water use in terms of % change 
from 2013 with similar neighborhood homes. 
    X 
	
*See Figures C.1-C.4 in Appendix C C for an example of each information component of each
treatment. T2 through T5 Mailers included the title: Below is your customized water use report.
**TMWA had recently merged with two other small regional utilities, Washoe County and South
Truckee Meadows Groundwater Irrigation District. In 2015 all customers were subject to the rate
structures that they had before the merger. Customers receiving this treatment were shown the
tariff structure relevant to them.
“How does your water use compare?” and a figure comparing the customer’s total water
use in thousands of gallons for the last billed month to the median water use of a peer
group consisting of single-family residences in their neighborhood with similar yard size
and number of bedrooms. This treatment essentially reproduces the standard social com-
parison used in the OPower studies on energy and the Cobb-County (Ferraro, Miranda
and Price, 2011) and Watersmart (Brent, Cook and Olsen, 2015) experiments in water
(see Figure C.3 in Appendix C C).
Treatment 5 (T5) included the same information as T2 with the additional message
and figure providing a similar comparison between households as in T4, but instead
expressed in terms of relative percent performance towards achieving the 10% goal com-
pared to 2013 water use (Figure C.4 in Appendix C C). This treatment decouples the
strength of the normative appeal from the level of water use, since low water users may
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not have conserved water and high users may have conserved a large amount in per-
centage terms, enabling us to isolate the impact of the strength of the message after
conditioning on water consumption. The comparison group was identified in the same
way as Treatment 4.
We also include injunctive norms for T4 and T5 in the form of a message. The message
“Keep up the good work” was included for residences that had met their 10% goal in the
last month billed. Households that did not meet their 10% goal in the previous month
received the message “As a reminder TMWA is asking all customers to do their best to
save at least 10% this summer. Please do your part to help with drought.” We did not
use emoticons or “smiley faces” as in Schultz et al. (2007).
3.2.2 Randomization
Our sample frame included 42,703 eligible8 single family homes. We then randomly
assigned each of these households to either the control group or one of the five treatment
groups, with randomization blocks defined by billing cycles, rate schedule and frequency
of recorded meter data (i.e. monthly, daily, or hourly, though all customers only receive
monthly usage totals). Appendix C provides more detail on our randomization procedure
and the process of generating the mailers. In total, 21,151 treatment households were
assigned to receive mailers (Table 1). In addition, we randomized whether households
received one or two mailers. A total of 7,086 households were assigned to receive a single
8Specifically, we included homes that (i) had metered water service; (ii) used enough water during
at least one month of the 2013 irrigation season to exceed the tier 1 limit (6,000 gals), indicating some
outdoor water use; (iii) had lived at their current residence since April 2013, and therefore had summer
2013 bills for comparison; (iv) had a billing address that corresponded with the residential service address
to eliminate rental occupants and other users who may not pay for water or have limited control over
water use at the residence; (v) had a 2-inch service main or smaller, excluding unusually large water
users; (vi) live within one of the targeted bill cycle regions (some regions were excluded because they
had a low number of single-family households, see Appendix C); and (vii) had nonzero water use during
each month of the 2013 irrigation season (May-September) and pre-treatment months during the 2015
irrigation season (May-July) to exclude homes that were unoccupied for an extended period of time.
74
Are Normative Appeals Moral Taxes? Chapter 3
Table 3.2: Total Treated Households by Month/Treatment
Treatment Type July Only August Only Both Months Total
T1: Tips Sheet Only 1,420 1,410 1,402 4,232
T2: Tips + Water Use History 1,414 1,411 1,412 4,237
T3: Tips + History + Rate Information 1,413 1,411 1,410 4,234
T4: Tips + History + Social Norms (Gallons) 1,419 1,416 1,396 4,231
T5: Tips + History + Social Norms (Percent) 1,420 1,403 1,394 4,217
Total 7,086 7,051 7,014 21,151
mailer in July (using June consumption as the last month billed), 7,051 received a single
mailer in August, and 7,014 received mailers in both July and August.
Table 3.3 shows that, in aggregate, the randomization achieved very strong balance
on observables. Additionally, Tables C.1-C.3 in Appendix C show that the experimental
sample is balanced on pre-treatment consumption for each treatment, across treatments,
and within deciles of pre-treatment consumption. Figure C.5 graphically displays the
densities of pre-treatment consumption for the pooled treatment, each of the five indi-
vidual treatments, and the control group. In addition to achieving balance on average
pre-treatment consumption, Figure C.5 shows the treatments are balanced across the
full distribution of pre-treatment consumption. The graphical evidence is formalized by
nonparametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests (Table C.4 in Appendix C) that fail to reject
the null of equality of distributions for pre-treatment consumption across the control
and the pooled treatment as well as each treatment individually. Our sample is well
balanced by design, which allows us to make valid inferences for the conditional aver-
age treatment effects within subgroups, particularly subgroups that are functions of the
normative appeal, which depends on pre-treatment consumption.
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Table 3.3: All Treatments Balance on Observables
Control Mean Treatment Mean Difference (p-value)
2013 Water 23.56 23.55 0.02 0.89
2015 Water 16.90 16.99 -0.09 0.37
Summer Water 21.63 21.70 -0.07 0.52
Winter Water 8.15 8.15 -0.01 0.88
Year Built 1,987.61 1,987.67 -0.05 0.77
Appraised Value 214.85 214.87 -0.02 0.99
Bedrooms 3.37 3.37 0.01 0.43
Lot Acre 0.27 0.27 -0.00 0.91
Yard Acre 0.22 0.22 -0.00 0.95
Build Sq. Ft. 1,985.10 1,991.07 -5.98 0.41
Bathrooms 2.19 2.20 -0.00 0.56
Note: 21,552 Control Observations and 21,151 treated observations, p-value is based on two-sided
t-test
3.3 Methodology
The primary variable of interest is monthly household consumption, obtained from
TMWA billing records, expressed in average gallons per day (GPD). We calculate GPD
by dividing total billing cycle usage by the number of days in that billing period to avoid
problems with billing periods of different lengths. The specification in our regression
analysis uses “normalized GPD” as the main dependent variable; every customer’s GPD
is divided by the average control group consumption across the experimental period (July-
September 2015) following Allcott (2011). This allows the regression coefficients to be
interpreted as the average percent change in consumption, while preserving the treatment
effect of very high water users, which the logarithmic transformation of consumption
would dampen. Our specification is:
yit = α + γlTi,l + fixit + it (3.1)
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where yit is normalized GPD, Ti,l is a dummy variable for the pooled treatment and
each of the five treatment letters (l = Pooled, 1, 2, ..., 5), and xit is a vector of control
variables. We restrict our sample to the post-intervention period, which comprises the
billing months of August, September, and October 2015. While treatment is exogenous
by virtue of the randomization, including control variables increases the precision of
the estimates. All regressions therefore include average consumption during irrigation
seasons prior to the intervention, billing cycle and month fixed effects, and average daily
temperature and days of precipitation during the billing cycle. We matched daily weather
data from the NOAA weather station at Reno-Tahoe Airport to the exact dates of each
customer’s water bill to calculate the weather variables. Robust standard errors are
clustered at the household level.
3.3.1 Identifying the Effect of Difference from the Peer Group
If normative appeals work by increasing the moral cost of consumption, then we
should see stronger treatment effects for households who received a “stronger” social
norms and thus a higher moral cost. We define the magnitude of the moral cost as the
difference between a household’s performance (consumption level or percentage conser-
vation) and the performance of the relevant comparison group. This is one of the cases
nested within the consumer utility model of social comparisons presented in Allcott and
Kessler (2015), where consumers face a constant marginal moral cost for “inappropri-
ate” consumption. Households consuming further above the norm receive a stronger
normative appeal.
As discussed in the introduction, a key feature affecting the interpretation of behav-
ioral responses to social comparisons is that consumers with high pre-treatment con-
sumption are more likely to receive a stronger normative (and negative) message, but
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they are also likely to have better opportunities to reduce water use at low welfare cost.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the existing correlation between baseline water use and the strength
of the social norm in traditional social comparisons (our Treatment 4), and demonstrates
that our experimental design successfully decouples the two in our new treatment (T5).
In each of the two panels (panel (a) for the comparison in gallons and panel (b) for the
comparison in percentage reduction, or conservation rate), we partition households into
quartiles of baseline water use (displayed on the x-axis). Within each of those quartiles,
we further partition households into quartiles of the difference between a household’s level
of consumption (or conservation rate) and that of its peer group. Since comparisons are
based on median consumption (or percent conservation) within the peer group, the first
two quartiles (Q1:Much better and Q2:Better) are households who are doing better than
their peer group, and the upper two quartiles (Q3:Worse and Q4:Much Worse) represent
households who are doing worse.
Panel (a) of Figure 3.1 shows that for the traditional social comparison in gallons most
low water users (Q1 on the x-axis) consume less water than their peer group: roughly
90% of the consumers with the lowest water consumption were informed that they used
less than their neighbors (Q1 + Q2 of Difference from Peer group (kgal)).9 Likewise,
most high users (Q4 on the x-axis) received a message telling them they used more water
than their peers.
This is not the case for our social comparison in percentage terms (Treatment 5):
a substantial fraction of low users conserved less than their peers and many high users
conserved more than their peers (Figure 3.1, Panel (b)). Even among households in the
9The only reason why there are some low users who are above their peer group in the traditional social
comparison (T4) is that the norm is based on a peer group - defined by households in the same meter route
who have similar number of bedrooms and yard size (above/below the median). By comparison, Ferraro
and Price (2013) compare household consumption to the full sample median, producing a treatment
where the strength of the descriptive norm is perfectly correlated with pre-treatment consumption.
Therefore a household with a high-water-use peer group can be above the median or 75th percentile of
the sample-wide distribution of pre-treatment consumption, but still consume less than the peer group.
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Figure 3.1: Strength of Normative Message by Quartiles of Pretreatment
Consumption
(a) Norm in kgal (T4) (b) Norm in conservation rate (T5)
Note: The graph displays the percentage of respondents receiving messages divided up by quartiles
of the performance relative to the peer group within each quartile of pre-treatment consumption.
The x-axis displays the quartiles of pre-treatment consumption and the y-axis displays the
percentage of respondents receiving a given message. The performances relative to the norm are
designated by the different colored bars. The performance relative to the peer group is defined based
on quartiles of the difference between a household’s consumption (panel (a) - T4) or conservation
rate (panel (b) - T5) and the peer group’s consumption.
bottom quartile of pre-treatment water consumption, some reduced their water consump-
tion by less than the median conservation rate in their peer group and thus received a
strong normative appeal. Likewise, some households with high pre-treatment consump-
tion reduced consumption by a larger percentage than their peer group. The distribution
of norms within each quartile of pre-treatment consumption is remarkably balanced for
the conservation rate comparison treatment. Figure 3.1 uses all data from the exper-
imental sample, but the same general pattern of consumption holds if we restrict the
sample to the treatment group, the control group, or any combination of treatment and
control for individual months of the sample.
We incorporate the information content of the mailers by estimating conditional av-
erage treatment effects (CATEs), where we condition on the difference between pre-
79
Are Normative Appeals Moral Taxes? Chapter 3
treatment consumption and the peer group median. The content of the mailers depends
on recent water use, which can introduce endogeneity into the estimated treatment ef-
fects for treatment groups that receive multiple mailers. The first mailing received only
depends on pre-treatment water use in the months immediately preceding the interven-
tion, but additional mailers include information from the first month of treatment. For
households randomly-selected to receive two letters, we therefore use only the first month
of post-treatment data, before the second letter was received. Since treatment is random-
ized across the distribution of pre-treatment water use, CATEs provide valid inference -
the results can be interpreted as causal treatment effects in the same style as studies that
condition on pre-intervention consumption (Allcott, 2011; Ferraro and Miranda, 2013;
Brent, Cook and Olsen, 2015).
The CATE model is defined as
yit = α +
k∑
c=1
γl,cTi,l × Ci,c +
k∑
c=1
θcCi,c + fixit + it (3.2)
In this model we are concerned with γl,c, which is the CATE for letter l in subgroup
c. Ti,l is an indicator for whether a household was treated with letter l and Ci,c is an
indicator for whether a household falls into subgroup c of the conditioning variable Ci,c.
The presence of Ci,c accounts for the sample-wide differences in consumption for subgroup
c. When we condition based on the performance relative to the peer group, Ci,c equals
a set of dummies indicating the quartiles of the difference between a household’s level
of consumption (or percentage conservation) and that of its peers in the month directly
preceding treatment. Since control households received no treatment, we calculate the
normative appeal that they would have received had they been treated. This accounts
for unobserved factors within each subgroup that are common to the treatment and
control groups. In the case of the difference from the comparison group in kgal (T4), Ci,c
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controls for the fact that high users generally receive comparisons above their peer group
in the gallons comparison (T4) and issues such as mean reversion in the conservation rate
comparison (T5). Since treated households only receive one realization of the difference
from their peer group, based either on their July or August water consumption, we
randomly assign each control household the difference from their peer group based on
either July or August in the same proportion as the treated households.10 We also run
specifications where the difference variables for the control households change over time
based on the realization in the previous month that produce very similar results.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Base Results
We begin by reporting the average treatment effects pooling the three treatments of
interest, and then briefly discuss each treatment individually. Column 1 of Table 3.4
shows that the average treatment effect (ATE) pooling all three treatments is slightly
greater than a 1.5% reduction in consumption. For reference, the generic tips treatment
(T1) had no statistically-significant impact on conservation, and the ATE of the tips
plus historical information (T2) treatment was slightly less than 1% and statistically
significant. Overall, our pooled ATE is a smaller effect than commonly reported for
social comparisons: Opower’s interventions typically reduced energy consumption by
about 2%, and both Ferraro and Miranda (2013) and Brent, Cook and Olsen (2015) find
average reductions in consumption of approximately 5%. However, these results should
10One third of the treatment group received a single mailer in July, one third received a single mailer
in August, and one third received mailers in July and August. Therefore two-thirds of the controls have
a comparison based on July consumption and one-third based on August consumption. Moreover, we
drop all observations after the first post-intervention month for the one-third of control households that
are randomly assigned to stand in for the two-mailer treatments.
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be considered in the context of an extensive utility-wide water conservation campaign
during the second year of a severe drought. Additionally, given that the aforementioned
studies on water examine some of the first interventions using social comparisons for
water conservation, the lower treatment effects are consistent with the findings of Allcott
(2015) that initial sites often have higher average treatment effects than subsequent sites.
Column (2) breaks down the treatments individually. Each treatment generated
statistically significant reductions in consumption and the point estimates are all very
close to each other. Columns (3)-(5) reproduce the ATE for each letter in separate
regressions using the individual treatment group and the control. This is simply to
demonstrate that both the point estimates and the standard errors are almost identical
whether we use the entire sample with three treatment dummies or restrict the sample to
one treatment and the control. Restricting the sample simplifies the presentation of the
results. All subsequent regressions also include controls for temperature, precipitation,
bill cycle fixed effects, month fixed effects, and pre-treatment consumption.
Next, we show that results for all of our treatments are consistent with previous re-
search that finds the level of pre-treatment consumption is positively correlated with the
conservation response to social comparisons. The results are based on the same model
in equation 3.2 but the conditioning variables are quartiles of pre-treatment consump-
tion. Figure 3.2 estimates CATEs by quartiles of pre-treatment consumption for each
individual treatment. Each panel reflects the results of one regression of the CATEs; the
shaded bars are the point estimates and the error bands are the 95% confidence intervals.
Each of the three treatments primarily generates statistically significant savings among
high users. Next, we analyze whether the treatment effect for the social comparison
treatments (T4 and T5) is driven by pre-treatment consumption or the strength of the
normative message.
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Table 3.4: Base Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Full Sample Individual Rate Social Comp. Social Comp.
(T3-T5) Treatments (T3) kgal (T4) % (T5)
All Treatments -1.550∗∗∗
(0.304)
Rate (T3) -1.604∗∗∗ -1.596∗∗∗
(0.466) (0.466)
Social Comp. kgal (T4) -1.455∗∗∗ -1.451∗∗∗
(0.446) (0.446)
Social Comp. % (T5) -1.591∗∗∗ -1.591∗∗∗
(0.473) (0.473)
Weather Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bill Cycle FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Baseline Water Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Households 33,937 33,937 25,532 25,529 25,510
Observations 96,759 96,759 74,530 74,494 74,449
Note: The dependent variable is normalized average daily water consumption; the coefficients can
be interpreted as a percentage change in consumption. Robust standard errors clustered at the
household level are reported in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
3.4.2 Difference from the Peer-Group Descriptive Norm
Our first CATE specification defines strong normative appeals as mailers that in-
formed households that they were above their peer group: either using more water than
their peer group (T4) or a lower percentage reduction than their peer group (T5). Our
second specification estimates CATEs based on quartiles of the difference from the peer
group, providing more variation in the performance relative to the peer group.
Column (1) of Table 3.5 shows the CATEs based on being above or below the peer
group for the social comparison in gallons. All of the savings essentially come from
households who are informed that they are consuming more than their peers. The same
pattern holds when we estimate CATEs within quartiles of the difference from the com-
parison group (Column (2) of Table 3.5). There is a monotonic relationship between the
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Figure 3.2: Conditional Average Treatment Effects by Quartiles of
Pre-treatment Consumption
Note: Each bar graph represents the output of one regression where the dependent variable is nor-
malized average daily water consumption. The bars are the point estimates of the CATEs for each
quartile of pre-treatment consumption, and the error bars are 95% confidence intervals constructed
from robust standard errors clustered at the household level. All regressions include controls for
temperature, precipitation, bill cycle fixed effects, month fixed effects, and pre-treatment consump-
tion.
difference from the peer group and the estimated treatment effects.11 As described above,
it is impossible to determine whether these results are due to the moral cost imposed by
the message or due to the fact that high users have more scope to correct internalities.
Columns (3)-(4) of Table 3.5 estimate the CATEs based on the difference from the
comparison group framed in terms of percentage conservation, which separates the per-
formance relative to the peer group from pre-treatment consumption. The pattern of
results is similar: households treated with a message telling them they conserved less
than their peers save water, whereas those who conserved more than their neighbors do
11Negative differences, which reflect households who are doing better than their peers, are associated
with insignificant treatment effects that are either positive or small and negative. Positive differences,
which reflect households who are doing worse than their peers, are associated with significant and
negative treatment effects, which increase with the difference from peer group.
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not. In fact, the results in column (4) using quartiles of the difference from the peer group
are even starker. Among households treated with the social comparison in percentage
terms, those who were conserving much less than their peers before receiving the letter
(Treat*Q4 Norm) saved over 5.7%. This is compared to a 1.3% increase (though not
statistically significant) among households who reduced consumption by a much larger
percentage than their peers (Treat*Q1 Norm). These results are consistent with social
comparisons operating through an increase in the moral cost of consumption: larger in-
creases in the moral cost lead to larger reductions in consumption. However, these results
do not rule out the second behavioral channel: stronger messages indicate more potential
to correct internalities.
To further disentangle the CATE’s from the level of consumption, we divide the
sample based on below-median baseline water users (column 5) and above-median users
(column 6) and estimate the CATE’s within each subsample. We do not perform the
analysis for the social comparison in gallons due to the strong correlation between the
difference from the peer group and pre-treatment consumption. The pattern of results
is the same for both low users who likely have fewer low-cost opportunities to correct
internalities and high users who likely have more opportunities. This is strong evidence
that the message operates by increasing the moral cost of consumption.
Moreover, higher levels of pre-treatment consumption act to magnify the results. The
savings for households in the upper two quartiles of the difference from peer group (worse
performance than peers, Treat*Q3 Norm and Treat*Q4 Norm) are roughly twice as large
for high users compared to low users. This suggests that there is a synergistic effect
between the moral cost of consumption and the motivation to correct internalities in
consumption. Alternatively, similar conservation actions, such as changing the irrigation
controller, are scaled up for high users so that the same action leads to more conservation.
There is no statistically-significant increase in consumption among those who outperform
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Table 3.5: Difference from Peer Group
Norm in Gallons (T4) Norm in % (T5)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All All All All Low Users High Users
Treat*Below Peer 0.205 0.184
(0.644) (0.766)
Treat*Above Peer -2.208∗∗ -3.768∗∗∗
(0.914) (0.907)
Treat*Q1 Norm 0.347 1.267 1.423 1.310
(0.901) (1.166) (0.980) (2.119)
Treat*Q2 Norm 0.0579 -0.117 0.477 -0.624
(0.874) (0.918) (0.884) (1.521)
Treat*Q3 Norm -1.692∗ -2.900∗∗∗ -1.637∗∗ -3.877∗∗∗
(1.014) (0.898) (0.828) (1.465)
Treat*Q4 Norm -2.627∗ -5.670∗∗∗ -4.358∗∗∗ -7.092∗∗∗
(1.528) (1.368) (1.313) (2.349)
Observations 68,933 68,873 68,929 68,834 33,129 35,477
Note: The dependent variable is normalized average daily water consumption, and the sample is
restricted to the month after a household’s first mailer. CATEs are estimated based on the difference
(above/below) of household consumption relative to the peer group. Column headers All represents
the whole sample, and Low/High Users restrict the sample to households above or below median
pre-treatment consumption. All regressions include controls for temperature, precipitation, bill cycle
fixed effects, month fixed effects, and pre-treatment consumption. Robust standard errors clustered
at the household level are reported in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
their peers. Overall, these results suggest that social comparisons appear to operate at
least partly through increasing the moral cost of consumption for households performing
worse than their peers.
3.4.3 Survey Evidence for Behavioral Channels
To provide additional evidence of the behavioral mechanisms of response to our treat-
ments, we link our data to responses from a utility-sponsored survey conducted after the
intervention (Christman, 2016). Approximately 1,500 households in our experimental
sample answered the survey, and although the survey respondents are not representative
of the greater service area (overall they used less water prior to treatment and lived in
smaller, less expensive homes), the survey sample is balanced across treatments and the
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control group for key variables (Tables C.6-C.8 show balance statistics for the survey
sample). We pool the two social comparison treatments to focus on how differences in
attitudes influence the treatment effects for the rate information treatment, which frames
conservation as a financial savings, compared to the social comparisons, which focus more
heavily on moral suasion.
Table 3.6 shows the results of regressions that interact the treatment effects with
indicators for households that answered yes to questions related to their motivations for
using water or capacity to conserve. In Table 3.6 “Survey Variable” corresponds to a
dummy indicating that the respondent answered yes to the question indicated in the
column header. Summary statistics for the survey variables are available in Appendix C.
The first column simply replicates the treatment effects for the survey sample; the point
estimates are similar, but slightly higher and not statistically significant.12 The next three
columns (2-4) represent pro-social motivations. These households indicated that they
would be willing to let their lawn go brown if the drought continued (column (2)); thought
that water scarcity was a serious concern (column (3)); and indicated that they saved
water to help the environment and/or their community (column (4)). The interaction
terms for all three pro-social indicators are negative and often significant, indicating that
pro-social households were more responsive to both types of treatments. Recall also that
the financially-oriented treatment also contained a reminder about TMWA’s 10% goal
and an exhortation to do their part.
The next two columns (5-6) represent households who make their water decisions
based on grounds other than water scarcity, environmental, or community concerns.
These households indicated that they should be able to use water as they choose (columns
(5)) or saved water in order to save money (column (6)). We argue that households that
12Pooling the three treatments together does produce a statistically significant treatment effect in the
survey sample.
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Table 3.6: Survey Evidence of Behavioral Channels
Pro-social Motivations Alternative Motivations Capacity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Baseline Lawn Brown Water Environment & Use How Save Already
Scarcity Community I Want Money Conserved
Rate (T3) -1.965 -0.631 0.536 3.772 -1.216 -2.739 -5.134∗
(1.920) (2.091) (2.460) (5.230) (2.271) (3.243) (2.633)
Social Comp. (T4-T5) -2.573 -1.556 0.00760 5.433 -2.812 -5.448∗ -2.421
(1.571) (1.636) (2.095) (4.472) (1.804) (2.807) (1.992)
Survey Variable 4.139 1.472 0.0162 0.847 -2.152 -0.0708
(3.856) (1.784) (2.134) (2.007) (1.826) (1.768)
T3*Survey Variable -13.52∗∗∗ -6.496∗ -6.696 -3.135 1.183 7.285∗
(5.065) (3.925) (5.628) (4.204) (4.046) (3.840)
T4-T5*Survey Variable -12.71∗∗ -6.709∗∗ -9.323∗ 1.489 4.285 -0.433
(5.427) (3.087) (4.780) (3.511) (3.403) (3.126)
Households 1,536 1,536 1,536 1,536 1,536 1,536 1,536
Observations 4,371 4,371 4,371 4,371 4,371 4,371 4,371
Note: The dependent variable is normalized average daily water consumption, and the sample is
restricted to survey respondents. The first column replicates the ATE for the rate information treat-
ment and pooled social comparisons. Columns (2) - (7) interact the treatment variable with dummy
variables if the respondent answered that survey question positively: “Survey Variable” refers to the
dummy variable indicated by the column headers. All regressions include controls for temperature,
precipitation, bill cycle fixed effects, month fixed effects, and pre-treatment consumption. Robust
standard errors clustered at the household level are reported in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1
want the freedom to use water as they choose and save water for financial reasons will
be less responsive to the social comparison treatments. This is indeed the case: while
the results are not significant (nor significantly different) relative to the rate information
treatment, the financially motivated households are less responsive to treatment. In the
last column, we show results for households that have already conserved and likely have
lower capacity to correct internalities. The rate information treatment is significantly
less effective for households with previous conservation efforts, which suggests that these
households might have previously over-perceived the marginal cost of water. By contrast,
for households who have not already conserved, rate and monetary savings information
leads to a 5% reduction in consumption that is significant at the 10% level. There
is essentially no impact of prior conservation on the savings from social comparisons.
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Overall, these survey results indicate that pro-social households are more responsive to
both treatments, which corroborates our main finding that social comparisons operate
in part by imposing a moral cost on consumption. There is also evidence that the rate
information treatment is relatively more effective at prompting households to correct
internalities than the social comparisons, a point that we investigate further in the next
section.
3.4.4 Persistence & Additionality
To further investigate the mechanisms of response to our treatments, we analyze the
variation in the persistence of the treatment effects. We posit that increasing the moral
cost of consumption has a temporary impact on consumers. This is consistent with pre-
vious studies that the magnitude of the treatment effect decays as time from the last
mailer increases, although treatment effect are often detectable long after treatment is
discontinued (Ferraro and Miranda, 2013; Bernedo, Ferraro and Price, 2014; Allcott and
Rogers, 2014; Brandon et al., 2017). Moreover, consumers who experience an increased
moral cost may seek to adjust consumption by making temporary behavioral changes,
whereas consumers seeking to correct internalities are more likely to undertake invest-
ments that will have more lasting conservation effects.13 Under this reasoning, treatments
that operate through increasing moral cost should have less persistent treatment effects
than treatments that prompt consumers to correct internalities. Treatments that gener-
ate similar patterns of savings over time are likely to operate through similar behavioral
mechanisms. To this end, we compare the persistence of the treatment effects for the
treatment focused on rate information and monetary savings (T3) and the social compar-
isons (T4-T5). The rate information treatment directly prompts consumers to address
13This is not to say that moral cost cannot induce investments in efficiency. Brandon et al. (2017)
provide evidence that OPower treatments induce savings after the initial tenants who received the reports
leave, which is consistent with investments in energy efficiency.
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internalities in consumption in order to save money, whereas our previous results suggest
that social norms operate in part through a moral motivation. We also examine whether
there is a differential effect of sending an additional letter on these treatments. We ex-
pect to see less of an effect of additionality on nudges that operate primarily through
prompting consumers to correct internalities in consumption. If a consumer receives use-
ful information that helps them re-optimize, seeing similar information a second time
should not generate additional savings. In order to understand the implications of the
timing and number of treatments we run the following regression,
yit = α+γ1,l1{First Mailer, F irst Monthit,l}+
γ2,l1{First Mailer, Second Monthit,l}+
γ3,l1{First Mailer, Third Monthit,l}+
γ4,l1{Second Mailerit,l}+ fixit + it
(3.3)
where the treatments are now broken down by the months since the first letter was
received in addition to a dummy for whether there was a second mailer (γ4,l). We analyze
three months from the first letter since this corresponds to the end of the summer demand
season (October). Therefore, γ2 and γ3 test whether the treatment was persistent and γ4
represents the additionality of the second mailer.14 Table 3.7 presents the results for the
rate and social comparison treatments.
The rate information treatment is very persistent with similar magnitude treatment
effects in each of the three months following the first letter, and a second letter generates
no additional savings. By contrast, the social comparison treatments (T4 and T5) are
not persistent; however these treatments achieve significant additionality from the second
mailer. The savings from the first treatment decreases by roughly 50% or more per
month. Sending another mailer increases conservation by almost 2%. The results for the
14The second mailer affects consumption in two months: September and October.
90
Are Normative Appeals Moral Taxes? Chapter 3
Table 3.7: Persistence & Additionality of Second Mailers
All Below Median Above Median
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rate Social Comp. Rate Social Comp. Rate Social Comp.
1st Letter, 1st Month -1.395∗∗ -1.474∗∗∗ -0.00465 -0.536 -2.680∗∗∗ -2.371∗∗∗
(0.542) (0.403) (0.565) (0.375) (0.903) (0.692)
1st Letter, 2nd Month -1.899∗∗∗ -1.108∗∗ -0.241 -0.839∗∗ -3.326∗∗∗ -1.374∗
(0.592) (0.449) (0.565) (0.417) (0.998) (0.762)
1st Letter, 3rd Month -1.499∗∗ -0.304 -0.305 -0.773 -2.850∗∗ 0.149
(0.739) (0.554) (0.677) (0.547) (1.250) (0.917)
2nd Letter 0.158 -1.922∗∗∗ -0.453 -0.321 0.743 -3.456∗∗∗
(0.759) (0.558) (0.694) (0.522) (1.296) (0.951)
Households 25,532 29,722 12,305 14,311 13,227 15,411
Observations 74,530 85,586 35,923 41,206 38,607 44,380
social comparisons are consistent with the Allcott and Rogers (2014) results where the
pattern of action and backsliding stems from a model of consumption cues, and indicate
similar behavioral motivations for response to social comparisons of energy consumption.
The same pattern holds when we estimate regressions for each of the social comparisons
individually.
We also divide the sample based on whether the household was above or below the
median of pre-treatment consumption to compare the persistence of treatment for low
and high users. We see high users within both treatments have a pattern of savings that
is consistent with the overall treatment effect pattern. High users drive the treatment
effect, which is not surprising, since most of the water savings in all of our five treatments
come from high users. The fact that social comparisons are not persistent and require
additional mailers even among high users with greater potential to correct internalities,
provides further evidence that households are responding to social comparisons due to
increased moral costs.
The differences in persistence and additionality across treatments can be interpreted
in the framework of intent-oriented actions and impact-oriented actions developed by
Attari (2014). Intent-oriented actions include behavioral changes such as turning off the
91
Are Normative Appeals Moral Taxes? Chapter 3
Table 3.8: Mechanisms of Water Conservation: Investment and Changes
in Behavior
(1) (2)
Invested in Efficiency Behavioral Changes
Rate (T3) 0.0528 0.0256
(0.0354) (0.0240)
Social Comparisons (T4-T5) -0.0759∗∗∗ -0.00339
(0.0228) (0.0188)
HOA w/ Landscape Restrictions Yes Yes
Already Invested in Traditional Landscape Yes Yes
Already Invested in Water Efficiency Yes Yes
Observations 1,536 1,536
water when brushing teeth, while impact-oriented actions include investments such as
replacing a toilet. Households perform intent-oriented actions with the intention to help
the environment, while impact-oriented actions are focused on achieving more substantial
conservation. The results suggest that nudges that operate by prompting consumers to
correct internalities (T3) lead to impact-oriented actions, while nudges that increase the
moral cost of consumption (T4 and T5) lead to intent-oriented actions.
Indeed TMWA survey results corroborate these findings. A series of questions asked
households what types of actions they took to reduce water consumption. We focused on
responses to questions that correspond to our treatment period. The types of actions can
be divided into two general categories: investments in efficiency such as repairing leaks or
replacing lawn with xeriscaping and behavioral changes such as taking shorter showers.
We generate indicator variables for whether a household engaged in any investment or
any behavioral change and use these as the dependent variables in a linear probability
model estimated with ordinary least squares. The results, presented in Table 3.8, show
that households treated with social comparisons are significantly less likely to invest in
efficiency compared to households that received the rate information treatment. There is
no statistical difference in the relative propensity to engage in behavioral changes. This
provides further evidence of the different mechanisms that are operating for the rate
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and social comparison treatments. The results are consistent with households correcting
internalities in response to rate information and making short-term cuts in consumption
in response to social comparisons.
3.4.5 Robustness
We run several robustness tests to assure that our results are not actually being driven
by spurious correlation or the discrete effects of being above or below the norm. The
treatment period started in August 2015 utilizing July 2015 data on the mailers. Our
first robustness check runs falsification tests by using the content generated by June 2015
data. We generate the difference from the peer group using June 2015 for both treated
and control households to see if the types of households that were above or below the peer
group were actually driving the results as opposed to the actual content of the mailers.
This is a valid falsification test of our results due to the fact that variation in seasonal
consumption leads to variation in household performance relative to a peer group. Some
households can be below their peer group earlier in the summer, but have much higher
peak water use than the peer group later in the summer. Table 3.9 shows results using
the simulated mailer content. The results are substantially different than Table 3.5.
Households above and below the false peer group have statistically significant CATEs in
the conservation rate information treatment (column (3)), and neither of the CATEs are
statistically significantly different from each other. The CATE for households below the
peer group in the traditional social comparison is not statistically significant, but this is
likely due to the fact that they are low users and their real letter also indicated that they
were below their peer group. The specification with quartiles of the norm in percentage
terms (column (4)) shows that three out of the four CATEs generate savings over 2% and
are significant at the 5% level. In general, households above the false peer group do save
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more water, but this is likely due to serial correlation in water consumption; households
above the peer group in June are more likely to be above the peer group in July and
August.
The regressions presented in Table 3.5 have different numbers of observations for
each household. Households treated with one mailer in July have three observations
after treatment (August, September, and October), households treated with one mailer
in August have two observations (September and October), and households treated with
two mailers only have the observation immediately following their initial letter. In order
to test if the difference in the number of observations impacts the results we drop all
households treated with two mailers and only use the first two observations after the first
mailer. The results are very similar to our preferred specification, which incorporates
all valid observations, and are available in Table C.9 in Appendix C. We also run the
same set of regressions limiting the sample to the first month after a household receives a
mailer. This sample includes observations immediately after a household’s first mailer for
households treated with two mailers. The results, presented in Table C.10 in Appendix
C, also display the same general pattern where the magnitude of the treatment effect
depends on the difference from the peer group.
Since the mailers also present information on historical consumption and reference
the utility-wide 10% goal we also run regressions for quartiles of the difference between
an household’s conservation rate and the 10% goal. The distance from the 10% goal does
affect the CATEs, but this is at least in part due to the correlation with pre-treatment
water use and the conservation rate. The results, presented in Table C.11 in Appendix
C, do not show the monotonic relationship that we observe for CATEs based on the
difference from the peer group, and they vary across treatments. Lastly, we test for
the discrete effects for moving above a peer group or failing to meet the 10% goal in
a regression discontinuity design. We find no effect of moving above the peer group in
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Table 3.9: Falsification Test for Difference from Peer Group
Norm in Gallons (T4) Norm in % (T5)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treat*Below Peer -0.660 -1.184
(0.636) (0.786)
Treat*Above Peer -1.794∗ -2.181∗∗
(0.938) (0.934)
Treat*Q1 Norm -0.148 -2.274∗∗
(0.910) (1.093)
Treat*Q2 Norm -1.166 -0.238
(0.881) (1.090)
Treat*Q3 Norm -2.197∗∗ -1.629∗
(1.108) (0.990)
Treat*Q4 Norm -1.290 -2.708∗
(1.512) (1.615)
Observations 68,933 68,930 68,929 68,896
Note: The dependent variable is normalized average daily water consumption, and the sample is
restricted to the month after a household’s first mailer. CATEs are estimated based on the quartiles of
the difference of household consumption relative to the peer group. Robust standard errors clustered
at the household level are reported in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
either gallons or percentage terms, nor do we find any effect of moving slightly above the
10% goal. This is consistent with the findings of Allcott (2011) for social comparisons
in energy and with unpublished results from the project reported in Brent, Cook and
Olsen (2015). Appendix C describes the regression discontinuity design in more detail
and presents both graphical evidence and the regression discontinuity estimates based on
Calonico, Catteneo and Titiunik (2015).
3.5 Conclusions
We designed and implemented an experiment using multiple treatments in a policy
environment where a municipal water utility was running a well-publicized campaign
asking every customer to reduce their monthly consumption by 10%. We find that two
versions of a social comparison and a third treatment providing information on monetary
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savings lead to a 1.5% reduction in water consumption relative to the control group.
This reduced consumption was in addition to the overall system-wide reduction achieved
of over 15%. While there may be some concern that the 10% goal reduces the external
validity of our experimental results, calls for uniform reductions are a common utility
practice as evidenced by Governor Brown’s 2015 call for reducing water consumption in
California by 25%. We also note that there was a utility-wide appeal for conservation
in the well-known water conservation experiments in Cobb County examined by Ferraro
and Price (2013). The treatments generated effects that were similar in magnitude and
statistically indistinguishable from each other.
We introduced a new normative appeal method that decouples pre-treatment con-
sumption from the difference from the peer group by framing savings in terms of percent-
age achievement to the target conservation goal of 10%. The strength of the normative
message is a strong driver of variation in the treatment effect over low and high consump-
tion levels for our new conservation rate social comparison treatment, although treatment
effects are magnified for larger water users. These results are consistent with an interpre-
tation that social comparisons impose a moral cost on consumption, and the size of the
moral tax depends on the magnitude of the difference between household performance
and that of a peer group. Both social comparison treatments display the pattern of “ac-
tion and backsliding” shown by Allcott and Rogers (2014) indicating that they operate
through a similar behavioral mechanism; however, we find a different pattern over time
for the treatment that highlights financial savings. In contrast to the social comparisons,
a single mailer for the financial savings treatment is persistent over the study period,
with no additional conservation generated by an additional mailer. This is consistent
with households responding to the social comparisons with intent-oriented actions that
fade over time, whereas the financial treatment may lead to re-optimizing water use to
correct internalities, as in a household production framework, where responses are more
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persistent (Attari, 2014). Survey evidence shows that households in the financial savings
information treatment are more likely to invest in water efficiency relative to households
treated with social comparisons.
The behavioral mechanisms underlying the response to social comparisons are impor-
tant when evaluating economic welfare effects of programs designed to promote voluntary
reduction in water consumption. Use of customized information in mailings that prompt
consumers to re-optimize consumption to address internalities will generally produce
higher welfare gains than those that impose a moral cost on consumption (Allcott and
Kessler, 2015). Individuals operating with moral motivations may act to reduce existing
internalities, thereby limiting welfare-reducing effects of normative appeals. However,
there is likely variation in the available internalities across regions due to differences in
whether irrigation is necessary to maintain healthy landscape as well as variation in the
extent to which utilities have promoted investment in efficient fixtures and appliances.
In regions similar to the area serviced by TMWA, which experiences seasonal outdoor
water use that is 4 to 5 times higher than indoor use alone, consumers may have ample
opportunities to correct internalities by investing in irrigation efficiency and water effi-
cient landscape. Similarly, households in areas which have experienced fewer instances of
calls for water conservation are likely to have room to exploit internality correction, since
consumers have not been previously prompted to invest in efficient appliances. Thus,
prior experience with conservation is likely to impact the welfare effects of normative
appeals for water and energy conservation. Understanding the behavioral mechanisms
also helps policymakers select interventions that meet specific objectives. For urban wa-
ter managers there are important distinctions between interventions that temporarily
reduce water consumption during a drought and permanently reduce consumption after
water supplies have recovered. Therefore, understanding different nudges prompt differ-
ent types of actions expands the toolbox for policymakers to address the different forms
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of water scarcity that varies across regions.
A practical contribution of our work is a more sophisticated understanding of the
motivations that underlie responses to normative appeal campaigns to improve welfare
outcomes of future campaigns. Utilities use normative messaging campaigns to reduce
energy or water consumption ostensibly to improve welfare in situations where unpriced
consumption externalities cause the social marginal cost to be greater than the retail
price. Normative messaging campaigns that also improve welfare for a household whose
current consumption does not in fact maximize their own welfare, by cuing the correction
of internalities, generates both private and external benefits. Conservation campaigns
that focus on addressing internalities, as opposed to imposing a moral cost, have the
potential to increase the welfare benefits of these tools more than reliance on moral
appeals alone, along with generating more persistent treatment effects.
98
Appendix A
The Effect of Price Information on
Consumer Behavior Under
Nonlinear Tariffs: Evidence from a
Water Utility Merger
A.1 First Order Conditions
The first order conditions from the expected utility maximization are as follows:
(A.1)
U1(q
∗
U , I − p1q∗U)− p1 U2(q∗U , I − p1q∗U)
+ f(q∗U)
[∫ q∗U
0
U(q∗U , I − p1k˜ − p2(q∗U − k˜))dF (k˜)− U(q∗U , I − p1q∗U)
]
+ F (q∗U)
[∫ q∗U
0
[
U1(q
∗
U , I − p1k˜ − p2(q∗U − k˜))
− p2 U2(q∗U , I − p1k˜ − p2(q∗U − k˜))
]
dF (k˜) + U(q∗U , I − p1q∗U)
− U1(q∗U , I − p1q∗U) + p1 U2(q∗U , I − p1q∗U)
]
= 0
where U1(·) = ∂U∂q and U2(·) = ∂U∂z .
For Quasilinear utility, which represents risk neutral preferences over income, the
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problem becomes:
(A.2)
max
q
αi log(q) + I − p1 q
+
Φ
(
q−k
σi
)
− Φ
(
−k
σi
)
1− Φ
(
−k
σi
)
 (p2 − p1)[k + σi [ φ(−kσi )− φ( q−kσi )
Φ( q−k
σi
)− Φ(−k
σi
)
]
− q
]
The first order conditions are as follows:
αi
q∗Ui
+ (p2 − p1)
 1σi φ( q∗Ui−kσi )
1− Φ(−k
σi
)
 k + σi
 φ(−kσi )− φ( q∗Ui−kσi )
Φ(
q∗Ui−k
σi
)− Φ(−k
σi
)
− q∗Ui

+
Φ( q∗Ui−kσi )− Φ(−kσi )
1− Φ
(
−k
σi
)
(Φ(−kσi )− Φ( q∗Ui−kσi ))φ′( q∗Ui−kσi )− (φ(−kσi )− φ( q∗Ui−kσi ))φ( q∗Ui−kσi )
(Φ(
q∗Ui−k
σi
)− Φ(−k
σi
))2

− 1
− p1 = 0
(A.3)
Figures A.1 (a) and A.1 (b) show the equivalence of maximizing expected utility and
maximizing utility with respect the expected budget constraint in the case of Quasilinear
utility. For a consumer with preferences that lead to a tier 1 consumption choice under
full information, in Figure A.1 (a), the uninformed consumption choice is roughly two
thousand gallons less than the informed consumption choice in this example. For a
consumer with preferences that lead to a tier 2 consumption choice under full information,
in Figure A.1 (b), the uninformed consumption choice is roughly two thousand gallons
more than the informed consumption choice in this example.
For constant-relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility, which represents risk averse pref-
erences over income, the problem becomes:
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Figure A.1: Expected Utility Maximization for Quasilinear Utility
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Note: These simulations assume k = 10, 000 gallons, p1 = $2/1, 000 gallons, p2 = $4/1, 000 gallons, quasi-linear
preferences: Ui(q, I − B(q; k˜i, p1, p2)) = αi log(q) + I − B(q; k˜i, p1, p2), and truncated Normal beliefs: F (k˜i) =
Φ
(
k˜−k
σi
)
−Φ
(−k
σi
)
1−Φ
(−k
σi
) . Figure A.1 (a) compares informed an uniformed choices for a consumer who prefers to consume
below the tier threshold under full information. Figure A.1 (b) shows a similar comparison for consumption choices
above the tier threshold.
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U(q, I −B(q; k˜, p1, p2)) = αi log(q) +
{
1
1−θ (I −B(q; k˜, p1, p2))(1−θ), if θ > 0, θ 6= 1
ln(I −B(q; k˜, p1, p2)), if θ = 1
(A.4)
max
q
[
αi log(q) +
1
1− θ (I − p1 q)
(1−θ) +[
Φ
(
q−k
σ
)− Φ (−k
σ
)
1− Φ (−k
σ
) ] [∫ q
0
1
1− θ (I − p1k˜ − p2(q − k˜))
(1−θ)dΦ
(
k˜ − k
σ
)
−
1
1− θ (I − p1 q)
(1−θ)
]]
First order conditions:
(A.5)
αi
q
− p1(I − p1 q)−θ +[
1
σ
φ( q−k
σ
)
1− Φ(−k
σ
)
] [∫ q
0
1
1− θ (I − p1k˜ − p2(q − k˜))
(1−θ)dΦ
(
k˜ − k
σ
)
−
1
1− θ (I − p1 q)
(1−θ)
]
+
[
Φ
(
q−k
σ
)− Φ (−k
σ
)
1− Φ (−k
σ
) ][∫ q
0
−p2 (I − p1k˜ − p2(q − k˜))−θdΦ
(
k˜ − k
σ
)
+
1
1− θ (I − p1 q)
(1−θ) − p1(I − p1 q)−θ
]
= 0
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A.2 Heterogeneous Response to Information
This section presents a simple difference-in-differences approach to estimating dif-
ferential response to information based location of pre-treatment consumption relative
to the tier thresholds. This model is based on the third takeaway from the theoretical
model, which predicts that consumers with pre-treatment consumption that is far away
from any tier threshold will not respond to price information on monthly bills. House-
holds with pre-treatment consumption outside of some bandwidth distance from the tier
thresholds serve as a control group for the households that are within this bandwidth
distance. These households control for any changes in demand that result from other
conservation policies and exogenous shocks to consumption. For a given bandwidth,
treatment households within the bandwidth are separated into whether they consume
below and above the tier threshold. Let d¯ be this bandwidth distance. Household i will
be assigned to the below tier treatment group during billing month s if
bis =
{
1, if k − d¯ ≤ Yis < k
0, otherwise
and the above treatment group if
ais =
{
1, if k ≤ Yis < k + d¯
0, otherwise
and the control group otherwise. The regression model is as follows:
ln(Yit) = αi + β1 bis 1Post + β2 ais 1Post + λt +Witγ + εit (A.6)
where bis is an indicator for household i equal to one if pre-treatment consumption
in month s is below the nearest tier threshold and zero otherwise, ais is an indicator for
household i equal to one if pre-treatment consumption in month s is above the nearest tier
threshold and zero otherwise, and 1Post is an indicator for billing periods after the merger.
If information leads households just below the tier threshold to increase consumption and
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households just above the tier threshold to decrease consumption then β1 > 0 and β2 < 0.
The drawback of this empirical strategy is that it is dependent on choosing the correct
d¯ that separates consumers who should be affected by price information from those who
should not be affected by price information.
Table A.1 presents results from equation A.6. For this specification d¯ = 4 (thousand
gallons), however the results are similar for bandwidths of three and five thousand gallons.
There are consistently positive signs for the below tier treatment group across all three
models and the coefficients are significant in models 2 and 3. These results suggest that
being just below a tier threshold leads to 1% increase in consumption after the merger
relative to the control group. The signs for the above tier treatment group are consistently
negative across all models and significant in models 1 and 2. These results suggest that
being just above the tier threshold leads to slightly under a 1% decrease in consumption
relative to the control group.
Table A.1: Alternative Specification for Low Information Heterogeneous
Response to Information
(1) (2) (3)
2010-2016 2013-2016 2014-2016
β1 0.0051 0.0112
∗∗ 0.0117∗∗∗
(0.0042) (0.0049) (0.0038)
β2 -0.0102
∗∗ -0.0069∗ -0.0043
(0.0042) (0.0035) (0.0027)
Within R-squared 0.0044 0.0031 0.0034
Households 14,361 14,361 14,361
Observations 468,944 284,427 213,340
Note: The dependent variable is log of monthly water consumption divided by the number of days on
the bill. The coefficients can be interpreted as the percentage change in consumption. The sample is
limited to summer water use (May-September) for Low Information households only. Controls for all
regressions include household FEs, month-by-year FEs, Average Temperature, and Precipitation in
Inches. Robust standard errors clustered at the meter reading route level are reported in parenthesis.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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A.3 Additional Robustness Checks
To further rule out concerns about remaining differences in pre-treatment trends after
including a separate linear trend and seasonality for the low information utility, I perform
two placebo tests. For the first test, I restrict the study period from 2010 to 2013, before
the merger is announced. I assume that the placebo policy occurs in January 2013. A
negative and significant estimated treatment effect would indicate that low information
average consumption is already decreasing relative to high information average consump-
tion before the merger, causing the estimated treatment effect to overstate the true effect
of providing price information on monthly utility bills on water consumption. In a second
placebo test, I restrict the study period from 2010 to 2014, and assume the placebo policy
occurs in January 2014. A negative and significant estimated treatment effect indicates
that news of the merger motivates low information households to decrease consumption,
possibly due to anticipation of higher prices or stricter water use policies after the utility
merger.
Column 1 of Table A.2 presents the results from the first placebo test. I leave 2014 out
of this first placebo test to prevent drought restrictions from confounding the analysis.
The placebo test indicates that there are no significant differences in pre-treatment trends
before 2014. Column 2 of Table A.2 uses data from 2010-2014 and assumes that a placebo
policy occurred in January 2014. Once again, there is no significant placebo effect. These
results further confirm that the model adequately controls for differences in pre-treatment
trends between low information and high information households.
In addition to the drought restrictions, another possible confounding policy includes
several conservation programs offered by the high information utility.1 At the time of
1Programs include providing conservation information, free water audits to detect leaks, and water
waste penalties. Water waste penalties are rarely assessed. The utility mainly focuses on educating
consumers about water waste and relies on positive encouragement rather than financial penalties.
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Table A.2: Additional Robustness Checks for Main Difference-in-differ-
ences Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2014 Placebo 2013 Placebo Conservation Field Experiment
β 0.0019 -0.0094 -0.0403∗∗∗ -0.0371∗∗∗
(0.0061) (0.0091) (0.0122) (0.0122)
β*Other Treatment 0.0381∗∗∗ 0.0195∗∗∗
(0.0058) (0.0067)
Low Info Linear Trend 0.0009∗∗ 0.0012∗∗∗ 0.0010∗∗∗ 0.0009∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Low Info Avg. Use 15.71 15.65
No Treat Avg. Use 15.32 15.21
Treat Avg. Use 18.15 16.52
Within R-squared 0.0110 0.0106 0.0089 0.0088
Households 60,833 60,810 60,833 60,833
Observations 3,266,388 2,548,715 4,460,397 4,460,397
Note: The dependent variable is log of monthly water consumption divided by the number of days
on the bill. The coefficients can be interpreted as the percentage change in consumption. Results
based on subsamples as indicated by column titles. Controls for all regressions include household
FEs, month-by-year FEs, Average Temperature, Precipitation in Inches, and a separate trend and
month FEs for Low Information households. Robust standard errors clustered at the meter reading
route level are reported in parenthesis. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
consolidation, all low information households had access to these conservation programs,
which were not previously available to them. A difference-in-differences strategy, there-
fore, estimates the joint effect of providing price information on monthly bill and con-
servation programs participation on low information households. To address this issue,
I estimate a separate treatment effect for low information households who participate in
conservation programs at any point after the merger using conservation program records
from the high information utility. This specification estimates the differential effect of
participation in conservation programs on low information households after the merger.
In doing so, I will determine whether the main treatment effect of providing price in-
formation on monthly utility bills is actually being driven by the availability of other
programs offered by the high information utility. If the treatment effect for households
who do not participate in conservation programs is comparable in magnitude to the
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overall treatment effect estimated in Table 1.4, this will indicate that the results are not
driven by voluntary participation in conservation programs.
The results, in Column 3 of Table A.2, are similar to the results for the full sample,
in Table 1.4. The estimated treatment effect is negative and significant. Moreover, the
coefficient is slightly larger in magnitude if anything. Households who participated in
conservation programs used significantly more water after the merger, which only serves
to attenuate the overall affect if anything. These results suggest that the availability of
conservation programs after the merger does not drive the treatment effect.
Another potential confounder is the treatment of a subset of households during the
course of a field experiment that was conducted by the high information utility during
summer 2015. The high information utility sent letters to 23,000 low and high informa-
tion households to encourage them to comply with the drought restrictions. The purpose
of these letters was to test the relative effectiveness of various sources of technical in-
formation and other normative messages on household conservation.2 To ensure that
the field experiment treatment effect is not driving the change in consumption after the
merger, I estimate one set of specifications that exclude treatment households from the
sample.
Results in Column 4 of Table A.2 suggest that the field experiment does not dra-
matically effect the results. This is likely due to the fact that both low information
and high information households were treated during the course of this field experiment.
The estimated coefficients are almost identical in magnitude to the estimates in Table
1.4. Moreover, the treatment households used significantly more water after the merger
relative to non-treatment households. These results suggest that the field experiment, if
anything, attenuates the measure effect of providing price information on monthly utility
bills.
2See Brent et al. (2016) for more information about the details of this field experiment.
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A.4 Additional Figures
Figure A.2: Differences in Estimated Linear Trends: Control vs. Treatment
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Note: This figure plots estimated year fixed effects for low information and high information house-
holds from a model that regresses the log of consumption divided by the number of days on the water
bill on separate year and month fixed effects for low information and high information households,
weather controls, and household fixed effects. The sample is limited to time periods that occur
before the merger. Robust standard errors clustered at the meter reading route level
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Figure A.3: Event Study Plot
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Note: This event study plot uses the last year before the merger (2014) as the reference year. It demonstrates
that model 1.7 does not adequately control for differences in pre-treatment trends between low and high information
households. Robust standard errors are clustered at the meter reading route level.
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Appendix B
Automatic Billing, Paperless Billing,
and Consumer Inattentiveness:
Evidence from Water Demand
B.1 Duration Results
To analyze the effect of enrollment duration in ABP and PL on consumption I estimate
1) a model that includes a polynomial function of ABP and PL enrollment and 2) a
nonlinear function of the treatment by enrollment length. The first model is as follows:
ln(Yit) = g(ABP Duration)+h(PL Duration)+αi+λt+Witγ+f(Account Duration)+εit
(B.1)
where g(ABP Duration) is a cubic function of the duration on ABP and h(PL Duration)
is a cubic function of the duration on PL.
To estimate the second specification, I divide the treatments into 1) enrolled for less
than 1 year, 2) enrolled for 1-3 years, and 3) enrolled for more than 3 years. The second
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specification is as follows:
ln(Yit) =β
A
1 x
A
it 11year + β
A
2 x
A
it 11−3years + β
A
3 x
A
it 13years
+ βP1 x
P
it 11year + β
P
2 x
P
it 11−3years + β
P
3 x
P
it 13years
+ αi + λt +Witγ + f(Account Duration) + εit (B.2)
where 11year is an indicator equal to one if account i is enrolled less than 1 year, 11−3years
is an indicator equal to one if account i is enrolled 1-3 years, and 13years is an indicator
equal to one if account i is enrolled at least 3 years.
Table B.1 presents results in columns 1-4 that estimate the effect of enrollment dura-
tion. For ABP and PL enrollment duration is positively related to consumption. More-
over, results in columns 3 and 4 suggest this is a linear effect. These results indicate that
the average ABP account, which is enrolled for 40 billing periods, increases consumption
by 2% relative to non-ABP accounts. The average PL account, which has an enrollment
of on 26 billing periods increases consumption by only 0.5% relative to non-PL accounts.
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Columns 5 and 6 of Table B.1 group the effects based on duration of 1 year or less,
1-3 years, or greater than 3 years. For accounts enrolled in ABP less than 1 year, there is
a significant decrease in consumption of more than 1%. For accounts enrolled 1-3 years
the effect is positive but not significant. However, for accounts enrolled longer than three
years the effect is over 3%. My results are similar to findings reported by Sexton (2015),
who finds that there is a negative and insignificant effect on electricity consumption
during the first 4 months of enrollment in ABP, and no positive and significant effect
until at least 8 months of enrollment. The pattern of results is different for PL, where the
effect is a significant 2% decrease for accounts enrolled in PL less than 1 year, the effect
is not significant for accounts on PL 1-3 years, and the effect is an almost 2% increase in
consumption for accounts enrolled at least 3 years. Overall these results show that the
ABP and PL effects are being driven by households who are enrolled for longer periods
of time—especially more than three years where consumption increases by at least 5%
years for both programs combined. These duration results are consistent with consumer
inattentiveness driving the increase in consumption after enrollment. It seems reasonable
to expect that consumers would gradually become more inattentive to the cost of water
consumption over time.
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B.2 Additional Tables and Figures
Table B.2: Baseline Results: 2003-2017
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ABP 0.0310∗∗∗ 0.0303∗∗∗ 0.0296∗∗∗
(0.0030) (0.0029) (0.0031)
PL 0.0126∗∗∗ 0.0068∗ 0.0044
(0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0041)
Enrolled ABP and PL 0.0058
(0.0061)
Weather Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
f(Act Duration) Yes Yes Yes Yes
HH FE’s Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period FE’s Yes Yes Yes Yes
Within R-squared 0.0109 0.0109 0.0109 0.0109
Households 178,886 178,886 178,886 178,886
Observations 9,620,712 9,620,712 9,620,712 9,620,712
(a) Summer Months
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ABP 0.0353∗∗∗ 0.0348∗∗∗ 0.0331∗∗∗
(0.0035) (0.0034) (0.0036)
PL 0.0115∗∗ 0.0049 -0.0014
(0.0052) (0.0051) (0.0053)
Enrolled ABP and PL 0.0151∗
(0.0081)
Weather Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
f(Act Duration) Yes Yes Yes Yes
HH FE’s Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period FE’s Yes Yes Yes Yes
Within R-squared 0.0147 0.0146 0.0147 0.0147
Households 174,459 174,459 174,459 174,459
Observations 3,990,335 3,990,335 3,990,335 3,990,335
(b) Summer Months
Note: The dependent variable is log of monthly water consumption divided by the number of days
on the bill. The coefficients can be interpreted as the percentage change in consumption. Controls
for all regressions include household FEs, month-by-year FEs, Average Temperature, Precipitation
in Inches, and a cubic function of account enrollment duration. Robust standard errors clustered at
the meter reading route level are reported in parenthesis. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table B.3: Heterogeneity Results: 2003-2017
Appraised Value Yard Size
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Preferred Sample Full Sample Preferred Sample Full Sample
Quintile 1*ABP 0.0112∗∗∗ 0.0104∗∗∗ 0.0052∗∗∗ 0.0060∗∗∗
(0.0032) (0.0020) (0.0018) (0.0014)
Quintile 2*ABP 0.0077∗∗∗ 0.0086∗∗∗ 0.0050∗ 0.0063∗∗∗
(0.0026) (0.0023) (0.0028) (0.0022)
Quintile 3*ABP 0.0098∗∗∗ 0.0093∗∗∗ 0.0115∗∗∗ 0.0109∗∗∗
(0.0027) (0.0025) (0.0021) (0.0018)
Quintile 4*ABP 0.0070∗∗∗ 0.0072∗∗∗ 0.0097∗∗∗ 0.0081∗∗∗
(0.0025) (0.0022) (0.0031) (0.0026)
Quintile 5*ABP 0.0063∗∗ 0.0101∗∗∗ 0.0161∗∗∗ 0.0187∗∗∗
(0.0030) (0.0033) (0.0040) (0.0036)
Quintile 1*PL 0.0078∗∗ 0.0078∗∗ 0.0041 0.0039
(0.0037) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0027)
Quintile 2*PL 0.0013 0.0017 0.0033 0.0042
(0.0033) (0.0026) (0.0032) (0.0029)
Quintile 3*PL -0.0048 -0.0025 0.0046 0.0040
(0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0041) (0.0032)
Quintile 4*PL -0.0024 -0.0006 0.0021 0.0037
(0.0032) (0.0028) (0.0034) (0.0030)
Quintile 5*PL 0.0081∗∗ 0.0051 -0.0047 -0.0036
(0.0035) (0.0038) (0.0057) (0.0042)
Weather Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
f(Act Duration) Yes Yes Yes Yes
HH FE’s Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period FE’s Yes Yes Yes Yes
Within R-squared 0.0067 0.0065 0.0071 0.0068
Households 154,287 178,832 154,295 178,848
Observations 8,512,734 9,619,047 8,513,104 9,619,776
Note: The dependent variable is log of monthly water consumption divided by the number of days on
the bill. The coefficients can be interpreted as the percentage change in consumption. The preferred
sample requires at least 1 year of pre-treatment data. Controls for all regressions include household
FEs, month-by-year FEs, Average Temperature, Precipitation in Inches, and a cubic function of
account enrollment duration. Robust standard errors clustered at the meter reading route level are
reported in parenthesis. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table B.4: Conservation Programs Results: 2003-2017
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Preferred Sample Full Sample Preferred Sample Full Sample
ABP 0.0162∗∗∗ 0.0253∗∗∗
(0.0041) (0.0033)
PL 0.0011 0.0031
(0.0053) (0.0044)
ABP, Conservation 0.0238∗∗∗ 0.0180∗∗∗
(0.0072) (0.0057)
PL, Conservation 0.0140 0.0147∗
(0.0101) (0.0081)
ABP, no PL 0.0158∗∗∗ 0.0267∗∗∗
(0.0045) (0.0039)
PL, no ABP -0.0031 -0.0025
(0.0060) (0.0055)
ABP, Enrolls Both 0.0180∗∗ 0.0249∗∗∗
(0.0089) (0.0058)
PL, Enrolls Both 0.0057 0.0095
(0.0092) (0.0064)
ABP only, Conservation 0.0256∗∗∗ 0.0195∗∗∗
(0.0085) (0.0068)
PL only, Conservation 0.0308∗∗ 0.0334∗∗∗
(0.0136) (0.0123)
Both, Conservation 0.0318∗ 0.0195
(0.0183) (0.0120)
Both, Conservation -0.0121 -0.0031
(0.0186) (0.0120)
Weather Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
f(Act Duration) Yes Yes No No
HH FE’s Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period FE’s Yes Yes Yes Yes
Within R-squared 0.0112 0.0109 0.0111 0.0108
Households 154,328 178,886 154,328 178,886
Observations 8,513,972 9,620,712 8,513,972 9,620,712
Note: The dependent variable is log of monthly water consumption divided by the number of days on
the bill. The coefficients can be interpreted as the percentage change in consumption. The preferred
sample requires at least 1 year of pre-treatment data. Controls for all regressions include household
FEs, month-by-year FEs, Average Temperature, Precipitation in Inches, and a cubic function of
account enrollment duration. Robust standard errors clustered at the meter reading route level are
reported in parenthesis. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Figure B.1: Event Study
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(a) Event Study ABP Enrollment
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(b) Event Study PL Enrollment
Note: This event study plot uses the year of enrollment as the reference year. It demonstrates that the approach used
in this chapter adequately controls for differences in pre-treatment trends and that there is a significant increase in
consumption after enrollment. The sample is limited to accounts with at least 1 year of pre-treatment data. Robust
standard errors are clustered at the meter reading route level.
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Appendix C
Are Normative Appeals Moral
Taxes? Evidence from a Field
Experiment on Water Conservation
C.1 Randomization and Implementation
The randomization used a procedure of quasi-pairwise matching within blocking
groups. This method first defines a set of blocks within which the randomization oc-
curs. The blocking procedure ensures that assignment to a treatment is balanced within
certain groups of interest. Blocks were defined by billing cycles, rate schedule and fre-
quency of recorded meter data (i.e. monthly, daily, or hourly, though all customers only
receive monthly usage totals). Within each block we ordered all observations on average
water consumption in summer 2013 in sets of five households. We randomly assigned each
household to one of five experimental samples that correspond to the five treatments (re-
gardless of the ultimate assignment to treatment group vs. control group). This ensures
a similar distribution of 2013 water consumption within each of the five experimental
samples.
Next, within each of the five experimental samples we repeated the procedure to assign
households to one of three possible timing treatments (single letter in July, single letter
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in August, or two letters repeated in July and August), or the control group. The same
blocking structure was used within each experimental sample and then households were
re-ordered based on summer 2013 water consumption and in sets of 12: two households
are randomly assigned to each of the three timing treatments and six households are
assigned to the control.1
The process for generating and mailing letters was as follows:
• 1-2 days after the most recent month’s consumption data is loaded into the billing
system we pull this information into Stata and using a set of pre-programmed
routines use it to generate the graphics and data for the mail merge.
• A mail merge is performed in Microsoft Word using the generated data and graphics.
• PDF’s of the letters are emailed to Digiprint
• Digiprint prints and ships the the letters within 1-3 days of receiving the electronic
files.
The average time from the data upload to letters shipment was 2 days with a maxi-
mum of 8 days during this study. We had attrition during the study of about 1.5 percent
of the treatment customers; 142 customers dropped out of the study in July and 211
customers dropped in August. This attrition was likely due to customers closing ac-
counts or billing data (meter reading) errors. Furthermore, the mailers did not generate
a very large increase in call center volume; out of the 23,213 customers we attempted
to reach with this pilot we estimate that only 43 contacted the call center. Most of the
customers who called the call center just wanted to ask clarification questions about the
information in their letter; only 26 wanted further assistance beyond what the call center
1Due to the unequal size of the blocking groups, some timing treatments were oversampled, thereby
creating some balance issues. We corrected these by identifying and dropping the oversampled observa-
tions after the conclusion of the field experiment (3,677 households: 2,025 control, 1,652 treatment). All
balance tables and regression results reflect the corrected sample.
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representatives could provide; and only five customers ended being truly upset by the
pilot program.
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C.2 Treatment Figures
Figure C.1: Treatment 2 - Historical water use information
Figure C.2: Treatment 3 - Rate structure information
Figure C.3: Treatment 4 - Social comparison, reported in thousands of gallons
Figure C.4: Treatment 5 - Social comparison, reported as progress towards
TMWA’s 10% conservation goal
Are you doing your part? The graph on 
the right shows your change in water use 
form July 2013 to July 2015 compared to 
similar properties in your neighborhood.  
Your neighbors used 19% less water last 
month compared to 2013. 
 
You saved 23% on your July water bill 
compared to 2013. 
Keep up the good work!  
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C.3 Additional Balance Tests
Table C.1: Balance on Pretreatment Consumption for each Letter
Control Mean Treatment Mean Difference (p-value)
Letter 1 21.69 21.81 -0.11 0.66
Letter 2 21.56 21.69 -0.12 0.63
Letter 3 21.63 21.66 -0.03 0.90
Letter 4 21.62 21.66 -0.04 0.86
Letter 5 21.65 21.70 -0.05 0.84
Note: p-values are based on two-sided t-tests
Table C.2: Balance on Pretreatment Consumption across Letters
Mean 1 Mean 2 Difference (p-value)
Letter 1 vs Letter 2 21.75 21.62 0.13 0.49
Letter 1 vs Letter 3 21.75 21.65 0.10 0.58
Letter 1 vs Letter 4 21.75 21.64 0.11 0.55
Letter 1 vs Letter 5 21.75 21.67 0.08 0.68
Letter 2 vs Letter 3 21.62 21.65 -0.02 0.89
Letter 2 vs Letter 4 21.62 21.64 -0.02 0.93
Letter 2 vs Letter 5 21.62 21.67 -0.05 0.78
Letter 3 vs Letter 4 21.65 21.64 0.01 0.96
Letter 3 vs Letter 5 21.65 21.67 -0.03 0.89
Letter 1 vs Letter 5 21.64 21.67 -0.03 0.85
Note: p-values are based on two-sided t-tests
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Table C.3: Balance within Deciles of Pretreatment Consumption
Control Mean Treatment Mean Difference (p-value)
Decile 1 7.96 7.91 0.05 0.20
Decile 2 11.06 11.06 -0.00 0.97
Decile 3 13.50 13.45 0.04 0.02
Decile 4 15.70 15.68 0.02 0.32
Decile 5 17.95 17.94 0.01 0.59
Decile 6 20.36 20.38 -0.02 0.41
Decile 7 23.25 23.23 0.02 0.38
Decile 8 26.81 26.83 -0.02 0.62
Decile 9 32.39 32.32 0.07 0.27
Decile 10 48.24 48.13 0.11 0.77
Note: p-values are based on two-sided t-tests
Figure C.5: Distributions of Pretreatment Consumption Across Treatment
Status
Note: The lines are kernel density estimates of pre-treatment consumption for all treated households,
all control households, and households within each of the five treatment groups.
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Table C.4: Kolmogorov-Smirnov Tests
D-statistic (p-value)
All Treatment vs Control 0.01 0.88
Letter 1 vs Control 0.01 0.89
Letter 2 vs Control 0.01 0.87
Letter 3 vs Control 0.01 0.86
Letter 4 vs Control 0.01 0.99
Letter 5 vs Control 0.01 0.76
Note: p-values are based on the combined D-statistic
C.4 Survey Information
Table C.5: Summary Statistics for Survey Variables
N Mean Standard Deviation
Lawn Brown 1949 0.08 0.28
Not Enough Water 1949 0.38 0.49
Environment/Community 1949 0.85 0.35
Use How Want 1949 0.26 0.44
Save Money 1949 0.66 0.47
Already Conserved 1949 0.38 0.49
Invest Water Efficiency 1949 0.22 0.41
Behavioral Change 1949 0.88 0.33
Invest Traditional Landscape 1949 0.31 0.46
Already Invested Efficiency 1949 0.50 0.50
Note: All variables are binary indicators.
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Table C.6: Balance on Pretreatment Consumption across Letters within
Survey Sample
Control Mean N Treatment Mean N Difference p-value
Rate (T3) vs.
Social Comparison kgal (T4) 21.26 361 22.36 361 -1.09 0.18
Rate (T3) vs.
Social Comparison % (T5) 21.26 361 21.23 361 0.03 0.97
Social Comparison kgal (T4) vs.
Social Comparison % (T5) 22.36 426 21.23 426 1.13 0.18
Rate (T3) vs.
Social Comparisons (T4 and T5) 21.26 361 21.82 361 -0.56 0.46
Note: Survey Sample, p-value is based on two-sided t-test
Table C.7: Balance on Pretreatment Consumption for Survey Respondents
vs. Non-Respondents
Non-Survey Mean Survey Mean Difference p-value
2013 Water 23.58 22.86 0.72 0.05
2015 Water 17.00 15.48 1.53 0.00
Summer Water 21.71 20.66 1.05 0.00
Winter Water 8.15 7.47 0.68 0.00
Year Built 1,987.68 1,986.20 1.47 0.00
Appraised Value 215.30 200.68 14.62 0.00
Bedrooms 3.37 3.32 0.05 0.02
Lot Acre 0.27 0.24 0.03 0.00
Yard Acre 0.23 0.20 0.03 0.00
Build Sq. Ft. 1,989.19 1,958.02 31.17 0.13
Bathrooms 2.19 2.17 0.02 0.18
Note: Non-survey sample of 41,110, Survey sample of 1,664; p-value is based on two-sided t-test.
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Table C.8: Balance on Pretreatment Consumption for Treatment and Con-
trol within Survey Sample
Control Mean Treatment Mean Difference p-value
2013 Water 24.04 23.57 0.46 0.45
2015 Water 16.42 16.14 0.28 0.54
Summer Water 21.76 21.43 0.33 0.54
Winter Water 8.82 7.66 1.16 0.25
Year Built 1,989.42 1,988.34 1.08 0.19
Appraised Value 225.01 222.67 2.34 0.75
Bedrooms 3.38 3.31 0.07 0.05
Lot Acre 0.28 0.27 0.01 0.44
Yard Acre 0.23 0.23 0.01 0.45
Build Sq. Ft. 2,039.40 2,020.15 19.25 0.56
Bathrooms 2.20 2.20 0.00 0.99
Note: Survey Sample of 954 Controls and 994 Treatments; p-value is based on two-sided t-test.
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C.5 Robustness for Difference from Peer Group
Table C.9: Difference from Peer Group - First Two Months for Single Mailers
Norm in Gallons (T4) Norm in % (T5)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All All All All Low Users High Users
Treat*Below Peer -2.140∗∗∗ -0.294
(0.817) (0.971)
Treat*Above Peer -1.505 -3.151∗∗∗
(1.177) (1.179)
Treat*Q1 Norm -2.770∗∗ 0.907 0.694 1.562
(1.109) (1.490) (1.050) (2.793)
Treat*Q2 Norm -1.801 -0.703 0.520 -2.030
(1.125) (1.134) (1.200) (1.828)
Treat*Q3 Norm -2.174 -2.682∗∗ -1.546 -3.758∗
(1.362) (1.194) (1.138) (1.946)
Treat*Q4 Norm -0.630 -4.715∗∗∗ -3.263 -6.651∗∗
(1.898) (1.804) (2.165) (2.768)
Observations 66,159 66,099 66,157 66,063 31,811 34,036
Note: The dependent variable is normalized average daily water consumption, and the sample is
restricted to the first two months after a mailer for households that only receive one mailer. CATEs
are estimated based on the difference (above/below) of household consumption relative to the peer
group. Column headers All represents the whole sample, and Low/High Users restrict the sample
to households above or below median pre-treatment consumption. All regressions include controls
for temperature, precipitation, bill cycle fixed effects, month fixed effects, and pre-treatment con-
sumption. Robust standard errors clustered at the household level are reported in parenthesis. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table C.10: Difference from Peer Group - First Month After Mailer
Norm in Gallons (T4) Norm in % (T5)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All All All All Low Users High Users
Treat*Below Peer -0.424 -1.248∗
(0.561) (0.710)
Treat*Above Peer -2.299∗∗∗ -2.408∗∗∗
(0.841) (0.761)
Treat*Q1 Norm 0.0149 -1.123 -0.177 -2.106
(0.855) (1.068) (0.704) (2.045)
Treat*Q2 Norm -0.665 -0.978 -0.661 -1.079
(0.712) (0.881) (0.720) (1.488)
Treat*Q3 Norm -1.431∗ -1.672∗∗ -0.902 -2.195∗
(0.861) (0.800) (0.888) (1.241)
Treat*Q4 Norm -3.253∗∗ -3.420∗∗∗ -1.554 -5.406∗∗
(1.446) (1.246) (1.243) (2.186)
Observations 46,603 46,568 46,581 46,525 22,416 23,956
Note: The dependent variable is normalized average daily water consumption, and the sample is re-
stricted to the first month after a mailer. CATEs are estimated based on the difference (above/below)
of household consumption relative to the peer group. Column headers All represents the whole sam-
ple, and Low/High Users restrict the sample to households above or below median pre-treatment
consumption. All regressions include controls for temperature, precipitation, bill cycle fixed effects,
month fixed effects, and pre-treatment consumption. Robust standard errors clustered at the house-
hold level are reported in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
C.6 Effects of the community-wide 10% Goal
As a robustness check we analyze how the treatment effect varies based on whether
households met their personal 10% savings goal. All three treatments (T3-T5) notify the
household whether they met their personal 10% savings goal for the previous month. We
estimate CATEs to based on how far away the household was from their 10% savings goal.
The specification is based on equation 3.2 where the conditioning variables are indicators
for the quartiles of difference between a household and its 10% goal in the month before
treatment. One key distinction between quartiles based on the difference from the peer
group and the difference from the personal goal is the interpretation within each quartile.
The peer group is based on the median consumption or conservation rate so the quartiles
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Table C.11: Conditional Average Treatment Effects: Quartiles of Differ-
ence from the 10% Goal
(1) (2) (3)
Rate (T3) Social Comp. kgal (T4) Social Comp. % (T5)
Treat*Q1 Goal -0.737 -1.984 0.896
(1.260) (1.236) (1.366)
Treat*Q2 Goal -1.689∗ -2.447∗∗∗ -3.456∗∗∗
(0.888) (0.909) (0.975)
Treat*Q3 Goal -4.465∗∗∗ -1.762∗ -3.087∗∗∗
(0.854) (0.978) (0.842)
Treat*Q4 Goal -2.754∗ -4.752∗∗∗ -6.499∗∗∗
(1.425) (1.045) (1.238)
Observations 68,860 68,840 68,834
Note: The dependent variable is normalized average daily water consumption, and the sample
is restricted post treatment data dropping all observations after the second mailer. The CATEs
are based on quartiles of the difference from the 10% goal. All regressions include controls
for temperature, precipitation, bill cycle fixed effects, month fixed effects, and pre-treatment
consumption. Robust standard errors clustered at the household level are reported in parenthesis.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
are centered at zero. However, the median households conserved by more than 10% so
the third quartile in the difference from the goal contains some households than saved
more than 10% and some households that saved less than 10%. We examine the discrete
effect of moving just below the 10% goal with a regression discontinuity below. For
this analysis the conservation rate for households within: Q1 Goal  10%, Q2 Goal >
10%, Q3 Goal ≶ 10%, Q4 Goal < 10%. Similar to the analysis on the difference from
the peer group, we assign control households values for the conditioning variables even
though they did not receive a letter, and we drop all observations following a household’s
second mailer. Whether a household met the goal is balanced across treatment and
control since it is based on pre-treatment consumption.2 Table C.11 shows that there is
heterogeneity based on the 10% goal, but the patterns are different than the CATEs based
on the strength of the social comparison message. For example, in the rate information
2The p-values based on the two-sided t-tests for differences in the July goal and August goals across
treatment status are 0.54 and 0.35 respectively.
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treatment in column (1) three out of the four quartiles are negative and statistically
significant with the largest effects in the third quartile. The pattern most closely mirrors
the CATEs for the difference from the peer group for the social comparison in percentage
terms (3). This is because the difference from the peer group is highly correlated with
the difference from the 10% when the comparison metric is the percentage savings.
C.7 Discrete Effects Moving Above the Peer Group
and 10% Goal
It is important to distinguish the continuous difference from peer group consumption
from the discrete injunctive norm defining appropriate behavior (Schultz et al., 2007).
We consider two separate effects. First, we test whether performing slightly worse than
one’s peers has an effect on consumption, and second we test for the discrete effect of
just barely missing the 10% conservation goal. In our setting the descriptive injunctive
norm is based on whether a household met the 10% goal. Therefore if a household less
than 10% it received the message, “Please do your part to help with the drought.”, while
a household that saved more than 10% was told, “Keep up the good work!”. It is also
possible that the household considered their performance relative to their peer group as
an additional categorical norm. The results in Table 3.5 contain both the effect of the
discrete injunctive norm and the continuous descriptive norm.
To isolate the effect of the injunctive norm, we employ a regression discontinuity (RD)
design (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008; Lee and Lemieux, 2010), analyzing behavior on either
side of the injunctive category similar to Allcott (2011).3 In the RD analysis we restrict
3Allcott (2011) showed little impact of moving into one of the three distinct categories in the Home
Energy Report (“Great”, “Good”, or “Below Average”) in a regression discontinuity design. In that
study a household is assigned the category “Great” if they consume below the 20th percentile of peer
consumption, “Good” if they consume below the average of peer consumption, or “Below Average” if
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Figure C.6: Effect of Moving Above the Peer Group
(a) Norm in kgal (T4) (b) Norm in percentage reduction (T5)
Note: The dependent variable is residual normalized consumption and the units are percentage terms.
The discontinuity is based on the moving above the peer group’s conservation rate.
the sample to households treated with a social comparison (T4 and T5) and examine
the effect of being just above the peer group. The running variable is the difference in
performance between a household and the peer group in gallons for Treatment 4 and
in percentage reduction for Treatment 5. The dependent variable in both is residual
normalized consumption based on a regression of normalized consumption on weather,
month fixed effects, and household fixed effects, following the approach of Allcott (2011).
The RD estimation assumes that factors varying with the difference from the peer group,
such as pre-treatment water and the strength of the descriptive norm, are the same for
households just above and below their peer group. Since some households were above
their peer group but saved more than 10%. Similarly some households were below their
peer and saved less than 10%. We repeat the analysis dropping these households and the
results are very similar.
We begin with graphical evidence of differences in consumption near the peer group
they consume above the average of peer consumption.
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Table C.12: Regression Discontinuity Estimates of the Moving Above the
Peer Group
(1) (2)
Kgal (T4) % (T5)
Conventional 1.326 -0.159
(0.897) (1.037)
Bias-corrected 1.329 -0.212
(0.897) (1.037)
Robust 1.329 -0.212
(1.063) (1.234)
Observations 3,842 2,869
Note: The rows are three separate RD estimators and the appropriate standard errors according to
Calonico, Catteneo and Titiunik (2014). The dependent variable is residual normalized consumption.
The discontinuity in column (1) is based on the moving above the peer group’s consumption (T4),
and in column (2) is based on the moving above the peer group’s year-on-year change in consumption
(4).
(Figure C.6), as is standard in RD approaches.4 For both social comparisons the graph-
ical evidence in Figure C.6 suggests that moving above the peer group does not affect
consumption.
The graphical evidence is corroborated in the RD estimates for moving above the
peer group. We use three different RD estimators developed by Calonico, Catteneo
and Titiunik (2014): the conventional, bias-corrected, and bias corrected with robust
standard errors. In all specifications the impact for moving above the peer group is small
and not statistically significant (Table C.12). The RD estimates show that the effects
in Table 3.5 are driven by the distance from the peer group as opposed to simply being
above or below the peer group. There is either no effect associated with adding a negative
injunctive norm.
We repeat this exercise to see if moving slightly below above the 10% goal influences
consumption. The analysis is the same as reported above except the running variable is
4The graphs are generated with a data-driven approach using spacing estimators to generate the bin
sizes in the plots (Calonico, Catteneo and Titiunik, 2015). The points on the graph are the average
normalized residual consumption within each bin, and the lines are the fitted values of separate third-
order polynomial regressions on either side of the distance threshold (zero).
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Figure C.7: Effect of Moving Above the Peer Group
(a) Rate (T3) (b) Social Comparison kgal (T4)
(c) Social Comparison (T5)
The dependent variable is residual normalized consumption and the units are percentage terms.
The discontinuity is based on the moving above the consumption threshold that constitutes the
household’s 10% goal. Data from all treatments are included.
the year-on-year percentage change in water consumption and the threshold is the -10%.
To be consistent with the analysis in the main text we subtract 10% off the running
variable and such that the threshold is at zero and year-on-year changes of less than 10%
are positive and more than 10% are negative. Figure C.7 graphs residual consumption on
the y-axis with the year-on-year percentage change in water consumption (minus 10%) on
the x-axis. There is no visual evidence of a change in consumption right at the threshold.
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This is corroborated with the RD estimates (Table C.13) for each of the treatments.
Table C.13: Regression Discontinuity Estimates of the Failing to Meet the
10% Goal
(1) (2) (3) (4)
History (T2) Rate (T3) Social kgal (T5) Social % (T5)
Conventional 0.238 -0.308 1.022 -0.047
(1.104) (1.193) (1.253) (1.146)
Bias-corrected 0.338 -0.387 1.262 0.058
(1.104) (1.193) (1.253) (1.146)
Robust 0.338 -0.387 1.262 0.058
(1.312) (1.415) (1.443) (1.338)
Observations 3,472 3,568 3,409 3,269
Note: The rows are three separate RD estimators and the appropriate standard errors according
to Calonico, Catteneo and Titiunik (2014). The dependent variable is residual normalized
consumption. The discontinuity in column (1) is based on moving above the consumption threshold
that constitutes the household’s 10% goal. The columns show the pooled treatment and each of the
individual treatments.
134
Bibliography
Abrevaya, Jason, Yu-Chin Hsu, and Robert Lieli. 2015. “Estimating Conditional
Average Treatment Effects.” Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 33(4): 485–
505.
Allcott, Hunt. 2011. “Social norms and energy conservation.” Journal of Public Eco-
nomics, 95(9-10): 1082–1095.
Allcott, Hunt. 2015. “Site Selection Bias in Program Evaluation.” Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 130(3): 1117–1165.
Allcott, Hunt, and Cass R Sunstein. 2015. “Regulating internalities.” Journal of
Policy Analysis and Management, 34(3): 698–705.
Allcott, Hunt, and Dmitry Taubinsky. 2015. “Evaluating Behaviorally-Motivated
Policy: Experimental Evidence from the Lightbulb Market.” American Economic Re-
view, 1–80.
Allcott, Hunt, and Judd B. Kessler. 2015. “The Welfare Effects of Nudges: A Case
Study of Energy Use Social Comparisons.” NBER Working Paper Series, 21671.
Allcott, Hunt, and Todd Rogers. 2014. “The Short-Run and Long-Run Effects of Be-
havioral Interventions: Experimental Evidence from Energy Conservation.” American
Economic Review, 104(10): 3003–3037.
Allcott, Hunt, Sendhil Mullainathan, and Dmitry Taubinsky. 2014. “Energy
policy with externalities and internalities.” Journal of Public Economics, 112: 72–88.
Attari, Shahzeen Z. 2014. “Perceptions of water use.” Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences, 111(14): 5129–5134.
Ayres, Ian, Sophie Raseman, and Alice Shih. 2013. “Evidence from two large
field experiments that peer comparison feedback can reduce residential energy usage.”
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 29(5): 992–1022.
Becker, Gary S. 1965. “A Theory of the Allocation of Time.” Economic Journal, 493–
517.
135
Bernedo, Maria, Paul J. Ferraro, and Michael K. Price. 2014. “The Persistent
Impacts of Norm-based Messaging and their Implications for Water Conservation.”
Journal of Consumer Policy, 37: 437–452.
Boampong, Richard. 2016. “The Effects of Automatic Bill Payment on Price Sensi-
tivity and Electricity Consumption.” Manuscript.
Bolsen, Toby, Paul J. Ferraro, and Juan Jose Miranda. 2014. “Are Voters More
Likely to Contribute to Other Public Goods? Evidence from a Large-Scale Randomized
Policy Experiment.” American Journal of Political Science, 58(1): 17–30.
Borenstein, Severin. 2009. “To What Electricity Price Do Consumers Respond? Res-
idential Demand Elasticity Under Increasing-Block Pricing.” Manuscript.
Brandon, Alec, Paul Ferraro, John A. List, Robert D. Metcalfe, Michael
Price, and Florian Rundhammer. 2017. “Do the Effects of Social Nudges Persist?
Theory and Evidence from 38 Natural Field Experiments.” NBER Working Paper
Series, 23277.
Brent, Daniel A., Joseph H. Cook, and Skylar Olsen. 2015. “Social Comparisons,
Household Water Use, and Participation in Utility Conservation Programs: Evidence
from Three Randomized Trials.” Journal of the Association of Environmental and
Resource Economists, 2(4): 597–627.
Brent, Daniel, Corey Lott, Michael Taylor, Joseph Cook, Kimberly Rollins,
and Shawn Stoddard. 2016. “Are Normative Appeals Moral Taxes? Evidence from
a Field Experiment on Water Conservation.” Manuscript.
Brown, Jennifer, Tanjim Hossain, and John Morgan. 2010. “Shrouded Attributes
and Information Suppression: Evidence from the Field.” Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 125(2): 859–876.
Busse, Meghan, Jorge Silva-Risso, and Florian Zettelmeyer. 2006. “$1,000 Cash
Back: The Pass-Through of Auto Manufacturer Promotions.” American Economic
Review, 96(4): 1253–1270.
Calonico, Sebastian, Matias D. Catteneo, and Rocio Titiunik. 2014. “Robust
Nonparametric Confidence Intervals for Regression-Discontinuity Designs.” Economet-
rica, 82(6): 2295–2326.
Calonico, Sebastian, Matias D. Catteneo, and Rocio Titiunik. 2015. “Optimal
Data-Driven Regression Discontinuity Plots.” Journal of the American Statistical As-
sociation, 110(512): 1753–1769.
Chetty, Raj, Adam Loney, and Kory Kroft. 2009. “Salience and Taxation: Theory
and Evidence.” American Economic Review, 99(4): 1145–1177.
136
Christman, Laine. 2016. “Presentation on the 2015 Summer Drought Campaign Survey
results.”
Costa, Dora L., and Matthew E. Kahn. 2013. “Energy Conservation Nudges and
Environmentalist Ideology: Evidence From a Randomized Residential Electricity Field
Experiment.” Journal of the European Economic Association, 11(3): 680–702.
Crump, Richard K., V. Joseph Hotz, Guido W. Imbens, and Oscar A. Mit-
nik. 2008. “Nonparametric Tests for Treatment Effect Heterogeneity.” The Review of
Economics and Statistics, 90(3): 389–405.
DellaVigna, Stefano. 2009. “Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the Field.”
Journal of Economic Literature, 47(2): 315–372.
DellaVigna, Stefano, and Joshua M. Pollet. 2009. “Investor Inattention and Friday
Earnings Announcements.” The Journal of Finance, 64(2): 709–749.
Dolan, Paul, and Robert Metcalfe. 2015. “Neighbors, Knowledge, and Nuggets:
Two Natural Field Experiments on the Role of Incentives on Energy Conservation.”
Ferraro, Paul J., and Juan Jose´ Miranda. 2013. “Heterogeneous Treatment Effects
and Mechanisms in Information-Based Environmental Policies: Evidence from a Large-
Scale Field Experiment.” Resource and Energy Economics, 35(3): 356–379.
Ferraro, Paul J., and Michael K. Price. 2013. “Using nonpecuniary strategies to
influence behavior: Evidence from a large-scale field experiment.” Review of Economics
and Statistics, 95(1): 64–73.
Ferraro, Paul J., Juan Jose Miranda, and Michael K. Price. 2011. “The
Persistence of Treatment Effects with Norm-Based Policy Instruments : Evidence
from a Randomized Environmental Policy Experiment.” American Economic Review,
101(3): 318–322.
Finkelstein, Amy. 2009. “E-ztax: Tax Salience and Tax Rates.” The Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 124(3): 969–1010.
Fiserv. 2010. “2010 Billing Household Survey: Consumer Survey of Oﬄine and Online
Billing and Payment Practices.” 255 Fiserv Drive, Brookfield, Wisconsin.
Fiserv. 2016. “Eighth Annual Billing Household Survey: Insights on Consumer Billing
and Payment Speed, Security and Satisfaction.” 255 Fiserv Drive, Brookfield, Wiscon-
sin.
Gaudin, S. 2006. “Effect of price information on residential water demand.” Applied
Economics, 38(4): 383–393.
137
Gneezy, Uri, Stephan Meier, and Pedro Rey-Biel. 2011. “When and Why Incen-
tives (Don’t) Work to Modify Behavior.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 25(4): 191–
210.
Grembi, Veronica, Tommaso Nannicini, and Ugo Troiano. 2012. “Effect of price
information on residential water demand.” IZA Discussion Paper, 6952.
Hossain, Tanjim, and John Morgan. 2006. “...Plus Shipping and Handling: Revenue
(Non) Equivalence in Field Experiments on eBay.” Advances in Economic Analysis and
Policy, 6(2): 1–27.
Imbens, Guido W., and Thomas Lemieux. 2008. “Regression discontinuity designs:
A guide to practice.” Journal of Econometrics, 142(2): 615–635.
Ito, Koichiro. 2013. “How Do Consumers Respond to Nonlinear Pricing? Evidence
from Household Water Demand.” Manuscript.
Ito, Koichiro. 2014. “Do Consumers Respond to Marginal or Average Price? Evidence
from Nonlinear Electricity Pricing.” American Economic Review, 104(2): 537–563.
Ito, Koichiro, Takanori Ida, and Makoto Tanaka. 2015. “The Persistence of Moral
Suasion and Economic Incentives: Field Experimental Evidence from Energy De-
mand.” E2e Project Working Paper Series, 017.
Ito, Koichiro, Takanori Ida, and Makoto Tanaka. Forthcoming. “Moral Suasion
and Economic Incentives: Field Experimental Evidence from Energy Demand.” Amer-
ican Economic Journal: Economic Policy.
Jessoe, Katrina, and David Rapson. 2014. “Knowledge is (Less) Power: Experimen-
tal Evidence from Residential Energy Use.” American Economic Review, 104(4): 1417–
1438.
Kahn, Matthew E., and Frank A Wolak. 2013. “Using Information to Improve the
Effectiveness of Nonlinear Pricing: Evidence from a Field Experiment.”
Lee, David S., and Thomas Lemieux. 2010. “Regression Discontinuity Designs in
Economics.” Journal of Economic Literature, 48(June): 281–355.
Levitt, Steven D., and John A. List. 2007. “What do laboratory experiments mea-
suring social preferences reveal about the real world?” The Journal of Economic Per-
spectives, 21(2): 153–174.
Lott, Corey. 2017. “The Effect of Price Information on Consumer Behavior Under
Nonlinear Tariffs: Evidence from a Water Utility Merger.” Manuscript.
Mastercard. 2006. “Revealing Attitudes on Recurring Payments.” Purchase, New York.
138
McRae, Shaun, and Robyn Meeks. 2016. “Price perception and electricity demand
with nonlinear tariffs.” Manuscript.
Pellerano, Jose´ A, Michael K Price, Steven L Puller, and Gonzalo E Sa´nchez.
2015. “Do Extrinsic Incentives Undermine Social Norms? Evidence from a Field Ex-
periment in Energy Conservation.” Environmental and Resource Economics, 1–16.
Renwick, Mary E., and Richard D. Green. 2000. “Do Residential Water Demand
Side Management Policies Measure Up? An Analysis of Eight California Water Agen-
cies.” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 40: 37–55.
Rosenbaum, Paul R., and Donald B. Rubin. 1983. “The Central Role of the Propen-
sity Score in Observational Studies for Causal Effects.” Biometrika, 70(1): 41–55.
Rubin, Donald B. 1990. “Formal Models of Statistical Inference for Causal Effects.”
Journal of Statistical Planning and Inference, 25: 279–292.
Schultz, P Wesley, Jessica M Nolan, Robert B Cialdini, Noah J Goldstein,
and Vladas Griskevicius. 2007. “The constructive, destructive, and reconstructive
power of social norms.” Psychological Science, 18(5): 429.
Sexton, Steven E. 2015. “Automatic Bill Payment and Salience Effects: Evidence from
Electricity Consumption.” Review of Economics and Statistics, 97(2): 229–241.
Staff, Truckee Meadows Water Authority. 2009. “2010-2030 Water Resource Plan.”
Truckee Meadows Water Authority.
Strong, Aaron, and Chris Goemans. 2014. “Quantity Uncertainty and Demand:
The Case of Water Smart Reader Ownership.” B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis
and Policy, 14(3): 669–694.
Strong, Aaron, and Chris Goemans. 2015. “The Impact of Real-Time Quantity
Information on Residential Water Demand.” Water Resources and Economics, 10: 1–
13.
Visa. 2006. “Visa Payment Panel Study: 2006 Payment Trends Summary.”
Wichman, Casey J. 2014. “Perceived price in residential water demand: Evidence from
a natural experiment.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 1–16.
Wichman, Casey J. 2016. “Information Provision and Consumer Behavior: A Natural
Experiment in Billing Frequency.” Resources for the Future Discussion Paper, DP 15-
35-REV.
Wooldridge, Jeffrey M. 2010. Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data.
. Second ed., Cambridge, Massachusetts:The MIT Press.
139
